Skip to main content
  • Home
  • login
  • Browse the archive

    swh mirror partner logo
swh logo
SoftwareHeritage
Software
Heritage
Mirror
Features
  • Search

  • Downloads

  • Save code now

  • Add forge now

  • Help

Revision 098f27f9ef8be2a418f76896ee3c824e8709fcf7 authored by Matt Caswell on 17 October 2023, 13:55:48 UTC, committed by Tomas Mraz on 19 October 2023, 09:54:44 UTC
Ignore ping deadline when calculating tick deadline if we can't send
If the CC TX allowance is zero then we cannot send a PING frame at the
moment, so do not take into account the ping deadline when calculating the
tick deadline in that case.

This avoids the hang found by the fuzzer mentioned in
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22368#issuecomment-1765131727

Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <hlandau@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22410)
1 parent 56e3032
  • Files
  • Changes
  • 55eafe5
  • /
  • test
  • /
  • asn1_dsa_internal_test.c
Raw File
Cook and download a directory from the Software Heritage Vault

You have requested the cooking of the directory with identifier None into a standard tar.gz archive.

Are you sure you want to continue ?

Download a directory from the Software Heritage Vault

You have requested the download of the directory with identifier None as a standard tar.gz archive.

Are you sure you want to continue ?

Cook and download a revision from the Software Heritage Vault

You have requested the cooking of the history heading to revision with identifier swh:1:rev:098f27f9ef8be2a418f76896ee3c824e8709fcf7 into a bare git archive.

Are you sure you want to continue ?

Download a revision from the Software Heritage Vault

You have requested the download of the history heading to revision with identifier swh:1:rev:098f27f9ef8be2a418f76896ee3c824e8709fcf7 as a bare git archive.

Are you sure you want to continue ?

Invalid Email !

The provided email is not well-formed.

Download link has expired

The requested archive is no longer available for download from the Software Heritage Vault.

Do you want to cook it again ?

Permalinks

To reference or cite the objects present in the Software Heritage archive, permalinks based on SoftWare Hash IDentifiers (SWHIDs) must be used.
Select below a type of object currently browsed in order to display its associated SWHID and permalink.

  • revision
  • content
revision badge
swh:1:rev:098f27f9ef8be2a418f76896ee3c824e8709fcf7
content badge Iframe embedding
swh:1:cnt:9beb382af7628468c27ba8fadae386b176139928
asn1_dsa_internal_test.c
/*
 * Copyright 2019-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
 *
 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
 * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
 */

#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>

#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include "crypto/asn1_dsa.h"
#include "testutil.h"

static unsigned char t_dsa_sig[] = {
    0x30, 0x06,                  /* SEQUENCE tag + length */
    0x02, 0x01, 0x01,            /* INTEGER tag + length + content */
    0x02, 0x01, 0x02             /* INTEGER tag + length + content */
};

static unsigned char t_dsa_sig_extra[] = {
    0x30, 0x06,                  /* SEQUENCE tag + length */
    0x02, 0x01, 0x01,            /* INTEGER tag + length + content */
    0x02, 0x01, 0x02,            /* INTEGER tag + length + content */
    0x05, 0x00                   /* NULL tag + length */
};

static unsigned char t_dsa_sig_msb[] = {
    0x30, 0x08,                  /* SEQUENCE tag + length */
    0x02, 0x02, 0x00, 0x81,      /* INTEGER tag + length + content */
    0x02, 0x02, 0x00, 0x82       /* INTEGER tag + length + content */
};

static unsigned char t_dsa_sig_two[] = {
    0x30, 0x08,                  /* SEQUENCE tag + length */
    0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00,      /* INTEGER tag + length + content */
    0x02, 0x02, 0x02, 0x00       /* INTEGER tag + length + content */
};

/*
 * Badly coded ASN.1 INTEGER zero wrapped in a sequence along with another
 * (valid) INTEGER.
 */
static unsigned char t_invalid_int_zero[] = {
    0x30, 0x05,                  /* SEQUENCE tag + length */
    0x02, 0x00,                  /* INTEGER tag + length */
    0x02, 0x01, 0x2a             /* INTEGER tag + length */
};

/*
 * Badly coded ASN.1 INTEGER (with leading zeros) wrapped in a sequence along
 * with another (valid) INTEGER.
 */
static unsigned char t_invalid_int[] = {
    0x30, 0x07,                  /* SEQUENCE tag + length */
    0x02, 0x02, 0x00, 0x7f,      /* INTEGER tag + length */
    0x02, 0x01, 0x2a             /* INTEGER tag + length */
};

/*
 * Negative ASN.1 INTEGER wrapped in a sequence along with another
 * (valid) INTEGER.
 */
static unsigned char t_neg_int[] = {
    0x30, 0x06,                  /* SEQUENCE tag + length */
    0x02, 0x01, 0xaa,            /* INTEGER tag + length */
    0x02, 0x01, 0x2a             /* INTEGER tag + length */
};

static unsigned char t_trunc_der[] = {
    0x30, 0x08,                  /* SEQUENCE tag + length */
    0x02, 0x02, 0x00, 0x81,      /* INTEGER tag + length */
    0x02, 0x02, 0x00             /* INTEGER tag + length */
};

static unsigned char t_trunc_seq[] = {
    0x30, 0x07,                  /* SEQUENCE tag + length */
    0x02, 0x02, 0x00, 0x81,      /* INTEGER tag + length */
    0x02, 0x02, 0x00, 0x82       /* INTEGER tag + length */
};

static int test_decode(void)
{
    int rv = 0;
    BIGNUM *r;
    BIGNUM *s;
    const unsigned char *pder;

    r = BN_new();
    s = BN_new();

    /* Positive tests */
    pder = t_dsa_sig;
    if (ossl_decode_der_dsa_sig(r, s, &pder, sizeof(t_dsa_sig)) == 0
            || !TEST_ptr_eq(pder, (t_dsa_sig + sizeof(t_dsa_sig)))
            || !TEST_BN_eq_word(r, 1) || !TEST_BN_eq_word(s, 2)) {
        TEST_info("asn1_dsa test_decode: t_dsa_sig failed");
        goto fail;
    }

    BN_clear(r);
    BN_clear(s);
    pder = t_dsa_sig_extra;
    if (ossl_decode_der_dsa_sig(r, s, &pder, sizeof(t_dsa_sig_extra)) == 0
            || !TEST_ptr_eq(pder,
                            (t_dsa_sig_extra + sizeof(t_dsa_sig_extra) - 2))
            || !TEST_BN_eq_word(r, 1) || !TEST_BN_eq_word(s, 2)) {
        TEST_info("asn1_dsa test_decode: t_dsa_sig_extra failed");
        goto fail;
    }

    BN_clear(r);
    BN_clear(s);
    pder = t_dsa_sig_msb;
    if (ossl_decode_der_dsa_sig(r, s, &pder, sizeof(t_dsa_sig_msb)) == 0
            || !TEST_ptr_eq(pder, (t_dsa_sig_msb + sizeof(t_dsa_sig_msb)))
            || !TEST_BN_eq_word(r, 0x81) || !TEST_BN_eq_word(s, 0x82)) {
        TEST_info("asn1_dsa test_decode: t_dsa_sig_msb failed");
        goto fail;
    }

    BN_clear(r);
    BN_clear(s);
    pder = t_dsa_sig_two;
    if (ossl_decode_der_dsa_sig(r, s, &pder, sizeof(t_dsa_sig_two)) == 0
            || !TEST_ptr_eq(pder, (t_dsa_sig_two + sizeof(t_dsa_sig_two)))
            || !TEST_BN_eq_word(r, 0x100) || !TEST_BN_eq_word(s, 0x200)) {
        TEST_info("asn1_dsa test_decode: t_dsa_sig_two failed");
        goto fail;
    }

    /* Negative tests */
    pder = t_invalid_int_zero;
    if (ossl_decode_der_dsa_sig(r, s, &pder, sizeof(t_invalid_int_zero)) != 0) {
        TEST_info("asn1_dsa test_decode: Expected t_invalid_int_zero to fail");
        goto fail;
    }

    BN_clear(r);
    BN_clear(s);
    pder = t_invalid_int;
    if (ossl_decode_der_dsa_sig(r, s, &pder, sizeof(t_invalid_int)) != 0) {
        TEST_info("asn1_dsa test_decode: Expected t_invalid_int to fail");
        goto fail;
    }

    BN_clear(r);
    BN_clear(s);
    pder = t_neg_int;
    if (ossl_decode_der_dsa_sig(r, s, &pder, sizeof(t_neg_int)) != 0) {
        TEST_info("asn1_dsa test_decode: Expected t_neg_int to fail");
        goto fail;
    }

    BN_clear(r);
    BN_clear(s);
    pder = t_trunc_der;
    if (ossl_decode_der_dsa_sig(r, s, &pder, sizeof(t_trunc_der)) != 0) {
        TEST_info("asn1_dsa test_decode: Expected fail t_trunc_der");
        goto fail;
    }

    BN_clear(r);
    BN_clear(s);
    pder = t_trunc_seq;
    if (ossl_decode_der_dsa_sig(r, s, &pder, sizeof(t_trunc_seq)) != 0) {
        TEST_info("asn1_dsa test_decode: Expected fail t_trunc_seq");
        goto fail;
    }

    rv = 1;
fail:
    BN_free(r);
    BN_free(s);
    return rv;
}

int setup_tests(void)
{
    ADD_TEST(test_decode);
    return 1;
}
The diff you're trying to view is too large. Only the first 1000 changed files have been loaded.
Showing with 0 additions and 0 deletions (0 / 0 diffs computed)
swh spinner

Computing file changes ...

ENEA — Copyright (C), ENEA. License: GNU AGPLv3+.
Legal notes  ::  JavaScript license information ::  Web API

back to top