| 32c1301 | Matt Caswell | 22 September 2016, 10:24:53 UTC | Prepare for 1.0.2i release Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 22 September 2016, 10:24:53 UTC |
| 35aede1 | Matt Caswell | 21 September 2016, 20:59:49 UTC | Updates CHANGES and NEWS for new release Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 22 September 2016, 08:22:05 UTC |
| 92c8d6a | Dmitry Belyavsky | 19 September 2016, 15:05:53 UTC | Avoid KCI attack for GOST Russian GOST ciphersuites are vulnerable to the KCI attack because they use long-term keys to establish the connection when ssl client authorization is on. This change brings the GOST implementation into line with the latest specs in order to avoid the attack. It should not break backwards compatibility. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 22 September 2016, 08:22:05 UTC |
| 38f59bd | Matt Caswell | 09 September 2016, 09:53:39 UTC | Fix a mem leak in NPN handling If a server sent multiple NPN extensions in a single ClientHello then a mem leak can occur. This will only happen where the client has requested NPN in the first place. It does not occur during renegotiation. Therefore the maximum that could be leaked in a single connection with a malicious server is 64k (the maximum size of the ServerHello extensions section). As this is client side, only occurs if NPN has been requested and does not occur during renegotiation this is unlikely to be exploitable. Issue reported by Shi Lei. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 22 September 2016, 08:22:05 UTC |
| ea39b16 | Matt Caswell | 09 September 2016, 09:08:45 UTC | Fix OCSP Status Request extension unbounded memory growth A malicious client can send an excessively large OCSP Status Request extension. If that client continually requests renegotiation, sending a large OCSP Status Request extension each time, then there will be unbounded memory growth on the server. This will eventually lead to a Denial Of Service attack through memory exhaustion. Servers with a default configuration are vulnerable even if they do not support OCSP. Builds using the "no-ocsp" build time option are not affected. I have also checked other extensions to see if they suffer from a similar problem but I could not find any other issues. CVE-2016-6304 Issue reported by Shi Lei. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 22 September 2016, 08:22:05 UTC |
| 90d6f35 | Richard Levitte | 22 September 2016, 08:01:38 UTC | mk1mf.pl: check for no-tls1 here as well Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 22 September 2016, 08:16:08 UTC |
| 22646a0 | Matt Caswell | 21 September 2016, 13:48:16 UTC | Don't allow too many consecutive warning alerts Certain warning alerts are ignored if they are received. This can mean that no progress will be made if one peer continually sends those warning alerts. Implement a count so that we abort the connection if we receive too many. Issue reported by Shi Lei. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 21 September 2016, 19:14:16 UTC |
| 006a788 | Dr. Stephen Henson | 21 September 2016, 12:26:01 UTC | Make message buffer slightly larger than message. Grow TLS/DTLS 16 bytes more than strictly necessary as a precaution against OOB reads. In most cases this will have no effect because the message buffer will be large enough already. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 21 September 2016, 18:56:05 UTC |
| bc9563f | Dr. Stephen Henson | 21 September 2016, 11:54:13 UTC | Use SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH instead of 4. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 21 September 2016, 18:56:05 UTC |
| 709ec8b | Dr. Stephen Henson | 21 September 2016, 11:57:01 UTC | Remove unnecessary check. The overflow check will never be triggered because the the n2l3 result is always less than 2^24. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 21 September 2016, 18:56:05 UTC |
| 62841a2 | Rich Salz | 21 September 2016, 14:59:15 UTC | Dcoument -alpn flag Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 776e15f9393a9e3083bec60a8da376ce2fe1e97e) | 21 September 2016, 15:24:59 UTC |
| ceb7342 | Rich Salz | 09 September 2016, 14:52:59 UTC | GH1555: Don't bump size on realloc failure Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 6fcace45bda108ad4d3f95261494dd479720d92c) | 21 September 2016, 14:42:10 UTC |
| 9583e41 | Richard Levitte | 20 September 2016, 16:43:24 UTC | apps/apps.c: include sys/socket.h to declare recv() Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit a19228b7f4fc6fcb49713455b3caedbc24fb0b01) | 21 September 2016, 14:21:08 UTC |
| ff553f8 | Dr. Stephen Henson | 17 September 2016, 11:36:58 UTC | Fix small OOB reads. In ssl3_get_client_certificate, ssl3_get_server_certificate and ssl3_get_certificate_request check we have enough room before reading a length. Thanks to Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.) for reporting these bugs. CVE-2016-6306 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 21 September 2016, 13:10:59 UTC |
| d0cbaa2 | Matt Caswell | 14 September 2016, 12:27:59 UTC | Fix a missing NULL check in dsa_builtin_paramgen We should check the last BN_CTX_get() call to ensure that it isn't NULL before we try and use any of the allocated BIGNUMs. Issue reported by Shi Lei. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 1ff7425d6130380bb00d3e64739633a4b21b11a3) | 21 September 2016, 12:35:11 UTC |
| a5e55f6 | Richard Levitte | 20 September 2016, 19:41:58 UTC | RT4669: dgst can only sign/verify one file Check arg count and print an error message. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 20 September 2016, 19:56:04 UTC |
| 6180c0f | Marcus Meissner | 06 September 2016, 09:01:21 UTC | initialize the RSA struct to 0. This helps with program code linked against static builds accessing a uninitialized ->engine pointer. CLA: none; trivial Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1540) | 20 September 2016, 02:06:35 UTC |
| 32cc4c2 | Dr. Stephen Henson | 15 September 2016, 22:49:41 UTC | update default dependencies Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 15 September 2016, 23:10:00 UTC |
| 502fcc6 | Matt Caswell | 15 September 2016, 19:53:09 UTC | Revert "Abort on unrecognised warning alerts" This reverts commit 15d81749322c3498027105f8ee44e8c25479d475. There were some unexpected side effects to this commit, e.g. in SSLv3 a warning alert gets sent "no_certificate" if a client does not send a Certificate during Client Auth. With the above commit this causes the connection to abort, which is incorrect. There may be some other edge cases like this so we need to have a rethink on this. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> | 15 September 2016, 21:53:27 UTC |
| 15c088e | Richard Levitte | 14 September 2016, 21:37:53 UTC | Finally, make sure vms_term_sock.c is built Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 15 September 2016, 21:23:06 UTC |
| d6d04b6 | Richard Levitte | 15 September 2016, 07:45:57 UTC | Refactor to avoid unnecessary preprocessor logic Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 15 September 2016, 21:23:06 UTC |
| b508267 | Richard Levitte | 14 September 2016, 18:54:30 UTC | Reformat to fit OpenSSL source code standards Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 15 September 2016, 21:23:06 UTC |
| a2d2120 | Richard Levitte | 14 September 2016, 18:53:06 UTC | Remove entirely unnecessary pointer size guards Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 15 September 2016, 21:23:06 UTC |
| 4585254 | Richard Levitte | 14 September 2016, 18:52:03 UTC | Add copyright and license on apps/vms_term_sock.[ch] Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 15 September 2016, 21:23:06 UTC |
| 1015609 | Richard Levitte | 03 August 2016, 19:16:43 UTC | VSI submission: redirect terminal input through socket This is needed, because on VMS, select() can only be used on sockets. being able to use select() on all kinds of file descriptors is unique to Unix. So, the solution for VMS is to create a layer that translates input from standard input to socket communication. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 15 September 2016, 21:23:06 UTC |
| d692475 | Dr. Stephen Henson | 14 September 2016, 22:42:55 UTC | Fix memory leak on realloc error. Backport leak fix from master branch. Thanks to Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.) for reporting this bug. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 15 September 2016, 11:49:00 UTC |
| ea060e0 | Dr. Stephen Henson | 14 September 2016, 22:54:12 UTC | Fix memory leak on error. Thanks to Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.) for reporting this bug. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 15 September 2016, 11:49:00 UTC |
| b05f231 | Richard Levitte | 06 September 2016, 15:39:35 UTC | VMS: only use _realloc32 with /POINTER_SIZE=32 This fixes the following error when building with no particular pointer size is specified (implied 32 bit): static void *(*realloc_func) (void *, size_t) = realloc; ................................................^ %CC-E-UNDECLARED, In the initializer for realloc_func, "_realloc32" is not declared. at line number 93 in file DEV:[OPENSSL102.crypto]mem.c;1 Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> | 15 September 2016, 08:33:42 UTC |
| 68f11e8 | Matt Caswell | 08 September 2016, 13:32:27 UTC | Add some sanity checks around usage of t_fromb64() The internal SRP function t_fromb64() converts from base64 to binary. It does not validate that the size of the destination is sufficiently large - that is up to the callers. In some places there was such a check, but not in others. Add an argument to t_fromb64() to provide the size of the destination buffer and validate that we don't write too much data. Also add some sanity checks to the callers where appropriate. With thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this issue. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 73f0df8331910d6726d45ecaab12bd93cc48b4e2) | 14 September 2016, 09:17:46 UTC |
| 15d8174 | Matt Caswell | 12 September 2016, 10:04:51 UTC | Abort on unrecognised warning alerts A peer continually sending unrecognised warning alerts could mean that we make no progress on a connection. We should abort rather than continuing if we receive an unrecognised warning alert. Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this issue. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 13 September 2016, 11:00:07 UTC |
| 204fb53 | Richard Levitte | 12 September 2016, 14:29:39 UTC | Add enginesdir to libcrypto.pc pkg-config file Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 12 September 2016, 14:29:39 UTC |
| 5ecb546 | Dr. Stephen Henson | 08 September 2016, 14:10:32 UTC | Fix memory leak on error. Backport leak fix from master branch. Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this bug. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 11 September 2016, 22:52:34 UTC |
| 373a561 | Rich Salz | 09 September 2016, 16:17:47 UTC | Make update Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> | 09 September 2016, 21:26:26 UTC |
| 20d402a | Richard Levitte | 08 September 2016, 21:39:26 UTC | If errno is ENXIO in BSS_new_file(), set BIO_R_NO_SUCH_FILE VMS sets that errno when the device part of a file spec is malformed or a logical name that doesn't exist. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit e82e2186e93e9a678dd8c0c5ba084d21d27d4d62) | 08 September 2016, 22:11:55 UTC |
| 8195a86 | David Woodhouse | 07 September 2016, 15:53:18 UTC | Avoid EVP_PKEY_cmp() crash on EC keys without public component Some hardware devices don't provide the public EC_POINT data. The only way for X509_check_private_key() to validate that the key matches a given certificate is to actually perform a sign operation and then verify it using the public key in the certificate. Maybe that can come later, as discussed in issue 1532. But for now let's at least make it fail gracefully and not crash. GH: 1532 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1547) (cherry picked from commit 92ed7fa575a80955f3bb6efefca9bf576a953586) | 07 September 2016, 17:56:43 UTC |
| 3f10149 | Rich Salz | 05 September 2016, 22:08:43 UTC | Misc BN fixes Never output -0; make "negative zero" an impossibility. Do better checking on BN_rand top/bottom requirements and #bits. Update doc. Ignoring trailing garbage in BN_asc2bn. Port this commit from boringSSL: https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/899b9b19a4cd3fe526aaf5047ab9234cdca19f7d%5E!/ Ensure |BN_div| never gives negative zero in the no_branch code. Have |bn_correct_top| fix |bn->neg| if the input is zero so that we don't have negative zeros lying around. Thanks to Brian Smith for noticing. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 01c09f9fde5793e0b3712d602b02e2aed4908e8d) (Some manual work required) | 06 September 2016, 15:09:50 UTC |
| 2a20b6d | Andy Polyakov | 27 August 2016, 18:47:57 UTC | crypto/bn/*: x86[_64] division instruction doesn't handle constants, change constraint from 'g' to 'r'. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 68b4a6e91f5acd42489bb9d1c580acc5ae457cad) | 31 August 2016, 14:46:11 UTC |
| 7c59fbf | Matt Caswell | 30 August 2016, 14:06:01 UTC | Ensure the CertStatus message adds a DTLS message header where needed The function tls_construct_cert_status() is called by both TLS and DTLS code. However it only ever constructed a TLS message header for the message which obviously failed in DTLS. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 30 August 2016, 14:06:01 UTC |
| 7fb82d0 | Matt Caswell | 26 August 2016, 14:14:24 UTC | SRP_create_verifier does not check for NULL before OPENSSL_cleanse OPENSSL_cleanse() does not validate its input parameter for NULL so SRP_create_verifier() should do so instead. Otherwise a segfault will result. Alternative solution to GitHub PR#1006 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 26 August 2016, 19:40:37 UTC |
| 06a549c | Richard Levitte | 26 August 2016, 07:59:55 UTC | Improve the definition of STITCHED_CALL in e_rc4_hmac_md5.c The definition of STITCHED_CALL relies on OPENSSL_NO_ASM. However, when a configuration simply lacks the assembler implementation for RC4 (which is where we have implemented the stitched call), OPENSSL_NO_ASM isn't implemented. Better, then, to rely on specific macros that indicated that RC4 (and MD5) are implemented in assembler. For this to work properly, we must also make sure Configure adds the definition of RC4_ASM among the C flags. (partly cherry picked from commit 216e8d91033d237880cff7da0d02d46d47bae41b) Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> | 26 August 2016, 19:19:18 UTC |
| a404656 | FdaSilvaYY | 04 April 2016, 22:33:41 UTC | Fix a few leaks in X509_REQ_to_X509. Fix a possible leak on NETSCAPE_SPKI_verify failure. Backport of 0517538d1a39bc Backport of f6c006ea76304a Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 26 August 2016, 13:43:31 UTC |
| 50c3015 | David Woodhouse | 03 August 2016, 17:25:07 UTC | Add basic test for Cisco DTLS1_BAD_VER and record replay handling (Modified for 1.0.2 by adding selected PACKET_xx() functions and PRF, and subsequent cleanup from commit eb633d03fe2db3666840dee8d0a2dbe491672dfc) Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 40425899200a3dea9ec3684d3eb80bcf50c99baf) | 26 August 2016, 12:44:11 UTC |
| ba30f1a | David Woodhouse | 02 August 2016, 21:54:46 UTC | Fix ubsan 'left shift of negative value -1' error in satsub64be() Baroque, almost uncommented code triggers behaviour which is undefined by the C standard. You might quite reasonably not care that the code was broken on ones-complement machines, but if we support a ubsan build then we need to at least pretend to care. It looks like the special-case code for 64-bit big-endian is going to behave differently (and wrongly) on wrap-around, because it treats the values as signed. That seems wrong, and allows replay and other attacks. Surely you need to renegotiate and start a new epoch rather than wrapping around to sequence number zero again? Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 2e94723c1b5d8ab974645e83de90b248265af3cd) | 26 August 2016, 12:44:11 UTC |
| df426c0 | David Woodhouse | 08 July 2016, 19:46:07 UTC | Fix SSL_export_keying_material() for DTLS1_BAD_VER Commit d8e8590e ("Fix missing return value checks in SCTP") made the DTLS handshake fail, even for non-SCTP connections, if SSL_export_keying_material() fails. Which it does, for DTLS1_BAD_VER. Apply the trivial fix to make it succeed, since there's no real reason why it shouldn't even though we never need it. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit c8a18468caef4d62778381be0acdadc8a88d6e51) | 26 August 2016, 12:44:11 UTC |
| 847fe92 | Matt Caswell | 26 August 2016, 12:11:17 UTC | Fix the no-tls1 option This also fixes no-tls which is an alias for no-tls1 in 1.0.2 (it is not possible to do no-tls1_1 or no-tls1_2 in 1.0.2). Because it is not possible to disable TLS1.1 or TLS1.2 it no longer follows that disabling TLS1.0 should force the disabling of tlsext. Also a few missing ifdef guards. GitHub Iusse#935 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 26 August 2016, 12:38:50 UTC |
| 3953bf5 | Andy Polyakov | 24 August 2016, 15:13:09 UTC | ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl: /cmovb/cmovc/ as nasm doesn't recognize cmovb. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit d3034d31e7c04b334dd245504dd4f56e513ca115) | 26 August 2016, 09:53:03 UTC |
| 09f0535 | Andy Polyakov | 19 August 2016, 21:16:04 UTC | ec/ecp_nistz256: harmonize is_infinity with ec_GFp_simple_is_at_infinity. RT#4625 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit e3057a57caf4274ea1fb074518e4714059dfcabf) | 26 August 2016, 09:51:52 UTC |
| e76cf5c | Andy Polyakov | 20 August 2016, 20:04:21 UTC | ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl: addition to perform stricter reduction. Addition was not preserving inputs' property of being fully reduced. Thanks to Brian Smith for reporting this. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit b62b2454fadfccaf5e055a1810d72174c2633b8f) | 26 August 2016, 09:51:25 UTC |
| 1f61e8f | Todd Short | 26 May 2016, 17:49:36 UTC | Always use session_ctx when removing a session Sessions are stored on the session_ctx, which doesn't change after SSL_set_SSL_CTX(). Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 26 August 2016, 09:19:56 UTC |
| 1027ad4 | Dr. Stephen Henson | 19 August 2016, 22:28:29 UTC | Avoid overflow in MDC2_Update() Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this issue. CVE-2016-6303 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 55d83bf7c10c7b205fffa23fa7c3977491e56c07) | 24 August 2016, 13:17:53 UTC |
| 0fff506 | Rich Salz | 18 August 2016, 13:26:52 UTC | SWEET32 (CVE-2016-2183): Move DES from HIGH to MEDIUM Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 12:55:50 UTC |
| 0ec0104 | Matt Caswell | 24 August 2016, 08:23:14 UTC | Fix no-ec Use a ciphersuite in dtlstest that is not affected by no-* options. Backport of commit fe34735c19. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 08:23:14 UTC |
| baaabfd | Dr. Stephen Henson | 23 August 2016, 17:14:54 UTC | Sanity check ticket length. If a ticket callback changes the HMAC digest to SHA512 the existing sanity checks are not sufficient and an attacker could perform a DoS attack with a malformed ticket. Add additional checks based on HMAC size. Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this bug. CVE-2016-6302 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 23 August 2016, 22:18:51 UTC |
| 3cb28d1 | Richard Levitte | 19 August 2016, 14:53:54 UTC | mk1mf: dtlstest needs ssltestlib, include it with a hack We don't really have a mechanism to include other object files into a given test program. For now, a simple hack in mk1mf.pl will do. RT#4653 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 22 August 2016, 22:09:40 UTC |
| 01f879d | David Benjamin | 20 August 2016, 17:55:17 UTC | Don't check for malloc failure twice. a03f81f4ead24c234dc26e388d86a352685f3948 added a malloc failure check to EVP_PKEY_keygen, but there already was one. Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1473 | 22 August 2016, 19:20:31 UTC |
| 67e11f1 | Kazuki Yamaguchi | 21 August 2016, 17:36:36 UTC | Fix overflow check in BN_bn2dec() Fix an off by one error in the overflow check added by 07bed46f332fc ("Check for errors in BN_bn2dec()"). Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 099e2968ed3c7d256cda048995626664082b1b30) | 22 August 2016, 16:07:34 UTC |
| 561530d | Rich Salz | 22 August 2016, 15:25:12 UTC | RT2676: Reject RSA eponent if even or 1 Also, re-organize RSA check to use goto err. Try all checks, not just stopping at first (via Richard Levitte) Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 464d59a5bb5811f7671e2bd37f41d610606b829d) | 22 August 2016, 15:52:17 UTC |
| 51690fb | Richard Levitte | 22 August 2016, 08:17:27 UTC | VMS: Use strict refdef extern model when building library object files Most of the time, this isn't strictly needed. However, in the default extern model (called relaxed refdef), symbols are treated as weak common objects unless they are initialised. The librarian doesn't include weak symbols in the (static) libraries, which renders them invisible when linking a program with said those libraries, which is a problem at times. Using the strict refdef model is much more like standard C on all other platforms, and thereby avoid the issues that come with the relaxed refdef model. Note: this doesn't apply to VAX C. It's possible that this will make OpenSSL building with VAX C difficult some time in the future if it isn't already. However, VAX C is a very old compiler that we don't expect to see too often, as DEC C (a.k.a VMS C) should have replaced it a long time ago. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 22 August 2016, 13:50:28 UTC |
| 93c616d | Richard Levitte | 22 August 2016, 11:35:27 UTC | GOST: rearrange code so it's more like C rather than C++ Some builds fail otherwise. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 22 August 2016, 13:48:35 UTC |
| fd7ca74 | Richard Levitte | 22 August 2016, 13:22:17 UTC | Make 'openssl req -x509' more equivalent to 'openssl req -new' The following would fail, or rather, freeze: openssl genrsa -out rsa2048.pem 2048 openssl req -x509 -key rsa2048.pem -keyform PEM -out cert.pem In that case, the second command wants to read a certificate request from stdin, because -x509 wasn't fully flagged as being for creating something new. This changes makes it fully flagged. RT#4655 Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> | 22 August 2016, 13:47:49 UTC |
| 9c8bca1 | Andy Polyakov | 16 March 2016, 22:33:53 UTC | bn/asm/x86[_64]-mont*.pl: implement slightly alternative page-walking. Original strategy for page-walking was adjust stack pointer and then touch pages in order. This kind of asks for double-fault, because if touch fails, then signal will be delivered to frame above adjusted stack pointer. But touching pages prior adjusting stack pointer would upset valgrind. As compromise let's adjust stack pointer in pages, touching top of the stack. This still asks for double-fault, but at least prevents corruption of neighbour stack if allocation is to overstep the guard page. Also omit predict-non-taken hints as they reportedly trigger illegal instructions in some VM setups. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 3ba1ef829cf3dd36eaa5e819258d90291c6a1027) | 22 August 2016, 13:08:36 UTC |
| 91dc605 | Richard Levitte | 22 August 2016, 12:02:31 UTC | ssltestlib: Tell compiler we don't care about the value when we don't In mempacket_test_read(), we've already fetched the top value of the stack, so when we shift the stack, we don't care for the value. The compiler needs to be told, or it will complain harshly when we tell it to be picky. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 1c288878af42650fbda911b702ae7b551a545b1c) | 22 August 2016, 12:16:27 UTC |
| 2020068 | Matt Caswell | 30 June 2016, 14:06:27 UTC | Prevent DTLS Finished message injection Follow on from CVE-2016-2179 The investigation and analysis of CVE-2016-2179 highlighted a related flaw. This commit fixes a security "near miss" in the buffered message handling code. Ultimately this is not currently believed to be exploitable due to the reasons outlined below, and therefore there is no CVE for this on its own. The issue this commit fixes is a MITM attack where the attacker can inject a Finished message into the handshake. In the description below it is assumed that the attacker injects the Finished message for the server to receive it. The attack could work equally well the other way around (i.e where the client receives the injected Finished message). The MITM requires the following capabilities: - The ability to manipulate the MTU that the client selects such that it is small enough for the client to fragment Finished messages. - The ability to selectively drop and modify records sent from the client - The ability to inject its own records and send them to the server The MITM forces the client to select a small MTU such that the client will fragment the Finished message. Ideally for the attacker the first fragment will contain all but the last byte of the Finished message, with the second fragment containing the final byte. During the handshake and prior to the client sending the CCS the MITM injects a plaintext Finished message fragment to the server containing all but the final byte of the Finished message. The message sequence number should be the one expected to be used for the real Finished message. OpenSSL will recognise that the received fragment is for the future and will buffer it for later use. After the client sends the CCS it then sends its own Finished message in two fragments. The MITM causes the first of these fragments to be dropped. The OpenSSL server will then receive the second of the fragments and reassemble the complete Finished message consisting of the MITM fragment and the final byte from the real client. The advantage to the attacker in injecting a Finished message is that this provides the capability to modify other handshake messages (e.g. the ClientHello) undetected. A difficulty for the attacker is knowing in advance what impact any of those changes might have on the final byte of the handshake hash that is going to be sent in the "real" Finished message. In the worst case for the attacker this means that only 1 in 256 of such injection attempts will succeed. It may be possible in some situations for the attacker to improve this such that all attempts succeed. For example if the handshake includes client authentication then the final message flight sent by the client will include a Certificate. Certificates are ASN.1 objects where the signed portion is DER encoded. The non-signed portion could be BER encoded and so the attacker could re-encode the certificate such that the hash for the whole handshake comes to a different value. The certificate re-encoding would not be detectable because only the non-signed portion is changed. As this is the final flight of messages sent from the client the attacker knows what the complete hanshake hash value will be that the client will send - and therefore knows what the final byte will be. Through a process of trial and error the attacker can re-encode the certificate until the modified handhshake also has a hash with the same final byte. This means that when the Finished message is verified by the server it will be correct in all cases. In practice the MITM would need to be able to perform the same attack against both the client and the server. If the attack is only performed against the server (say) then the server will not detect the modified handshake, but the client will and will abort the connection. Fortunately, although OpenSSL is vulnerable to Finished message injection, it is not vulnerable if *both* client and server are OpenSSL. The reason is that OpenSSL has a hard "floor" for a minimum MTU size that it will never go below. This minimum means that a Finished message will never be sent in a fragmented form and therefore the MITM does not have one of its pre-requisites. Therefore this could only be exploited if using OpenSSL and some other DTLS peer that had its own and separate Finished message injection flaw. The fix is to ensure buffered messages are cleared on epoch change. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 22 August 2016, 09:59:41 UTC |
| 26f2c57 | Matt Caswell | 30 June 2016, 12:17:08 UTC | Fix DTLS buffered message DoS attack DTLS can handle out of order record delivery. Additionally since handshake messages can be bigger than will fit into a single packet, the messages can be fragmented across multiple records (as with normal TLS). That means that the messages can arrive mixed up, and we have to reassemble them. We keep a queue of buffered messages that are "from the future", i.e. messages we're not ready to deal with yet but have arrived early. The messages held there may not be full yet - they could be one or more fragments that are still in the process of being reassembled. The code assumes that we will eventually complete the reassembly and when that occurs the complete message is removed from the queue at the point that we need to use it. However, DTLS is also tolerant of packet loss. To get around that DTLS messages can be retransmitted. If we receive a full (non-fragmented) message from the peer after previously having received a fragment of that message, then we ignore the message in the queue and just use the non-fragmented version. At that point the queued message will never get removed. Additionally the peer could send "future" messages that we never get to in order to complete the handshake. Each message has a sequence number (starting from 0). We will accept a message fragment for the current message sequence number, or for any sequence up to 10 into the future. However if the Finished message has a sequence number of 2, anything greater than that in the queue is just left there. So, in those two ways we can end up with "orphaned" data in the queue that will never get removed - except when the connection is closed. At that point all the queues are flushed. An attacker could seek to exploit this by filling up the queues with lots of large messages that are never going to be used in order to attempt a DoS by memory exhaustion. I will assume that we are only concerned with servers here. It does not seem reasonable to be concerned about a memory exhaustion attack on a client. They are unlikely to process enough connections for this to be an issue. A "long" handshake with many messages might be 5 messages long (in the incoming direction), e.g. ClientHello, Certificate, ClientKeyExchange, CertificateVerify, Finished. So this would be message sequence numbers 0 to 4. Additionally we can buffer up to 10 messages in the future. Therefore the maximum number of messages that an attacker could send that could get orphaned would typically be 15. The maximum size that a DTLS message is allowed to be is defined by max_cert_list, which by default is 100k. Therefore the maximum amount of "orphaned" memory per connection is 1500k. Message sequence numbers get reset after the Finished message, so renegotiation will not extend the maximum number of messages that can be orphaned per connection. As noted above, the queues do get cleared when the connection is closed. Therefore in order to mount an effective attack, an attacker would have to open many simultaneous connections. Issue reported by Quan Luo. CVE-2016-2179 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 22 August 2016, 09:59:41 UTC |
| 0ee4f13 | Matt Caswell | 22 August 2016, 08:09:06 UTC | Silence some "maybe used uninitialised" warnings Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 22 August 2016, 08:25:12 UTC |
| eca5174 | Andy Polyakov | 18 August 2016, 11:38:42 UTC | ec/ecp_nistz256.c: get is_one on 32-bit platforms right. Thanks to Brian Smith for reporting this. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 21 August 2016, 20:18:18 UTC |
| bc89456 | Rich Salz | 21 August 2016, 17:23:45 UTC | Fix pointer/alloc prob from previous commit Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 21 August 2016, 17:39:11 UTC |
| 71da19b | Rich Salz | 21 August 2016, 16:50:05 UTC | Fix incorrect return argument. Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> | 21 August 2016, 16:50:59 UTC |
| 061d6c2 | Kurt Roeckx | 06 August 2016, 17:16:00 UTC | Fix off by 1 in ASN1_STRING_set() Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> MR: #3176 (cherry picked from commit a73be798ced572a988d455d961a2387f6eccb549) | 20 August 2016, 17:01:47 UTC |
| ff5537c | Rich Salz | 13 August 2016, 14:47:50 UTC | RT3940: For now, just document the issue. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 2a9afa4046592d44af84644cd89fe1a0d6d46889) | 19 August 2016, 15:45:45 UTC |
| a03f81f | Rich Salz | 19 August 2016, 14:31:03 UTC | Fix NULL-return checks in 1.0.2 RT4386: Add sanity checks for BN_new() RT4384: Missing Sanity Checks for RSA_new_method() RT4384: Missing Sanity Check plus potential NULL pointer deref RT4382: Missing Sanity Check(s) for BUF_strdup() RT4380: Missing Sanity Checks for EVP_PKEY_new() RT4377: Prevent potential NULL pointer dereference RT4375: Missing sanity checks for OPENSSL_malloc() RT4374: Potential for NULL pointer dereferences RT4371: Missing Sanity Check for malloc() RT4370: Potential for NULL pointer dereferences Also expand tabs, make update, typo fix (rsalz) Minor tweak by Paul Dale. Some minor internal review feedback. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 19 August 2016, 14:44:32 UTC |
| 66e7083 | Richard Levitte | 19 August 2016, 13:19:00 UTC | Have dtlstest run on VMS as well Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 19 August 2016, 13:19:00 UTC |
| 26aebca | Matt Caswell | 17 August 2016, 16:55:36 UTC | Update function error code A function error code needed updating due to merge issues. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 19 August 2016, 12:50:27 UTC |
| 3884b47 | Matt Caswell | 05 July 2016, 11:04:37 UTC | Fix DTLS replay protection The DTLS implementation provides some protection against replay attacks in accordance with RFC6347 section 4.1.2.6. A sliding "window" of valid record sequence numbers is maintained with the "right" hand edge of the window set to the highest sequence number we have received so far. Records that arrive that are off the "left" hand edge of the window are rejected. Records within the window are checked against a list of records received so far. If we already received it then we also reject the new record. If we have not already received the record, or the sequence number is off the right hand edge of the window then we verify the MAC of the record. If MAC verification fails then we discard the record. Otherwise we mark the record as received. If the sequence number was off the right hand edge of the window, then we slide the window along so that the right hand edge is in line with the newly received sequence number. Records may arrive for future epochs, i.e. a record from after a CCS being sent, can arrive before the CCS does if the packets get re-ordered. As we have not yet received the CCS we are not yet in a position to decrypt or validate the MAC of those records. OpenSSL places those records on an unprocessed records queue. It additionally updates the window immediately, even though we have not yet verified the MAC. This will only occur if currently in a handshake/renegotiation. This could be exploited by an attacker by sending a record for the next epoch (which does not have to decrypt or have a valid MAC), with a very large sequence number. This means the right hand edge of the window is moved very far to the right, and all subsequent legitimate packets are dropped causing a denial of service. A similar effect can be achieved during the initial handshake. In this case there is no MAC key negotiated yet. Therefore an attacker can send a message for the current epoch with a very large sequence number. The code will process the record as normal. If the hanshake message sequence number (as opposed to the record sequence number that we have been talking about so far) is in the future then the injected message is bufferred to be handled later, but the window is still updated. Therefore all subsequent legitimate handshake records are dropped. This aspect is not considered a security issue because there are many ways for an attacker to disrupt the initial handshake and prevent it from completing successfully (e.g. injection of a handshake message will cause the Finished MAC to fail and the handshake to be aborted). This issue comes about as a result of trying to do replay protection, but having no integrity mechanism in place yet. Does it even make sense to have replay protection in epoch 0? That issue isn't addressed here though. This addressed an OCAP Audit issue. CVE-2016-2181 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 19 August 2016, 12:50:27 UTC |
| 30ea36e | Matt Caswell | 05 July 2016, 10:52:43 UTC | Add DTLS replay protection test Injects a record from epoch 1 during epoch 0 handshake, with a record sequence number in the future, to test that the record replay protection feature works as expected. This is described more fully in the next commit. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 19 August 2016, 12:50:27 UTC |
| 20744f6 | Matt Caswell | 05 July 2016, 10:46:26 UTC | Fix DTLS unprocessed records bug During a DTLS handshake we may get records destined for the next epoch arrive before we have processed the CCS. In that case we can't decrypt or verify the record yet, so we buffer it for later use. When we do receive the CCS we work through the queue of unprocessed records and process them. Unfortunately the act of processing wipes out any existing packet data that we were still working through. This includes any records from the new epoch that were in the same packet as the CCS. We should only process the buffered records if we've not got any data left. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 19 August 2016, 12:50:27 UTC |
| bc4d7e1 | Matt Caswell | 05 July 2016, 10:37:40 UTC | Add a DTLS unprocesed records test Add a test to inject a record from the next epoch during the handshake and make sure it doesn't get processed immediately. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 19 August 2016, 12:50:27 UTC |
| 48e8df6 | Matt Caswell | 05 July 2016, 10:36:10 UTC | Back port ssltestlib code to 1.0.2 Enables the testing of DTLS code in 1.0.2 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 19 August 2016, 12:50:27 UTC |
| 7b415b0 | Richard Levitte | 03 August 2016, 19:45:06 UTC | VSI submission: RAND fixups - make the VMS version of RAND_poll() faster and more secure - avoid pointer size warnings with setvbuf() Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 19 August 2016, 12:41:07 UTC |
| 23ffde2 | Richard Levitte | 03 August 2016, 19:33:31 UTC | VSI submission: make better use of item lists in o_time.c Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 19 August 2016, 12:41:07 UTC |
| 556c4b5 | Richard Levitte | 03 August 2016, 19:22:34 UTC | VSI submission: avoid pointer size warnings in mem.c Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 19 August 2016, 12:41:07 UTC |
| c78a34f | Richard Levitte | 03 August 2016, 19:18:55 UTC | evp_test.c: avoid warning from having a pointer difference returned as int Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 19 August 2016, 12:41:07 UTC |
| 8a2ce3a | Richard Levitte | 18 August 2016, 13:42:42 UTC | VMS: synchronise tests with Unix Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 18 August 2016, 15:17:12 UTC |
| a1be17a | Richard Levitte | 16 August 2016, 12:14:33 UTC | make update to have PEM_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG defined Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 16 August 2016, 12:14:33 UTC |
| b552f32 | Dr. Stephen Henson | 15 August 2016, 15:52:21 UTC | Limit reads in do_b2i_bio() Apply a limit to the maximum blob length which can be read in do_d2i_bio() to avoid excessive allocation. Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 66bcba145740e4f1210499ba6e5033035a2a4647) | 15 August 2016, 23:28:16 UTC |
| e36f27d | Dr. Stephen Henson | 05 August 2016, 13:26:03 UTC | Check for errors in BN_bn2dec() If an oversize BIGNUM is presented to BN_bn2dec() it can cause BN_div_word() to fail and not reduce the value of 't' resulting in OOB writes to the bn_data buffer and eventually crashing. Fix by checking return value of BN_div_word() and checking writes don't overflow buffer. Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this bug. CVE-2016-2182 Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 07bed46f332fce8c1d157689a2cdf915a982ae34) Conflicts: crypto/bn/bn_print.c | 15 August 2016, 23:21:54 UTC |
| d871284 | Dr. Stephen Henson | 05 August 2016, 13:33:03 UTC | Check for errors in a2d_ASN1_OBJECT() Check for error return in BN_div_word(). Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 8b9afbc0fc7f8be0049d389d34d9416fa377e2aa) | 15 August 2016, 23:20:34 UTC |
| 657566e | Andy Polyakov | 31 July 2016, 19:19:57 UTC | sha/asm/sha1-x86_64.pl: fix crash in SHAEXT code on Windows. RT#4530 Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 7123aa81e9fb19afb11fdf3850662c5f7ff1f19c) | 11 August 2016, 11:41:01 UTC |
| 13bacff | Dr. Stephen Henson | 05 August 2016, 16:59:32 UTC | Sanity check input length in OPENSSL_uni2asc(). Thanks to Hanno Böck for reporting this bug. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 39a43280316f1b9c45be5ac5b04f4f5c3f923686) Conflicts: crypto/pkcs12/p12_utl.c | 05 August 2016, 18:00:34 UTC |
| e1be1dc | Dr. Stephen Henson | 05 August 2016, 15:21:26 UTC | Leak fixes. Fix error path leaks in a2i_ASN1_STRING(), a2i_ASN1_INTEGER() and a2i_ASN1_ENUMERATED(). Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting these issues. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 05 August 2016, 15:46:09 UTC |
| 32baafb | Kurt Roeckx | 16 July 2016, 14:56:54 UTC | Return error when trying to print invalid ASN1 integer GH: #1322 (cherry picked from commit 5e3553c2de9a365479324b8ba8b998f0cce3e527) Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> | 04 August 2016, 21:22:07 UTC |
| 81f69e5 | Dr. Stephen Henson | 04 August 2016, 14:00:26 UTC | Limit recursion depth in old d2i_ASN1_bytes function Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this bug. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 04 August 2016, 16:46:27 UTC |
| af601b8 | Dr. Stephen Henson | 04 August 2016, 12:54:51 UTC | Check for overflows in i2d_ASN1_SET() Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this issue. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 04 August 2016, 16:42:53 UTC |
| f96b3ff | Dr. Stephen Henson | 02 August 2016, 20:38:37 UTC | Limit status message sisze in ts_get_status_check Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this issue. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 20fc103f782bb0bcd41d211c6423187b02146b9d) Conflicts: include/openssl/ts.h | 04 August 2016, 16:37:59 UTC |
| 1228ae7 | Richard Levitte | 03 August 2016, 14:02:20 UTC | Don't check any revocation info on proxy certificates Because proxy certificates typically come without any CRL information, trying to check revocation on them will fail. Better not to try checking such information for them at all. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 790555d6756285b3ec18e3efbb195cf33f217d8f) | 03 August 2016, 14:15:05 UTC |
| 436dead | Dr. Stephen Henson | 02 August 2016, 22:53:41 UTC | Calculate sequence length properly. Use correct length in old ASN.1 indefinite length sequence decoder (only used by SSL_SESSION). This bug was discovered by Hanno Böck using libfuzzer. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 02 August 2016, 23:13:03 UTC |
| 134ab51 | Dr. Stephen Henson | 02 August 2016, 22:41:45 UTC | include <limits.h> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 02 August 2016, 22:41:45 UTC |
| ff8b6b9 | Dr. Stephen Henson | 01 August 2016, 23:30:47 UTC | Check for overflows in ASN1_object_size(). Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit e9f17097e9fbba3e7664cd67e54eebf2bd438863) | 02 August 2016, 19:54:32 UTC |
| b10c104 | Dr. Stephen Henson | 01 August 2016, 23:45:31 UTC | Check for overlows and error return from ASN1_object_size() Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 56f9953c846204cb3251ab27605e403c7444fd72) | 02 August 2016, 19:54:31 UTC |
| 3dc160e | Dr. Stephen Henson | 29 July 2016, 16:54:52 UTC | Fix CRL time comparison. Thanks to David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> for reporting this bug. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit e032117db251968bd09badc7d4718c2497302e55) | 29 July 2016, 17:49:12 UTC |
