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Revision 63ef0db60f7b9fc0c2bcabdc7e2bd133784ddd60 authored by Adam Langley on 13 December 2014, 20:13:10 UTC, committed by Matt Caswell on 16 December 2014, 14:46:57 UTC
Don't set client_version to the ServerHello version.
The client_version needs to be preserved for the RSA key exchange.

This change also means that renegotiation will, like TLS, repeat the old
client_version rather than advertise only the final version. (Either way,
version change on renego is not allowed.) This is necessary in TLS to work
around an SChannel bug, but it's not strictly necessary in DTLS.

(From BoringSSL)

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ec1af3c4195c1dfecdd9dc7458850ab1b8b951e0)
1 parent f74f5c8
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  • 47a4c1a
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  • crypto
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  • ec
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  • ec_pmeth.c
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ec_pmeth.c
/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
 * project 2006.
 */
/* ====================================================================
 * Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 *
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
 *
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
 *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
 *    distribution.
 *
 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
 *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
 *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
 *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
 *
 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
 *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
 *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
 *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
 *
 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
 *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
 *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
 *
 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
 *    acknowledgment:
 *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
 *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
 *
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 * ====================================================================
 *
 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
 * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
 *
 */

#include <stdio.h>
#include "cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/ec.h>
#include "ec_lcl.h"
#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include "evp_locl.h"

/* EC pkey context structure */

typedef struct
	{
	/* Key and paramgen group */
	EC_GROUP *gen_group;
	/* message digest */
	const EVP_MD *md;
	/* Duplicate key if custom cofactor needed */
	EC_KEY *co_key;
	/* Cofactor mode */
	signed char cofactor_mode;
	/* KDF (if any) to use for ECDH */
	char kdf_type;
	/* Message digest to use for key derivation */
	const EVP_MD *kdf_md;
	/* User key material */
	unsigned char *kdf_ukm;
	size_t kdf_ukmlen;
	/* KDF output length */
	size_t kdf_outlen;

	} EC_PKEY_CTX;

static int pkey_ec_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
	{
	EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx;
	dctx = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EC_PKEY_CTX));
	if (!dctx)
		return 0;
	dctx->gen_group = NULL;
	dctx->md = NULL;

	dctx->cofactor_mode = -1;
	dctx->co_key = NULL;
	dctx->kdf_type = EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_NONE;
	dctx->kdf_md = NULL;
	dctx->kdf_outlen = 0;
	dctx->kdf_ukm = NULL;
	dctx->kdf_ukmlen = 0;

	ctx->data = dctx;

	return 1;
	}

static int pkey_ec_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, EVP_PKEY_CTX *src)
	{
	EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx, *sctx;
	if (!pkey_ec_init(dst))
		return 0;
       	sctx = src->data;
	dctx = dst->data;
	if (sctx->gen_group)
		{
		dctx->gen_group = EC_GROUP_dup(sctx->gen_group);
		if (!dctx->gen_group)
			return 0;
		}
	dctx->md = sctx->md;

	if (sctx->co_key)
		{
		dctx->co_key = EC_KEY_dup(sctx->co_key);
		if (!dctx->co_key)
			return 0;
		}
	dctx->kdf_type = sctx->kdf_type;
	dctx->kdf_md = sctx->kdf_md;
	dctx->kdf_outlen = sctx->kdf_outlen;
	if (sctx->kdf_ukm)
		{
		dctx->kdf_ukm = BUF_memdup(sctx->kdf_ukm, sctx->kdf_ukmlen);
		if (!dctx->kdf_ukm)
			return 0;
		}
	else
		dctx->kdf_ukm = NULL;
	dctx->kdf_ukmlen = sctx->kdf_ukmlen;
	return 1;
	}

static void pkey_ec_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
	{
	EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
	if (dctx)
		{
		if (dctx->gen_group)
			EC_GROUP_free(dctx->gen_group);
		if (dctx->co_key)
			EC_KEY_free(dctx->co_key);
		if (dctx->kdf_ukm)
			OPENSSL_free(dctx->kdf_ukm);
		OPENSSL_free(dctx);
		}
	}

static int pkey_ec_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen,
					const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
	{
	int ret, type;
	unsigned int sltmp;
	EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
	EC_KEY *ec = ctx->pkey->pkey.ec;

	if (!sig)
		{
		*siglen = ECDSA_size(ec);
		return 1;
		}
	else if(*siglen < (size_t)ECDSA_size(ec))
		{
		ECerr(EC_F_PKEY_EC_SIGN, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
		return 0;
		}

	if (dctx->md)
		type = EVP_MD_type(dctx->md);
	else
		type = NID_sha1;


	ret = ECDSA_sign(type, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, ec);

	if (ret <= 0)
		return ret;
	*siglen = (size_t)sltmp;
	return 1;
	}

static int pkey_ec_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
					const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
					const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen)
	{
	int ret, type;
	EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
	EC_KEY *ec = ctx->pkey->pkey.ec;

	if (dctx->md)
		type = EVP_MD_type(dctx->md);
	else
		type = NID_sha1;

	ret = ECDSA_verify(type, tbs, tbslen, sig, siglen, ec);

	return ret;
	}

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
static int pkey_ec_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key, size_t *keylen)
	{
	int ret;
	size_t outlen;
	const EC_POINT *pubkey = NULL;
	EC_KEY *eckey;
	EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
	if (!ctx->pkey || !ctx->peerkey)
		{
		ECerr(EC_F_PKEY_EC_DERIVE, EC_R_KEYS_NOT_SET);
		return 0;
		}

	eckey = dctx->co_key ? dctx->co_key : ctx->pkey->pkey.ec;

	if (!key)
		{
		const EC_GROUP *group;
		group = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey);
		*keylen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7)/8;
		return 1;
		}
	pubkey = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ctx->peerkey->pkey.ec);

	/* NB: unlike PKCS#3 DH, if *outlen is less than maximum size this is
	 * not an error, the result is truncated.
	 */

	outlen = *keylen;
		
	ret = ECDH_compute_key(key, outlen, pubkey, eckey, 0);
	if (ret <= 0)
		return 0;
	*keylen = ret;
	return 1;
	}

static int pkey_ec_kdf_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
				unsigned char *key, size_t *keylen)
	{
	EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
	unsigned char *ktmp = NULL;
	size_t ktmplen;
	int rv = 0;
	if (dctx->kdf_type == EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_NONE)
		return pkey_ec_derive(ctx, key, keylen);
	if (!key)
		{
		*keylen = dctx->kdf_outlen;
		return 1;
		}
	if (*keylen != dctx->kdf_outlen)
		return 0;
	if (!pkey_ec_derive(ctx, NULL, &ktmplen))
		return 0;
	ktmp = OPENSSL_malloc(ktmplen);
	if (!ktmp)
		return 0;
	if (!pkey_ec_derive(ctx, ktmp, &ktmplen))
		goto err;
	/* Do KDF stuff */
	if (!ECDH_KDF_X9_62(key, *keylen, ktmp, ktmplen, 
				dctx->kdf_ukm, dctx->kdf_ukmlen,
				dctx->kdf_md))
		goto err;
	rv = 1;

	err:
	if (ktmp)
		{
		OPENSSL_cleanse(ktmp, ktmplen);
		OPENSSL_free(ktmp);
		}
	return rv;
	}
#endif

static int pkey_ec_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
	{
	EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
	EC_GROUP *group;
	switch (type)
		{
		case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_PARAMGEN_CURVE_NID:
		group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(p1);
		if (group == NULL)
			{
			ECerr(EC_F_PKEY_EC_CTRL, EC_R_INVALID_CURVE);
			return 0;
			}
		if (dctx->gen_group)
			EC_GROUP_free(dctx->gen_group);
		dctx->gen_group = group;
		return 1;

		case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_PARAM_ENC:
		if (!dctx->gen_group)
			{
			ECerr(EC_F_PKEY_EC_CTRL, EC_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET);
			return 0;
			}
		EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(dctx->gen_group, p1);
		return 1;

#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
		case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_ECDH_COFACTOR:
		if (p1 == -2)
			{
			if (dctx->cofactor_mode != -1)
				return dctx->cofactor_mode;
			else
				{
				EC_KEY *ec_key = ctx->pkey->pkey.ec;
				return EC_KEY_get_flags(ec_key) & EC_FLAG_COFACTOR_ECDH ? 1 : 0;
				}
			}
		else if (p1 < -1 || p1 > 1)
			return -2;
		dctx->cofactor_mode = p1;
		if (p1 != -1)
			{
			EC_KEY *ec_key = ctx->pkey->pkey.ec;
			if (!ec_key->group)
				return -2;
			/* If cofactor is 1 cofactor mode does nothing */
			if (BN_is_one(&ec_key->group->cofactor))
				return 1;
			if (!dctx->co_key)
				{
				dctx->co_key = EC_KEY_dup(ec_key);
				if (!dctx->co_key)
					return 0;
				}
			if (p1)
				EC_KEY_set_flags(dctx->co_key,
							EC_FLAG_COFACTOR_ECDH);
			else
				EC_KEY_clear_flags(dctx->co_key,
							EC_FLAG_COFACTOR_ECDH);
			}
		else if (dctx->co_key)
			{
			EC_KEY_free(dctx->co_key);
			dctx->co_key = NULL;
			}
		return 1;
#endif

		case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_TYPE:
		if (p1 == -2)
			return dctx->kdf_type;
		if (p1 != EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_NONE &&
		    p1 != EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_X9_62)
			return -2;
		dctx->kdf_type = p1;
		return 1;

		case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_MD:
		dctx->kdf_md = p2;
		return 1;

		case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_EC_KDF_MD:
		*(const EVP_MD **)p2 = dctx->kdf_md;
		return 1;

		case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_OUTLEN:
		if (p1 <= 0)
			return -2;
		dctx->kdf_outlen = (size_t)p1;
		return 1;

		case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_EC_KDF_OUTLEN:
		*(int *)p2 = dctx->kdf_outlen;
		return 1;

		case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_UKM:
		if (dctx->kdf_ukm)
			OPENSSL_free(dctx->kdf_ukm);
		dctx->kdf_ukm = p2;
		if (p2)
			dctx->kdf_ukmlen = p1;
		else
			dctx->kdf_ukmlen = 0;
		return 1;

		case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_EC_KDF_UKM:
		*(unsigned char **)p2 = dctx->kdf_ukm;
		return dctx->kdf_ukmlen;

		case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD:
		if (EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha1 &&
		    EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1 &&
		    EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha224 &&
		    EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha256 &&
		    EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha384 &&
		    EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha512)
			{
			ECerr(EC_F_PKEY_EC_CTRL, EC_R_INVALID_DIGEST_TYPE);
			return 0;
			}
		dctx->md = p2;
		return 1;

		case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_MD:
		*(const EVP_MD **)p2 = dctx->md;
		return 1;

		case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY:
		/* Default behaviour is OK */
		case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT:
		case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN:
		case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN:
		return 1;

		default:
		return -2;

		}
	}
			
static int pkey_ec_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
			const char *type, const char *value)
	{
	if (!strcmp(type, "ec_paramgen_curve"))
		{
		int nid;
		nid = EC_curve_nist2nid(value);
		if (nid == NID_undef)
			nid = OBJ_sn2nid(value);
		if (nid == NID_undef)
			nid = OBJ_ln2nid(value);
		if (nid == NID_undef)
			{
			ECerr(EC_F_PKEY_EC_CTRL_STR, EC_R_INVALID_CURVE);
			return 0;
			}
		return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(ctx, nid);
		}
	else if (!strcmp(type, "ec_param_enc"))
		{
		int param_enc;
		if (!strcmp(value, "explicit"))
			param_enc = 0;
		else if (!strcmp(value, "named_curve"))
			param_enc = OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE;
		else
			return -2;
		return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_param_enc(ctx, param_enc);
		}
	else if (!strcmp(type, "ecdh_kdf_md"))
		{
		const EVP_MD *md;
		if (!(md = EVP_get_digestbyname(value)))
			{
			ECerr(EC_F_PKEY_EC_CTRL_STR, EC_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
			return 0;
			}
		return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_md(ctx, md);
		}
	else if (!strcmp(type, "ecdh_cofactor_mode"))
		{
		int co_mode;
		co_mode = atoi(value);
		return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_cofactor_mode(ctx, co_mode);
		}
			
	return -2;
	}

static int pkey_ec_paramgen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
	{
	EC_KEY *ec = NULL;
	EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
	int ret = 0;
	if (dctx->gen_group == NULL)
		{
		ECerr(EC_F_PKEY_EC_PARAMGEN, EC_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET);
		return 0;
		}
	ec = EC_KEY_new();
	if (!ec)
		return 0;
	ret = EC_KEY_set_group(ec, dctx->gen_group);
	if (ret)
		EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey, ec);
	else
		EC_KEY_free(ec);
	return ret;
	}

static int pkey_ec_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
	{
	EC_KEY *ec = NULL;
	EC_PKEY_CTX *dctx = ctx->data;
	if (ctx->pkey == NULL && dctx->gen_group == NULL)
		{
		ECerr(EC_F_PKEY_EC_KEYGEN, EC_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET);
		return 0;
		}
	ec = EC_KEY_new();
	if (!ec)
		return 0;
	EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey, ec);
	if (ctx->pkey)
		{
		/* Note: if error return, pkey is freed by parent routine */
		if (!EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ctx->pkey))
			return 0;
		}
	else
		{
		if (!EC_KEY_set_group(ec, dctx->gen_group))
			return 0;
		}
	return EC_KEY_generate_key(pkey->pkey.ec);
	}

const EVP_PKEY_METHOD ec_pkey_meth = 
	{
	EVP_PKEY_EC,
	0,
	pkey_ec_init,
	pkey_ec_copy,
	pkey_ec_cleanup,

	0,
	pkey_ec_paramgen,

	0,
	pkey_ec_keygen,

	0,
	pkey_ec_sign,

	0,
	pkey_ec_verify,

	0,0,

	0,0,0,0,

	0,0,

	0,0,

	0,
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
	pkey_ec_kdf_derive,
#else
	0,
#endif

	pkey_ec_ctrl,
	pkey_ec_ctrl_str

	};
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