| a520723 | Matt Caswell | 14 October 2016, 12:07:00 UTC | Ensure we have length checks for all extensions The previous commit inspired a review of all the length checks for the extension adding code. This adds more robust checks and adds checks where some were missing previously. The real solution for this is to use WPACKET which is currently in master - but that cannot be applied to release branches. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 28 October 2016, 08:43:41 UTC |
| 83a1d4b | Matt Caswell | 14 October 2016, 10:49:06 UTC | Fix length check writing status request extension The status request extension did not correctly check its length, meaning that writing the extension could go 2 bytes beyond the buffer size. In practice this makes little difference because, due to logic in buffer.c the buffer is actually over allocated by approximately 5k! Issue reported by Guido Vranken. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 28 October 2016, 08:43:41 UTC |
| 57aa2f1 | Matt Caswell | 10 October 2016, 15:53:11 UTC | Fix a double free in ca command line Providing a spkac file with no default section causes a double free. Thanks to Brian Carpenter for reporting this issue. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 229bd12487f8576fc088dc4f641950ac33c62033) | 28 October 2016, 08:35:03 UTC |
| fa4c374 | Matt Caswell | 21 October 2016, 13:49:33 UTC | A zero return from BIO_read/BIO_write() could be retryable A zero return from BIO_read()/BIO_write() could mean that an IO operation is retryable. A zero return from SSL_read()/SSL_write() means that the connection has been closed down (either cleanly or not). Therefore we should not propagate a zero return value from BIO_read()/BIO_write() back up the stack to SSL_read()/SSL_write(). This could result in a retryable failure being treated as fatal. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 28 October 2016, 08:19:49 UTC |
| 31bf65c | Rich Salz | 26 October 2016, 15:48:43 UTC | Fix typo (reported by Matthias St. Pierre) Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 12a7715e3daed439e46cbed461d2a3d9dfd37c0f) | 26 October 2016, 15:49:49 UTC |
| 0e46901 | Dr. Matthias St. Pierre | 15 October 2016, 22:53:33 UTC | Fix leak of secrecy in ecdh_compute_key() A temporary buffer containing g^xy was not cleared in ecdh_compute_key() before freeing it, so the shared secret was leaked in memory. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 25 October 2016, 21:04:36 UTC |
| 3ade92e | Rich Salz | 22 October 2016, 07:53:47 UTC | Correctly find all critical CRL extensions Unhandled critical CRL extensions were not detected if they appeared after the handled ones. (GitHub issue 1757). Thanks to John Chuah for reporting this. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1769) | 22 October 2016, 07:53:47 UTC |
| 45f4761 | Cristian Stoica | 17 August 2016, 11:55:57 UTC | remove redundant zero assignments The structure has already been initialized to zero with memset. See also commit 64b25758edca688a30f02c260262150f7ad0bc7d (remove 0 assignments) Signed-off-by: Cristian Stoica <cristian.stoica@nxp.com> CLA: trivial Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1463) | 20 October 2016, 08:59:44 UTC |
| cdb203f | Richard Levitte | 20 October 2016, 07:07:06 UTC | %p takes void*, so make sure to cast arguments to void* This avoids failures when configuring with --strict-warnings Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1749) | 20 October 2016, 07:07:06 UTC |
| 0df1caa | Richard Levitte | 19 October 2016, 17:46:38 UTC | apps: make setup_engine() and release_engine() available always This removes some #ifndef clutter. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1644) | 20 October 2016, 07:04:00 UTC |
| aa01b82 | Richard Levitte | 28 September 2016, 22:40:20 UTC | If an engine comes up explicitely, it must also come down explicitely In apps/apps.c, one can set up an engine with setup_engine(). However, we freed the structural reference immediately, which means that for engines that don't already have a structural reference somewhere else (because it has registered at least one cipher or digest algorithm method, and therefore gets a functional reference through the ENGINE_set_default() call), we end up returning an invalid reference. Instead, the function release_engine() is added, and called at the end of the routines that call setup_engine(). Originally, the ENGINE API wasn't designed for this to happen, an engine had to register at least one algorithm method, and was especially expected to register the algorithms corresponding to the key types that could be stored and hidden in hardware. However, it turns out that some engines will not register those algorithms with the ENGINE_set_{algo}, ENGINE_set_cipher or ENGINE_set_digest functions, as they only want the methods to be used for keys, not as general crypto accelerator methods. That may cause ENGINE_set_default() to do nothing, and no functional reference is therefore made, leading to a premature deallocation of the engine and it thereby becoming unavailable when trying to fetch a key. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1644) | 20 October 2016, 07:04:00 UTC |
| 10e60f2 | Richard Levitte | 19 October 2016, 20:54:06 UTC | Fix no-des Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1748) | 19 October 2016, 20:54:06 UTC |
| 1c6aab6 | Richard Levitte | 06 October 2016, 07:31:34 UTC | Make 'openssl prime ""' not segfault Fixes RT#4699 Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1668) | 19 October 2016, 10:17:45 UTC |
| 99c002b | Patrick Steuer | 17 October 2016, 08:30:33 UTC | Fix strict-warnings build crypto/evp/e_aes.c: Types of inp and out parameters of AES_xts_en/decrypt functions need to be changed from char to unsigned char to avoid build error due to -Werror=incompatible-pointer-types. crypto/aes/asm/aes-s390x.pl: Comments need to reflect the above change. Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <psteuer@mail.de> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> CLA: trivial | 18 October 2016, 16:34:52 UTC |
| b0161f6 | Patrick Steuer | 17 October 2016, 08:24:49 UTC | Fix strict-warnings build crypto/s390xcap.c: cryptlib.h needs to be included for OPENSSL_cpuid_setup function prototype is located there to avoid build error due to -Werror=missing-prototypes. Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <psteuer@mail.de> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> CLA: trivial | 18 October 2016, 16:34:52 UTC |
| 78ee64c | Steven Fackler | 15 October 2016, 20:01:25 UTC | Fix signatures of EVP_Digest{Sign,Verify}Update These are implemented as macros delegating to `EVP_DigestUpdate`, which takes a `size_t` as its third argument, not an `unsigned int`. CLA: trivial Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 8bdce8d160e29b4e1b80fec31f618d85d8c2b7a8) | 15 October 2016, 22:47:01 UTC |
| 02a0231 | Matt Caswell | 12 October 2016, 15:43:03 UTC | Ensure we handle len == 0 in ERR_err_string_n If len == 0 in a call to ERR_error_string_n() then we can read beyond the end of the buffer. Really applications should not be calling this function with len == 0, but we shouldn't be letting it through either! Thanks to Agostino Sarubbo for reporting this issue. Agostino's blog on this issue is available here: https://blogs.gentoo.org/ago/2016/10/14/openssl-libcrypto-stack-based-buffer-overflow-in-err_error_string_n-err-c/ Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit e5c1361580d8de79682958b04a5f0d262e680f8b) | 15 October 2016, 10:34:23 UTC |
| 6d69dc5 | Vitezslav Cizek | 10 October 2016, 14:41:57 UTC | Degrade 3DES to MEDIUM in SSL2 The SWEET32 fix moved 3DES from HIGH to MEDIUM, but omitted SSL2. CLA: trivial Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1683) | 14 October 2016, 15:31:18 UTC |
| e8e380c | Rich Salz | 12 October 2016, 19:49:06 UTC | RT is put out to pasture Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1702) (cherry picked from commit 7954dced19a7e59e7055eab95a981fa943c7d100) | 13 October 2016, 13:41:17 UTC |
| f1f9769 | Kurt Cancemi | 22 September 2016, 22:05:37 UTC | Add missing error string for SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 11 October 2016, 18:22:28 UTC |
| 53a71b7 | Richard Levitte | 28 September 2016, 19:28:00 UTC | apps/apps.c: initialize and de-initialize engine around key loading Before loading a key from an engine, it may need to be initialized. When done loading the key, we must de-initialize the engine. (if the engine is already initialized somehow, only the reference counter will be incremented then decremented) Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 49e476a5382602d0bad1139d6f1f66ddbc7959d6) | 28 September 2016, 20:00:26 UTC |
| a269e5f | Rich Salz | 28 September 2016, 18:39:32 UTC | Revert "Call ENGINE_init() before trying to use keys from engine" This reverts commit 4badd2b3c29c2c6c551c737c07a429a53d9d1a0d. This fails to call ENGINE_finish; an alternate fix is coming. Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> | 28 September 2016, 18:39:32 UTC |
| 4badd2b | David Woodhouse | 28 September 2016, 13:31:22 UTC | Call ENGINE_init() before trying to use keys from engine Things like 'openssl s_client' only ever worked with keys from an engine which provided a default generic method for some key type — because it called ENGINE_set_default() and that ended up being an implicit initialisation and functional refcount. But an engine which doesn't provide generic methods doesn't get initialised, and then when you try to use it you get an error: cannot load client certificate private key file from engine 140688147056384:error:26096075:engine routines:ENGINE_load_private_key:not initialised:crypto/engine/eng_pkey.c:66: unable to load client certificate private key file cf. https://github.com/OpenSC/libp11/issues/107 (in which we discover that engine_pkcs11 *used* to provide generic methods that OpenSSL would try to use for ephemeral DH keys when negotiating ECDHE cipher suites in TLS, and that didn't work out very well.) Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1640) | 28 September 2016, 13:34:20 UTC |
| 9702bf5 | Matt Caswell | 26 September 2016, 10:20:11 UTC | Fix NEWS error The NEWS file referenced the wrong CVE for 1.0.2 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 26 September 2016, 10:20:11 UTC |
| f6e43fe | Matt Caswell | 26 September 2016, 09:50:48 UTC | Prepare for 1.0.2k-dev Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 26 September 2016, 09:50:48 UTC |
| e216bf9 | Matt Caswell | 26 September 2016, 09:49:49 UTC | Prepare for 1.0.2j release Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 26 September 2016, 09:49:49 UTC |
| ca430ec | Matt Caswell | 26 September 2016, 08:51:30 UTC | Update CHANGES and NEWS for the new release Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 26 September 2016, 09:02:06 UTC |
| 6e629b5 | Matt Caswell | 22 August 2016, 23:01:57 UTC | Add some sanity checks when checking CRL scores Note: this was accidentally omitted from OpenSSL 1.0.2 branch. Without this fix any attempt to use CRLs will crash. CVE-2016-7052 Thanks to Bruce Stephens and Thomas Jakobi for reporting this issue. Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 26 September 2016, 08:19:50 UTC |
| f15a7e3 | Dirk Feytons | 22 September 2016, 14:17:45 UTC | Fix build with no-nextprotoneg Add a missing ifdef. Same change is already present in master. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1100) | 22 September 2016, 14:17:45 UTC |
| 581215a | Rich Salz | 22 September 2016, 12:47:45 UTC | Fix typo introduced by a03f81f4 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 22 September 2016, 12:57:09 UTC |
| 9d264d1 | Matt Caswell | 22 September 2016, 10:25:49 UTC | Prepare for 1.0.2j-dev Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 22 September 2016, 10:25:49 UTC |
| 32c1301 | Matt Caswell | 22 September 2016, 10:24:53 UTC | Prepare for 1.0.2i release Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 22 September 2016, 10:24:53 UTC |
| 35aede1 | Matt Caswell | 21 September 2016, 20:59:49 UTC | Updates CHANGES and NEWS for new release Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 22 September 2016, 08:22:05 UTC |
| 92c8d6a | Dmitry Belyavsky | 19 September 2016, 15:05:53 UTC | Avoid KCI attack for GOST Russian GOST ciphersuites are vulnerable to the KCI attack because they use long-term keys to establish the connection when ssl client authorization is on. This change brings the GOST implementation into line with the latest specs in order to avoid the attack. It should not break backwards compatibility. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 22 September 2016, 08:22:05 UTC |
| 38f59bd | Matt Caswell | 09 September 2016, 09:53:39 UTC | Fix a mem leak in NPN handling If a server sent multiple NPN extensions in a single ClientHello then a mem leak can occur. This will only happen where the client has requested NPN in the first place. It does not occur during renegotiation. Therefore the maximum that could be leaked in a single connection with a malicious server is 64k (the maximum size of the ServerHello extensions section). As this is client side, only occurs if NPN has been requested and does not occur during renegotiation this is unlikely to be exploitable. Issue reported by Shi Lei. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 22 September 2016, 08:22:05 UTC |
| ea39b16 | Matt Caswell | 09 September 2016, 09:08:45 UTC | Fix OCSP Status Request extension unbounded memory growth A malicious client can send an excessively large OCSP Status Request extension. If that client continually requests renegotiation, sending a large OCSP Status Request extension each time, then there will be unbounded memory growth on the server. This will eventually lead to a Denial Of Service attack through memory exhaustion. Servers with a default configuration are vulnerable even if they do not support OCSP. Builds using the "no-ocsp" build time option are not affected. I have also checked other extensions to see if they suffer from a similar problem but I could not find any other issues. CVE-2016-6304 Issue reported by Shi Lei. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 22 September 2016, 08:22:05 UTC |
| 90d6f35 | Richard Levitte | 22 September 2016, 08:01:38 UTC | mk1mf.pl: check for no-tls1 here as well Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 22 September 2016, 08:16:08 UTC |
| 22646a0 | Matt Caswell | 21 September 2016, 13:48:16 UTC | Don't allow too many consecutive warning alerts Certain warning alerts are ignored if they are received. This can mean that no progress will be made if one peer continually sends those warning alerts. Implement a count so that we abort the connection if we receive too many. Issue reported by Shi Lei. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 21 September 2016, 19:14:16 UTC |
| 006a788 | Dr. Stephen Henson | 21 September 2016, 12:26:01 UTC | Make message buffer slightly larger than message. Grow TLS/DTLS 16 bytes more than strictly necessary as a precaution against OOB reads. In most cases this will have no effect because the message buffer will be large enough already. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 21 September 2016, 18:56:05 UTC |
| bc9563f | Dr. Stephen Henson | 21 September 2016, 11:54:13 UTC | Use SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH instead of 4. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 21 September 2016, 18:56:05 UTC |
| 709ec8b | Dr. Stephen Henson | 21 September 2016, 11:57:01 UTC | Remove unnecessary check. The overflow check will never be triggered because the the n2l3 result is always less than 2^24. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 21 September 2016, 18:56:05 UTC |
| 62841a2 | Rich Salz | 21 September 2016, 14:59:15 UTC | Dcoument -alpn flag Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 776e15f9393a9e3083bec60a8da376ce2fe1e97e) | 21 September 2016, 15:24:59 UTC |
| ceb7342 | Rich Salz | 09 September 2016, 14:52:59 UTC | GH1555: Don't bump size on realloc failure Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 6fcace45bda108ad4d3f95261494dd479720d92c) | 21 September 2016, 14:42:10 UTC |
| 9583e41 | Richard Levitte | 20 September 2016, 16:43:24 UTC | apps/apps.c: include sys/socket.h to declare recv() Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit a19228b7f4fc6fcb49713455b3caedbc24fb0b01) | 21 September 2016, 14:21:08 UTC |
| ff553f8 | Dr. Stephen Henson | 17 September 2016, 11:36:58 UTC | Fix small OOB reads. In ssl3_get_client_certificate, ssl3_get_server_certificate and ssl3_get_certificate_request check we have enough room before reading a length. Thanks to Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.) for reporting these bugs. CVE-2016-6306 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 21 September 2016, 13:10:59 UTC |
| d0cbaa2 | Matt Caswell | 14 September 2016, 12:27:59 UTC | Fix a missing NULL check in dsa_builtin_paramgen We should check the last BN_CTX_get() call to ensure that it isn't NULL before we try and use any of the allocated BIGNUMs. Issue reported by Shi Lei. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 1ff7425d6130380bb00d3e64739633a4b21b11a3) | 21 September 2016, 12:35:11 UTC |
| a5e55f6 | Richard Levitte | 20 September 2016, 19:41:58 UTC | RT4669: dgst can only sign/verify one file Check arg count and print an error message. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 20 September 2016, 19:56:04 UTC |
| 6180c0f | Marcus Meissner | 06 September 2016, 09:01:21 UTC | initialize the RSA struct to 0. This helps with program code linked against static builds accessing a uninitialized ->engine pointer. CLA: none; trivial Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1540) | 20 September 2016, 02:06:35 UTC |
| 32cc4c2 | Dr. Stephen Henson | 15 September 2016, 22:49:41 UTC | update default dependencies Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 15 September 2016, 23:10:00 UTC |
| 502fcc6 | Matt Caswell | 15 September 2016, 19:53:09 UTC | Revert "Abort on unrecognised warning alerts" This reverts commit 15d81749322c3498027105f8ee44e8c25479d475. There were some unexpected side effects to this commit, e.g. in SSLv3 a warning alert gets sent "no_certificate" if a client does not send a Certificate during Client Auth. With the above commit this causes the connection to abort, which is incorrect. There may be some other edge cases like this so we need to have a rethink on this. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> | 15 September 2016, 21:53:27 UTC |
| 15c088e | Richard Levitte | 14 September 2016, 21:37:53 UTC | Finally, make sure vms_term_sock.c is built Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 15 September 2016, 21:23:06 UTC |
| d6d04b6 | Richard Levitte | 15 September 2016, 07:45:57 UTC | Refactor to avoid unnecessary preprocessor logic Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 15 September 2016, 21:23:06 UTC |
| b508267 | Richard Levitte | 14 September 2016, 18:54:30 UTC | Reformat to fit OpenSSL source code standards Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 15 September 2016, 21:23:06 UTC |
| a2d2120 | Richard Levitte | 14 September 2016, 18:53:06 UTC | Remove entirely unnecessary pointer size guards Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 15 September 2016, 21:23:06 UTC |
| 4585254 | Richard Levitte | 14 September 2016, 18:52:03 UTC | Add copyright and license on apps/vms_term_sock.[ch] Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 15 September 2016, 21:23:06 UTC |
| 1015609 | Richard Levitte | 03 August 2016, 19:16:43 UTC | VSI submission: redirect terminal input through socket This is needed, because on VMS, select() can only be used on sockets. being able to use select() on all kinds of file descriptors is unique to Unix. So, the solution for VMS is to create a layer that translates input from standard input to socket communication. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 15 September 2016, 21:23:06 UTC |
| d692475 | Dr. Stephen Henson | 14 September 2016, 22:42:55 UTC | Fix memory leak on realloc error. Backport leak fix from master branch. Thanks to Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.) for reporting this bug. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 15 September 2016, 11:49:00 UTC |
| ea060e0 | Dr. Stephen Henson | 14 September 2016, 22:54:12 UTC | Fix memory leak on error. Thanks to Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.) for reporting this bug. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 15 September 2016, 11:49:00 UTC |
| b05f231 | Richard Levitte | 06 September 2016, 15:39:35 UTC | VMS: only use _realloc32 with /POINTER_SIZE=32 This fixes the following error when building with no particular pointer size is specified (implied 32 bit): static void *(*realloc_func) (void *, size_t) = realloc; ................................................^ %CC-E-UNDECLARED, In the initializer for realloc_func, "_realloc32" is not declared. at line number 93 in file DEV:[OPENSSL102.crypto]mem.c;1 Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> | 15 September 2016, 08:33:42 UTC |
| 68f11e8 | Matt Caswell | 08 September 2016, 13:32:27 UTC | Add some sanity checks around usage of t_fromb64() The internal SRP function t_fromb64() converts from base64 to binary. It does not validate that the size of the destination is sufficiently large - that is up to the callers. In some places there was such a check, but not in others. Add an argument to t_fromb64() to provide the size of the destination buffer and validate that we don't write too much data. Also add some sanity checks to the callers where appropriate. With thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this issue. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 73f0df8331910d6726d45ecaab12bd93cc48b4e2) | 14 September 2016, 09:17:46 UTC |
| 15d8174 | Matt Caswell | 12 September 2016, 10:04:51 UTC | Abort on unrecognised warning alerts A peer continually sending unrecognised warning alerts could mean that we make no progress on a connection. We should abort rather than continuing if we receive an unrecognised warning alert. Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this issue. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 13 September 2016, 11:00:07 UTC |
| 204fb53 | Richard Levitte | 12 September 2016, 14:29:39 UTC | Add enginesdir to libcrypto.pc pkg-config file Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 12 September 2016, 14:29:39 UTC |
| 5ecb546 | Dr. Stephen Henson | 08 September 2016, 14:10:32 UTC | Fix memory leak on error. Backport leak fix from master branch. Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this bug. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 11 September 2016, 22:52:34 UTC |
| 373a561 | Rich Salz | 09 September 2016, 16:17:47 UTC | Make update Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> | 09 September 2016, 21:26:26 UTC |
| 20d402a | Richard Levitte | 08 September 2016, 21:39:26 UTC | If errno is ENXIO in BSS_new_file(), set BIO_R_NO_SUCH_FILE VMS sets that errno when the device part of a file spec is malformed or a logical name that doesn't exist. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit e82e2186e93e9a678dd8c0c5ba084d21d27d4d62) | 08 September 2016, 22:11:55 UTC |
| 8195a86 | David Woodhouse | 07 September 2016, 15:53:18 UTC | Avoid EVP_PKEY_cmp() crash on EC keys without public component Some hardware devices don't provide the public EC_POINT data. The only way for X509_check_private_key() to validate that the key matches a given certificate is to actually perform a sign operation and then verify it using the public key in the certificate. Maybe that can come later, as discussed in issue 1532. But for now let's at least make it fail gracefully and not crash. GH: 1532 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1547) (cherry picked from commit 92ed7fa575a80955f3bb6efefca9bf576a953586) | 07 September 2016, 17:56:43 UTC |
| 3f10149 | Rich Salz | 05 September 2016, 22:08:43 UTC | Misc BN fixes Never output -0; make "negative zero" an impossibility. Do better checking on BN_rand top/bottom requirements and #bits. Update doc. Ignoring trailing garbage in BN_asc2bn. Port this commit from boringSSL: https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/899b9b19a4cd3fe526aaf5047ab9234cdca19f7d%5E!/ Ensure |BN_div| never gives negative zero in the no_branch code. Have |bn_correct_top| fix |bn->neg| if the input is zero so that we don't have negative zeros lying around. Thanks to Brian Smith for noticing. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 01c09f9fde5793e0b3712d602b02e2aed4908e8d) (Some manual work required) | 06 September 2016, 15:09:50 UTC |
| 2a20b6d | Andy Polyakov | 27 August 2016, 18:47:57 UTC | crypto/bn/*: x86[_64] division instruction doesn't handle constants, change constraint from 'g' to 'r'. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 68b4a6e91f5acd42489bb9d1c580acc5ae457cad) | 31 August 2016, 14:46:11 UTC |
| 7c59fbf | Matt Caswell | 30 August 2016, 14:06:01 UTC | Ensure the CertStatus message adds a DTLS message header where needed The function tls_construct_cert_status() is called by both TLS and DTLS code. However it only ever constructed a TLS message header for the message which obviously failed in DTLS. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 30 August 2016, 14:06:01 UTC |
| 7fb82d0 | Matt Caswell | 26 August 2016, 14:14:24 UTC | SRP_create_verifier does not check for NULL before OPENSSL_cleanse OPENSSL_cleanse() does not validate its input parameter for NULL so SRP_create_verifier() should do so instead. Otherwise a segfault will result. Alternative solution to GitHub PR#1006 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 26 August 2016, 19:40:37 UTC |
| 06a549c | Richard Levitte | 26 August 2016, 07:59:55 UTC | Improve the definition of STITCHED_CALL in e_rc4_hmac_md5.c The definition of STITCHED_CALL relies on OPENSSL_NO_ASM. However, when a configuration simply lacks the assembler implementation for RC4 (which is where we have implemented the stitched call), OPENSSL_NO_ASM isn't implemented. Better, then, to rely on specific macros that indicated that RC4 (and MD5) are implemented in assembler. For this to work properly, we must also make sure Configure adds the definition of RC4_ASM among the C flags. (partly cherry picked from commit 216e8d91033d237880cff7da0d02d46d47bae41b) Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> | 26 August 2016, 19:19:18 UTC |
| a404656 | FdaSilvaYY | 04 April 2016, 22:33:41 UTC | Fix a few leaks in X509_REQ_to_X509. Fix a possible leak on NETSCAPE_SPKI_verify failure. Backport of 0517538d1a39bc Backport of f6c006ea76304a Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 26 August 2016, 13:43:31 UTC |
| 50c3015 | David Woodhouse | 03 August 2016, 17:25:07 UTC | Add basic test for Cisco DTLS1_BAD_VER and record replay handling (Modified for 1.0.2 by adding selected PACKET_xx() functions and PRF, and subsequent cleanup from commit eb633d03fe2db3666840dee8d0a2dbe491672dfc) Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 40425899200a3dea9ec3684d3eb80bcf50c99baf) | 26 August 2016, 12:44:11 UTC |
| ba30f1a | David Woodhouse | 02 August 2016, 21:54:46 UTC | Fix ubsan 'left shift of negative value -1' error in satsub64be() Baroque, almost uncommented code triggers behaviour which is undefined by the C standard. You might quite reasonably not care that the code was broken on ones-complement machines, but if we support a ubsan build then we need to at least pretend to care. It looks like the special-case code for 64-bit big-endian is going to behave differently (and wrongly) on wrap-around, because it treats the values as signed. That seems wrong, and allows replay and other attacks. Surely you need to renegotiate and start a new epoch rather than wrapping around to sequence number zero again? Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 2e94723c1b5d8ab974645e83de90b248265af3cd) | 26 August 2016, 12:44:11 UTC |
| df426c0 | David Woodhouse | 08 July 2016, 19:46:07 UTC | Fix SSL_export_keying_material() for DTLS1_BAD_VER Commit d8e8590e ("Fix missing return value checks in SCTP") made the DTLS handshake fail, even for non-SCTP connections, if SSL_export_keying_material() fails. Which it does, for DTLS1_BAD_VER. Apply the trivial fix to make it succeed, since there's no real reason why it shouldn't even though we never need it. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit c8a18468caef4d62778381be0acdadc8a88d6e51) | 26 August 2016, 12:44:11 UTC |
| 847fe92 | Matt Caswell | 26 August 2016, 12:11:17 UTC | Fix the no-tls1 option This also fixes no-tls which is an alias for no-tls1 in 1.0.2 (it is not possible to do no-tls1_1 or no-tls1_2 in 1.0.2). Because it is not possible to disable TLS1.1 or TLS1.2 it no longer follows that disabling TLS1.0 should force the disabling of tlsext. Also a few missing ifdef guards. GitHub Iusse#935 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 26 August 2016, 12:38:50 UTC |
| 3953bf5 | Andy Polyakov | 24 August 2016, 15:13:09 UTC | ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl: /cmovb/cmovc/ as nasm doesn't recognize cmovb. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit d3034d31e7c04b334dd245504dd4f56e513ca115) | 26 August 2016, 09:53:03 UTC |
| 09f0535 | Andy Polyakov | 19 August 2016, 21:16:04 UTC | ec/ecp_nistz256: harmonize is_infinity with ec_GFp_simple_is_at_infinity. RT#4625 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit e3057a57caf4274ea1fb074518e4714059dfcabf) | 26 August 2016, 09:51:52 UTC |
| e76cf5c | Andy Polyakov | 20 August 2016, 20:04:21 UTC | ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl: addition to perform stricter reduction. Addition was not preserving inputs' property of being fully reduced. Thanks to Brian Smith for reporting this. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit b62b2454fadfccaf5e055a1810d72174c2633b8f) | 26 August 2016, 09:51:25 UTC |
| 1f61e8f | Todd Short | 26 May 2016, 17:49:36 UTC | Always use session_ctx when removing a session Sessions are stored on the session_ctx, which doesn't change after SSL_set_SSL_CTX(). Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 26 August 2016, 09:19:56 UTC |
| 1027ad4 | Dr. Stephen Henson | 19 August 2016, 22:28:29 UTC | Avoid overflow in MDC2_Update() Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this issue. CVE-2016-6303 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 55d83bf7c10c7b205fffa23fa7c3977491e56c07) | 24 August 2016, 13:17:53 UTC |
| 0fff506 | Rich Salz | 18 August 2016, 13:26:52 UTC | SWEET32 (CVE-2016-2183): Move DES from HIGH to MEDIUM Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 12:55:50 UTC |
| 0ec0104 | Matt Caswell | 24 August 2016, 08:23:14 UTC | Fix no-ec Use a ciphersuite in dtlstest that is not affected by no-* options. Backport of commit fe34735c19. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 08:23:14 UTC |
| baaabfd | Dr. Stephen Henson | 23 August 2016, 17:14:54 UTC | Sanity check ticket length. If a ticket callback changes the HMAC digest to SHA512 the existing sanity checks are not sufficient and an attacker could perform a DoS attack with a malformed ticket. Add additional checks based on HMAC size. Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this bug. CVE-2016-6302 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 23 August 2016, 22:18:51 UTC |
| 3cb28d1 | Richard Levitte | 19 August 2016, 14:53:54 UTC | mk1mf: dtlstest needs ssltestlib, include it with a hack We don't really have a mechanism to include other object files into a given test program. For now, a simple hack in mk1mf.pl will do. RT#4653 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 22 August 2016, 22:09:40 UTC |
| 01f879d | David Benjamin | 20 August 2016, 17:55:17 UTC | Don't check for malloc failure twice. a03f81f4ead24c234dc26e388d86a352685f3948 added a malloc failure check to EVP_PKEY_keygen, but there already was one. Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1473 | 22 August 2016, 19:20:31 UTC |
| 67e11f1 | Kazuki Yamaguchi | 21 August 2016, 17:36:36 UTC | Fix overflow check in BN_bn2dec() Fix an off by one error in the overflow check added by 07bed46f332fc ("Check for errors in BN_bn2dec()"). Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 099e2968ed3c7d256cda048995626664082b1b30) | 22 August 2016, 16:07:34 UTC |
| 561530d | Rich Salz | 22 August 2016, 15:25:12 UTC | RT2676: Reject RSA eponent if even or 1 Also, re-organize RSA check to use goto err. Try all checks, not just stopping at first (via Richard Levitte) Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 464d59a5bb5811f7671e2bd37f41d610606b829d) | 22 August 2016, 15:52:17 UTC |
| 51690fb | Richard Levitte | 22 August 2016, 08:17:27 UTC | VMS: Use strict refdef extern model when building library object files Most of the time, this isn't strictly needed. However, in the default extern model (called relaxed refdef), symbols are treated as weak common objects unless they are initialised. The librarian doesn't include weak symbols in the (static) libraries, which renders them invisible when linking a program with said those libraries, which is a problem at times. Using the strict refdef model is much more like standard C on all other platforms, and thereby avoid the issues that come with the relaxed refdef model. Note: this doesn't apply to VAX C. It's possible that this will make OpenSSL building with VAX C difficult some time in the future if it isn't already. However, VAX C is a very old compiler that we don't expect to see too often, as DEC C (a.k.a VMS C) should have replaced it a long time ago. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 22 August 2016, 13:50:28 UTC |
| 93c616d | Richard Levitte | 22 August 2016, 11:35:27 UTC | GOST: rearrange code so it's more like C rather than C++ Some builds fail otherwise. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 22 August 2016, 13:48:35 UTC |
| fd7ca74 | Richard Levitte | 22 August 2016, 13:22:17 UTC | Make 'openssl req -x509' more equivalent to 'openssl req -new' The following would fail, or rather, freeze: openssl genrsa -out rsa2048.pem 2048 openssl req -x509 -key rsa2048.pem -keyform PEM -out cert.pem In that case, the second command wants to read a certificate request from stdin, because -x509 wasn't fully flagged as being for creating something new. This changes makes it fully flagged. RT#4655 Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> | 22 August 2016, 13:47:49 UTC |
| 9c8bca1 | Andy Polyakov | 16 March 2016, 22:33:53 UTC | bn/asm/x86[_64]-mont*.pl: implement slightly alternative page-walking. Original strategy for page-walking was adjust stack pointer and then touch pages in order. This kind of asks for double-fault, because if touch fails, then signal will be delivered to frame above adjusted stack pointer. But touching pages prior adjusting stack pointer would upset valgrind. As compromise let's adjust stack pointer in pages, touching top of the stack. This still asks for double-fault, but at least prevents corruption of neighbour stack if allocation is to overstep the guard page. Also omit predict-non-taken hints as they reportedly trigger illegal instructions in some VM setups. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 3ba1ef829cf3dd36eaa5e819258d90291c6a1027) | 22 August 2016, 13:08:36 UTC |
| 91dc605 | Richard Levitte | 22 August 2016, 12:02:31 UTC | ssltestlib: Tell compiler we don't care about the value when we don't In mempacket_test_read(), we've already fetched the top value of the stack, so when we shift the stack, we don't care for the value. The compiler needs to be told, or it will complain harshly when we tell it to be picky. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 1c288878af42650fbda911b702ae7b551a545b1c) | 22 August 2016, 12:16:27 UTC |
| 2020068 | Matt Caswell | 30 June 2016, 14:06:27 UTC | Prevent DTLS Finished message injection Follow on from CVE-2016-2179 The investigation and analysis of CVE-2016-2179 highlighted a related flaw. This commit fixes a security "near miss" in the buffered message handling code. Ultimately this is not currently believed to be exploitable due to the reasons outlined below, and therefore there is no CVE for this on its own. The issue this commit fixes is a MITM attack where the attacker can inject a Finished message into the handshake. In the description below it is assumed that the attacker injects the Finished message for the server to receive it. The attack could work equally well the other way around (i.e where the client receives the injected Finished message). The MITM requires the following capabilities: - The ability to manipulate the MTU that the client selects such that it is small enough for the client to fragment Finished messages. - The ability to selectively drop and modify records sent from the client - The ability to inject its own records and send them to the server The MITM forces the client to select a small MTU such that the client will fragment the Finished message. Ideally for the attacker the first fragment will contain all but the last byte of the Finished message, with the second fragment containing the final byte. During the handshake and prior to the client sending the CCS the MITM injects a plaintext Finished message fragment to the server containing all but the final byte of the Finished message. The message sequence number should be the one expected to be used for the real Finished message. OpenSSL will recognise that the received fragment is for the future and will buffer it for later use. After the client sends the CCS it then sends its own Finished message in two fragments. The MITM causes the first of these fragments to be dropped. The OpenSSL server will then receive the second of the fragments and reassemble the complete Finished message consisting of the MITM fragment and the final byte from the real client. The advantage to the attacker in injecting a Finished message is that this provides the capability to modify other handshake messages (e.g. the ClientHello) undetected. A difficulty for the attacker is knowing in advance what impact any of those changes might have on the final byte of the handshake hash that is going to be sent in the "real" Finished message. In the worst case for the attacker this means that only 1 in 256 of such injection attempts will succeed. It may be possible in some situations for the attacker to improve this such that all attempts succeed. For example if the handshake includes client authentication then the final message flight sent by the client will include a Certificate. Certificates are ASN.1 objects where the signed portion is DER encoded. The non-signed portion could be BER encoded and so the attacker could re-encode the certificate such that the hash for the whole handshake comes to a different value. The certificate re-encoding would not be detectable because only the non-signed portion is changed. As this is the final flight of messages sent from the client the attacker knows what the complete hanshake hash value will be that the client will send - and therefore knows what the final byte will be. Through a process of trial and error the attacker can re-encode the certificate until the modified handhshake also has a hash with the same final byte. This means that when the Finished message is verified by the server it will be correct in all cases. In practice the MITM would need to be able to perform the same attack against both the client and the server. If the attack is only performed against the server (say) then the server will not detect the modified handshake, but the client will and will abort the connection. Fortunately, although OpenSSL is vulnerable to Finished message injection, it is not vulnerable if *both* client and server are OpenSSL. The reason is that OpenSSL has a hard "floor" for a minimum MTU size that it will never go below. This minimum means that a Finished message will never be sent in a fragmented form and therefore the MITM does not have one of its pre-requisites. Therefore this could only be exploited if using OpenSSL and some other DTLS peer that had its own and separate Finished message injection flaw. The fix is to ensure buffered messages are cleared on epoch change. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 22 August 2016, 09:59:41 UTC |
| 26f2c57 | Matt Caswell | 30 June 2016, 12:17:08 UTC | Fix DTLS buffered message DoS attack DTLS can handle out of order record delivery. Additionally since handshake messages can be bigger than will fit into a single packet, the messages can be fragmented across multiple records (as with normal TLS). That means that the messages can arrive mixed up, and we have to reassemble them. We keep a queue of buffered messages that are "from the future", i.e. messages we're not ready to deal with yet but have arrived early. The messages held there may not be full yet - they could be one or more fragments that are still in the process of being reassembled. The code assumes that we will eventually complete the reassembly and when that occurs the complete message is removed from the queue at the point that we need to use it. However, DTLS is also tolerant of packet loss. To get around that DTLS messages can be retransmitted. If we receive a full (non-fragmented) message from the peer after previously having received a fragment of that message, then we ignore the message in the queue and just use the non-fragmented version. At that point the queued message will never get removed. Additionally the peer could send "future" messages that we never get to in order to complete the handshake. Each message has a sequence number (starting from 0). We will accept a message fragment for the current message sequence number, or for any sequence up to 10 into the future. However if the Finished message has a sequence number of 2, anything greater than that in the queue is just left there. So, in those two ways we can end up with "orphaned" data in the queue that will never get removed - except when the connection is closed. At that point all the queues are flushed. An attacker could seek to exploit this by filling up the queues with lots of large messages that are never going to be used in order to attempt a DoS by memory exhaustion. I will assume that we are only concerned with servers here. It does not seem reasonable to be concerned about a memory exhaustion attack on a client. They are unlikely to process enough connections for this to be an issue. A "long" handshake with many messages might be 5 messages long (in the incoming direction), e.g. ClientHello, Certificate, ClientKeyExchange, CertificateVerify, Finished. So this would be message sequence numbers 0 to 4. Additionally we can buffer up to 10 messages in the future. Therefore the maximum number of messages that an attacker could send that could get orphaned would typically be 15. The maximum size that a DTLS message is allowed to be is defined by max_cert_list, which by default is 100k. Therefore the maximum amount of "orphaned" memory per connection is 1500k. Message sequence numbers get reset after the Finished message, so renegotiation will not extend the maximum number of messages that can be orphaned per connection. As noted above, the queues do get cleared when the connection is closed. Therefore in order to mount an effective attack, an attacker would have to open many simultaneous connections. Issue reported by Quan Luo. CVE-2016-2179 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 22 August 2016, 09:59:41 UTC |
| 0ee4f13 | Matt Caswell | 22 August 2016, 08:09:06 UTC | Silence some "maybe used uninitialised" warnings Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 22 August 2016, 08:25:12 UTC |
| eca5174 | Andy Polyakov | 18 August 2016, 11:38:42 UTC | ec/ecp_nistz256.c: get is_one on 32-bit platforms right. Thanks to Brian Smith for reporting this. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 21 August 2016, 20:18:18 UTC |
| bc89456 | Rich Salz | 21 August 2016, 17:23:45 UTC | Fix pointer/alloc prob from previous commit Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 21 August 2016, 17:39:11 UTC |
| 71da19b | Rich Salz | 21 August 2016, 16:50:05 UTC | Fix incorrect return argument. Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> | 21 August 2016, 16:50:59 UTC |
| 061d6c2 | Kurt Roeckx | 06 August 2016, 17:16:00 UTC | Fix off by 1 in ASN1_STRING_set() Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> MR: #3176 (cherry picked from commit a73be798ced572a988d455d961a2387f6eccb549) | 20 August 2016, 17:01:47 UTC |
