| abd3077 | Matt Caswell | 25 August 2016, 15:29:18 UTC | Prepare for 1.1.0 release Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 25 August 2016, 15:29:18 UTC |
| bee5ee5 | Matt Caswell | 25 August 2016, 14:58:53 UTC | Fix uninit read in sslapitest msan detected an uninit read. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 25 August 2016, 14:58:53 UTC |
| eedb9db | Andy Polyakov | 25 August 2016, 10:08:35 UTC | CHANGES: mention Windows UTF-8 opt-in option. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 25 August 2016, 11:00:45 UTC |
| fb5d9f1 | Andy Polyakov | 25 August 2016, 06:06:26 UTC | Windows: UTF-8 opt-in for command-line arguments and console input. User can make Windows openssl.exe to treat command-line arguments and console input as UTF-8 By setting OPENSSL_WIN32_UTF8 environment variable (to any value). This is likely to be required for data interchangeability with other OSes and PKCS#12 containers generated with Windows CryptoAPI. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 25 August 2016, 10:56:28 UTC |
| 647ac8d | Dr. Stephen Henson | 24 August 2016, 17:55:51 UTC | Support broken PKCS#12 key generation. OpenSSL versions before 1.1.0 didn't convert non-ASCII UTF8 PKCS#12 passwords to Unicode correctly. To correctly decrypt older files, if MAC verification fails with the supplied password attempt to use the broken format which is compatible with earlier versions of OpenSSL. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 25 August 2016, 10:43:40 UTC |
| 0fe1749 | Andy Polyakov | 24 August 2016, 17:54:10 UTC | Don't switch password formats using global state. To avoid possible race conditions don't switch password format using global state in crypto/pkcs12 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 25 August 2016, 10:42:33 UTC |
| cc06906 | Matt Caswell | 25 August 2016, 08:40:17 UTC | Fix an uninitialised read on an error path Found by Coverity. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 25 August 2016, 09:11:35 UTC |
| 5105ba5 | Richard Levitte | 25 August 2016, 08:06:55 UTC | NEWS: add a number of the types that were made opaque Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 25 August 2016, 08:06:55 UTC |
| 4a7b3a7 | Viktor Dukhovni | 24 August 2016, 18:53:09 UTC | Un-delete still documented X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify It should not have been removed. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 19:30:45 UTC |
| 3188c95 | Andy Polyakov | 24 August 2016, 15:05:05 UTC | Configurations/10-main.conf: fix solaris64-*-cc link problems. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 19:26:42 UTC |
| d3034d3 | Andy Polyakov | 24 August 2016, 15:13:09 UTC | ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl: /cmovb/cmovc/ as nasm doesn't recognize cmovb. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 15:13:09 UTC |
| efba778 | Matt Caswell | 24 August 2016, 12:36:07 UTC | Clarify the error messages in 08f6ae5b28 Ensure it is clear to the user why there has been an error. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 13:49:40 UTC |
| 0a30745 | Matt Caswell | 24 August 2016, 12:54:05 UTC | Fix no-ec2m The new curves test did not take into account no-ec2m Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 13:44:19 UTC |
| 1beca67 | Richard Levitte | 24 August 2016, 07:14:44 UTC | CRYPTO_atomic_add(): check that the object is lock free If not, fall back to our own code, using the given mutex Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 13:37:48 UTC |
| 11fc6c7 | Richard Levitte | 24 August 2016, 10:01:39 UTC | CRYPTO_atomic_add(): use acquire release memory order rather than relaxed For increments, the relaxed model is fine. For decrements, it's recommended to use the acquire release model. We therefore go for the latter. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 13:37:40 UTC |
| cb4b54c | Richard Levitte | 24 August 2016, 11:03:20 UTC | Check for __GNUC__ to use GNU C atomic buildins Note: we trust any other compiler that fully implements GNU extension to define __GNUC__ RT#4642 Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 13:37:30 UTC |
| 63db6b7 | Richard Levitte | 24 August 2016, 10:46:09 UTC | Trust RSA_check_key() to return correct values In apps/rsa.c, we were second guessing RSA_check_key() to leave error codes lying around without returning -1 properly. However, this also catches other errors that are lying around and that we should not care about. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 13:31:05 UTC |
| 55d83bf | Dr. Stephen Henson | 19 August 2016, 22:28:29 UTC | Avoid overflow in MDC2_Update() Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this issue. CVE-2016-6303 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 13:12:51 UTC |
| ef28891 | Rich Salz | 18 August 2016, 12:56:42 UTC | Put DES into "not default" category. Add CVE to CHANGES Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 13:05:52 UTC |
| d33726b | Rich Salz | 30 July 2016, 16:21:32 UTC | To avoid SWEET32 attack, move 3DES to weak Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 13:05:52 UTC |
| cfd20f6 | Rob Percival | 24 August 2016, 09:11:15 UTC | Typo fixes Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 12:58:19 UTC |
| ea4b7de | Rob Percival | 23 August 2016, 17:41:18 UTC | Updates the CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX POD Ownership semantics and function names have changed. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 12:58:19 UTC |
| 513a3cb | Rob Percival | 23 August 2016, 17:30:18 UTC | Correct documentation about SCT setters resetting validation status Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 12:58:19 UTC |
| e129810 | Rob Percival | 23 August 2016, 17:11:13 UTC | Removes the SCT_verify* POD SCT_verify_v1 has been removed and SCT_verify is no longer part of the public API. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 12:58:19 UTC |
| a0a9f36 | Rob Percival | 23 August 2016, 17:05:28 UTC | Documents the SCT validation functions Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 12:58:19 UTC |
| 76bfd2c | Rob Percival | 23 August 2016, 16:39:53 UTC | Removes {o2i,i2o}_SCT_signature from PODs These functions have been removed from the public API. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 12:58:19 UTC |
| 5edcadb | Rob Percival | 23 August 2016, 15:51:57 UTC | Documents the CTLOG functions CTLOG_new_null() has been removed from the code, so it has also been removed from this POD. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 12:58:19 UTC |
| 0e74d7c | Rob Percival | 23 August 2016, 15:17:09 UTC | Document the i2o and o2i SCT functions Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 12:58:19 UTC |
| a8d5d13 | Rob Percival | 23 August 2016, 15:16:32 UTC | Removes d2i_SCT_LIST.pod This is covered by d2i_X509.pod. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 12:58:19 UTC |
| 4cfdabb | Rob Percival | 05 August 2016, 12:40:05 UTC | Document that SCT_set_source returns 0 on failure. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 12:58:19 UTC |
| 882babd | Rob Percival | 04 August 2016, 17:41:23 UTC | Clarifies the format of a log's public key in the CONF file Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 12:58:19 UTC |
| 4a388d1 | Rob Percival | 04 August 2016, 16:05:18 UTC | Refer to OPENSSLDIR rather than "the OpenSSL install directory" The prior wording was less accurate. See https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1372#discussion_r73127000. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 12:58:19 UTC |
| 32fa3da | Rob Percival | 04 August 2016, 15:42:42 UTC | Adds history section to CT PODs Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 12:58:19 UTC |
| e469945 | Rob Percival | 04 August 2016, 10:37:35 UTC | Fixes final issue in CT PODs highlighted by util/find-doc-nits.pl Fixes complaint "ct missing from SYNOPSIS". Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 12:58:19 UTC |
| 4eabbe9 | Rob Percival | 04 August 2016, 10:36:11 UTC | Renames CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX.pod to CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_new.pod util/fix-doc-nits.pl complains that "CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX (filename) missing from NAME section". Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 12:58:19 UTC |
| 7a2c739 | Rob Percival | 04 August 2016, 10:29:36 UTC | Adds copyright section to ct.pod Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 12:58:19 UTC |
| 6c3e9a7 | Rob Percival | 04 August 2016, 10:29:23 UTC | Adds newline after =cut in PODs util/find-doc-nits.pl complains that the file "doesn't end with =cut". Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 12:58:19 UTC |
| cb8145f | Rob Percival | 04 August 2016, 10:28:04 UTC | Adds missing function names to NAME section of PODs Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 12:58:19 UTC |
| ae97a65 | Rob Percival | 02 August 2016, 14:39:41 UTC | Add enum definitions to CT pods Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 12:58:19 UTC |
| 8b12a3e | Rob Percival | 02 August 2016, 14:39:23 UTC | Remove unnecessary bold tags in CT pods Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 12:58:19 UTC |
| b4a9861 | Rob Percival | 01 August 2016, 19:08:11 UTC | Add comment about calling CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_free Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 12:58:19 UTC |
| efa00a4 | Rob Percival | 01 August 2016, 19:07:15 UTC | Fix comment about what SCT_LIST_validate does. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 12:58:19 UTC |
| 0620ecd | Rob Percival | 01 August 2016, 14:37:10 UTC | Add SSL_get0_peer_scts to ssl.pod Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 12:58:19 UTC |
| 6b13bd1 | Rob Percival | 01 August 2016, 14:36:38 UTC | Fix comment about return value of ct_extract_tls_extension_scts Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 12:58:19 UTC |
| 56f3f71 | Rob Percival | 28 April 2016, 06:37:24 UTC | First draft of CT documentation Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 12:58:19 UTC |
| c42b8a6 | Matt Caswell | 24 August 2016, 10:28:58 UTC | Remove some dead code from rec_layer_s3.c It is never valid to call ssl3_read_bytes with type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, and in fact we check for valid values for type near the beginning of the function. Therefore this check will never be true and can be removed. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 10:28:58 UTC |
| fe81a1b | Matt Caswell | 24 August 2016, 10:25:23 UTC | Remove useless assignment The variable assignment c1 is never read before it is overwritten. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 10:25:23 UTC |
| 08f6ae5 | Matt Caswell | 24 August 2016, 10:22:47 UTC | Fix some resource leaks in the apps Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 10:22:47 UTC |
| c74aea8 | Andy Polyakov | 19 August 2016, 21:18:35 UTC | ec/ecp_nistz256: harmonize is_infinity with ec_GFp_simple_is_at_infinity. RT#4625 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 09:55:11 UTC |
| e3057a5 | Andy Polyakov | 19 August 2016, 21:16:04 UTC | ec/ecp_nistz256: harmonize is_infinity with ec_GFp_simple_is_at_infinity. RT#4625 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 09:55:02 UTC |
| dfde421 | Andy Polyakov | 20 August 2016, 20:10:24 UTC | ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-*.pl: addition to perform stricter reduction. Addition was not preserving inputs' property of being fully reduced. Thanks to Brian Smith for reporting this. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 09:44:56 UTC |
| b62b245 | Andy Polyakov | 20 August 2016, 20:04:21 UTC | ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl: addition to perform stricter reduction. Addition was not preserving inputs' property of being fully reduced. Thanks to Brian Smith for reporting this. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 09:44:48 UTC |
| 9e42196 | Andy Polyakov | 23 August 2016, 11:31:36 UTC | evp/bio_enc.c: stop using pointer arithmetic for error detection. Thanks to David Benjamin for reporting this. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 09:34:27 UTC |
| 44cb4f5 | Matt Caswell | 23 August 2016, 19:49:26 UTC | Fix no-sock The declaration of bio_type_lock is independent of no-sock so should not be inside OPENSSL_NO_SOCK guards. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 24 August 2016, 08:25:53 UTC |
| e97763c | Dr. Stephen Henson | 22 August 2016, 16:20:01 UTC | Sanity check ticket length. If a ticket callback changes the HMAC digest to SHA512 the existing sanity checks are not sufficient and an attacker could perform a DoS attack with a malformed ticket. Add additional checks based on HMAC size. Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this bug. CVE-2016-6302 Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> | 23 August 2016, 22:16:24 UTC |
| 652c52a | Andy Polyakov | 23 August 2016, 07:45:03 UTC | 80-test_pkcs12.t: skip the test on Windows with non-Greek locale. Test doesn't work on Windows with non-Greek locale, because of Win32 perl[!] limitation, not OpenSSL. For example it passes on Cygwin and MSYS... Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 23 August 2016, 20:05:04 UTC |
| 2338ad8 | David Benjamin | 23 August 2016, 05:39:24 UTC | Fix math in BN_bn2dec comment. The bound on log(2)/3 on the second line is incorrect and has an extra zero compared to the divisions in the third line. log(2)/3 = 0.10034... which is bounded by 0.101 and not 0.1001. The divisions actually correspond to 0.101 which is fine. The third line also dropped a factor of three. The actual code appears to be fine. Just the comments are wrong. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 23 August 2016, 19:37:58 UTC |
| fa51541 | Rob Percival | 23 August 2016, 17:31:16 UTC | SCT_set_source resets validation_status This makes it consistent with all of the other SCT setters. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 23 August 2016, 19:31:03 UTC |
| eb96e8b | Rob Percival | 23 August 2016, 16:35:14 UTC | Document that o2i_SCT_signature can leave the SCT in an inconsistent state Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 23 August 2016, 19:23:28 UTC |
| 63e27d4 | Rob Percival | 23 August 2016, 16:27:35 UTC | Removes {i2o,o2i}_SCT_signature from the CT public API They may return if an SCT_signature struct is added in the future that allows them to be refactored to conform to the i2d/d2i function signature conventions. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 23 August 2016, 19:23:28 UTC |
| 986dbbb | Rob Percival | 23 August 2016, 15:55:09 UTC | Prevent double-free of CTLOG public key Previously, if ct_v1_log_id_from_pkey failed, public_key would be freed by CTLOG_free at the end of the function, and then again by the caller (who would assume ownership was not transferred when CTLOG_new returned NULL). Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 23 August 2016, 19:17:14 UTC |
| cdb2a60 | Rob Percival | 23 August 2016, 11:52:43 UTC | Internalizes SCT_verify and removes SCT_verify_v1 SCT_verify is impossible to call through the public API (SCT_CTX_new() is not part of the public API), so rename it to SCT_CTX_verify and move it out of the public API. SCT_verify_v1 is redundant, since SCT_validate does the same verification (by calling SCT_verify) and more. The API is less confusing with a single verification function (SCT_validate). Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 23 August 2016, 19:12:25 UTC |
| 5579eab | Kurt Roeckx | 12 August 2016, 16:54:11 UTC | Update fuzz corpora This is a new minimal corpus with the following changes: - asn1: files: 1135 (+474), tuples: 27236 (+7496) - asn1parse: files: 305 (-3), tuples: 8758 (+11) - bignum: files: 370 (-1), tuples: 9547 (+10) - bndiv: files: 160 (+0), tuples: 2416 (+6) - cms: files: 155 (-1), tuples: 3408 (+0) - conf: files: 231 (-11), tuples: 4668 (+3) - crl: files: 905 (+188), tuples: 22876 (+4096) - ct: files: 117 (+35), tuples: 3557 (+908) - x509: files: 920, tuples: 28334 Note that tuple count depends on the binary and is random. Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 23 August 2016, 19:01:54 UTC |
| 0fe9123 | FdaSilvaYY | 19 August 2016, 17:44:10 UTC | Constify a bit X509_NAME_get_entry Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 23 August 2016, 09:47:22 UTC |
| 9f5466b | FdaSilvaYY | 07 July 2016, 21:45:55 UTC | Constify some X509_NAME, ASN1 printing code ASN1_buf_print, asn1_print_*, X509_NAME_oneline, X509_NAME_print Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 23 August 2016, 09:47:22 UTC |
| bf9d5e4 | FdaSilvaYY | 11 August 2016, 22:40:49 UTC | Constify some input parameters. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 23 August 2016, 09:47:22 UTC |
| a026fbf | FdaSilvaYY | 06 August 2016, 15:54:32 UTC | Constify some inputs buffers remove useless cast to call ASN1_STRING_set Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 23 August 2016, 09:47:22 UTC |
| 35da893 | FdaSilvaYY | 02 August 2016, 18:19:00 UTC | Constify ASN1_PCTX_* ... add a static keyword. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 23 August 2016, 09:47:22 UTC |
| 61884b8 | Matt Caswell | 22 August 2016, 15:11:55 UTC | Fix bio_enc_test There was a block of code at the start that used the Camellia cipher. The original idea behind this was to fill the buffer with non-zero data so that oversteps can be detected. However this block failed when using no-camellia. This has been replaced with a RAND_bytes() call. I also updated the the CTR test section, since it seems to be using a CBC cipher instead of a CTR cipher. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> | 23 August 2016, 08:24:29 UTC |
| 8b7c51a | Matt Caswell | 22 August 2016, 23:01:57 UTC | Add some sanity checks when checking CRL scores Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> | 22 August 2016, 23:19:15 UTC |
| c6231e9 | Matt Caswell | 22 August 2016, 22:53:09 UTC | Remove some dead code The assignment to ret is dead, because ret is assigned again later. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> | 22 August 2016, 23:19:15 UTC |
| a36c5ea | Matt Caswell | 22 August 2016, 22:41:15 UTC | Sanity check an ASN1_object_size result If it's negative don't try and malloc it. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> | 22 August 2016, 23:19:15 UTC |
| b197257 | Matt Caswell | 22 August 2016, 22:39:28 UTC | Check for error return from ASN1_object_size Otherwise we try to malloc a -1 size. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> | 22 August 2016, 23:19:15 UTC |
| 4d94bd3 | Matt Caswell | 22 August 2016, 22:34:30 UTC | Check for malloc error in bn_x931p.c Ensure BN_CTX_get() has been successful Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> | 22 August 2016, 23:19:15 UTC |
| 4162c7d | Matt Caswell | 22 August 2016, 22:23:31 UTC | Fix mem leak on error path The mem pointed to by cAB can be leaked on an error path. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> | 22 August 2016, 23:19:15 UTC |
| 85d6b09 | Matt Caswell | 22 August 2016, 22:20:45 UTC | Fix mem leak on error path The mem pointed to by cAB can be leaked on an error path. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> | 22 August 2016, 23:19:15 UTC |
| c72b8e0 | Matt Caswell | 22 August 2016, 22:18:50 UTC | Fix mem leak on error path The mem pointed to by tmp can be leaked on an error path. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> | 22 August 2016, 23:19:15 UTC |
| 030648c | Matt Caswell | 22 August 2016, 21:27:27 UTC | Ensure the mime_hdr_free function can handle NULLs Sometimes it is called with a NULL pointer Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> | 22 August 2016, 23:19:15 UTC |
| 2b201c5 | Matt Caswell | 22 August 2016, 21:21:30 UTC | Ensure CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_free behaves properly with a NULL arg Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> | 22 August 2016, 23:19:15 UTC |
| 2f3930b | Matt Caswell | 22 August 2016, 21:17:20 UTC | Fix leak on error in tls_construct_cke_gost Don't leak pke_ctx on error. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> | 22 August 2016, 23:19:15 UTC |
| b1b22b0 | Kurt Roeckx | 20 August 2016, 17:51:14 UTC | Test the support curves in tls Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1472 | 22 August 2016, 20:13:04 UTC |
| 2d87ee6 | FdaSilvaYY | 20 August 2016, 16:31:45 UTC | Closing output file from inside the loop who open it Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1471 | 22 August 2016, 19:32:04 UTC |
| 1c55e37 | Matt Caswell | 22 August 2016, 15:04:47 UTC | Fix no-des The PKCS12 command line utility is not available if no-des is used. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 22 August 2016, 15:39:28 UTC |
| 464d59a | Rich Salz | 22 August 2016, 15:25:12 UTC | RT2676: Reject RSA eponent if even or 1 Also, re-organize RSA check to use goto err. Add a test case. Try all checks, not just stopping at first (via Richard Levitte) Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 22 August 2016, 15:25:12 UTC |
| a66234b | Richard Levitte | 17 August 2016, 13:39:49 UTC | Configure: Properly cache the configured compiler command Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 22 August 2016, 14:12:42 UTC |
| 0110a47 | Kazuki Yamaguchi | 06 August 2016, 13:24:44 UTC | Fix a memory leak in EC_GROUP_get_ecparameters() The variable 'buffer', allocated by EC_POINT_point2buf(), isn't free'd on the success path. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 22 August 2016, 14:10:03 UTC |
| 9ba6f34 | Kazuki Yamaguchi | 16 August 2016, 04:55:34 UTC | Expose alloc functions for EC{PK,}PARAMETERS Declare EC{PK,}PARAMETERS_{new,free} functions in public headers. The free functions are necessary because EC_GROUP_get_ec{pk,}parameters() was made public by commit 60b350a3ef96 ("RT3676: Expose ECgroup i2d functions"). Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 22 August 2016, 14:10:02 UTC |
| fb2141c | FdaSilvaYY | 17 August 2016, 22:51:20 UTC | Fix loopargs_t object duplication into ASYNC context Code was relying on an implicit data-sharing through duplication of loopargs_t pointer-members made by ASYNC_start_job(). Now share structure address instead of structure content. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 22 August 2016, 14:03:51 UTC |
| 0038ad4 | Richard Levitte | 22 August 2016, 13:25:34 UTC | Avoid more compiler warnings for use of uninitialised variables Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> | 22 August 2016, 13:36:35 UTC |
| 599e590 | Richard Levitte | 22 August 2016, 12:53:53 UTC | Make 'openssl req -x509' more equivalent to 'openssl req -new' The following would fail, or rather, freeze: openssl genrsa -out rsa2048.pem 2048 openssl req -x509 -key rsa2048.pem -keyform PEM -out cert.pem In that case, the second command wants to read a certificate request from stdin, because -x509 wasn't fully flagged as being for creating something new. This changes makes it fully flagged. RT#4655 Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> | 22 August 2016, 13:28:00 UTC |
| 3ba1ef8 | Andy Polyakov | 16 March 2016, 22:33:53 UTC | bn/asm/x86[_64]-mont*.pl: implement slightly alternative page-walking. Original strategy for page-walking was adjust stack pointer and then touch pages in order. This kind of asks for double-fault, because if touch fails, then signal will be delivered to frame above adjusted stack pointer. But touching pages prior adjusting stack pointer would upset valgrind. As compromise let's adjust stack pointer in pages, touching top of the stack. This still asks for double-fault, but at least prevents corruption of neighbour stack if allocation is to overstep the guard page. Also omit predict-non-taken hints as they reportedly trigger illegal instructions in some VM setups. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 22 August 2016, 12:58:32 UTC |
| fe34735 | Matt Caswell | 22 August 2016, 09:42:08 UTC | Choose a ciphersuite for testing that won't be affected by "no-*" options The previous ciphersuite broke in no-ec builds. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 22 August 2016, 12:52:02 UTC |
| 099e296 | Kazuki Yamaguchi | 21 August 2016, 17:36:36 UTC | Fix overflow check in BN_bn2dec() Fix an off by one error in the overflow check added by 07bed46f332fc ("Check for errors in BN_bn2dec()"). Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 22 August 2016, 12:38:48 UTC |
| 1c28887 | Richard Levitte | 22 August 2016, 12:02:31 UTC | ssltestlib: Tell compiler we don't care about the value when we don't In mempacket_test_read(), we've already fetched the top value of the stack, so when we shift the stack, we don't care for the value. The compiler needs to be told, or it will complain harshly when we tell it to be picky. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 22 August 2016, 12:02:31 UTC |
| 1194ea8 | Andy Polyakov | 26 July 2016, 14:42:41 UTC | crypto/pkcs12: facilitate accessing data with non-interoperable password. Originally PKCS#12 subroutines treated password strings as ASCII. It worked as long as they were pure ASCII, but if there were some none-ASCII characters result was non-interoperable. But fixing it poses problem accessing data protected with broken password. In order to make asscess to old data possible add retry with old-style password. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 22 August 2016, 11:52:59 UTC |
| b799aef | Andy Polyakov | 25 July 2016, 23:48:01 UTC | crypto/pkcs12: default to UTF-8. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 22 August 2016, 11:52:55 UTC |
| 70bf33d | Andy Polyakov | 25 July 2016, 23:46:03 UTC | Add PKCS#12 UTF-8 interoperability test. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 22 August 2016, 11:52:51 UTC |
| 9e6b2f5 | Andy Polyakov | 24 November 2015, 22:34:51 UTC | crypto/pkcs12: add UTF8 support. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 22 August 2016, 11:50:04 UTC |
| 5cb4d64 | Matt Caswell | 30 June 2016, 14:06:27 UTC | Prevent DTLS Finished message injection Follow on from CVE-2016-2179 The investigation and analysis of CVE-2016-2179 highlighted a related flaw. This commit fixes a security "near miss" in the buffered message handling code. Ultimately this is not currently believed to be exploitable due to the reasons outlined below, and therefore there is no CVE for this on its own. The issue this commit fixes is a MITM attack where the attacker can inject a Finished message into the handshake. In the description below it is assumed that the attacker injects the Finished message for the server to receive it. The attack could work equally well the other way around (i.e where the client receives the injected Finished message). The MITM requires the following capabilities: - The ability to manipulate the MTU that the client selects such that it is small enough for the client to fragment Finished messages. - The ability to selectively drop and modify records sent from the client - The ability to inject its own records and send them to the server The MITM forces the client to select a small MTU such that the client will fragment the Finished message. Ideally for the attacker the first fragment will contain all but the last byte of the Finished message, with the second fragment containing the final byte. During the handshake and prior to the client sending the CCS the MITM injects a plaintext Finished message fragment to the server containing all but the final byte of the Finished message. The message sequence number should be the one expected to be used for the real Finished message. OpenSSL will recognise that the received fragment is for the future and will buffer it for later use. After the client sends the CCS it then sends its own Finished message in two fragments. The MITM causes the first of these fragments to be dropped. The OpenSSL server will then receive the second of the fragments and reassemble the complete Finished message consisting of the MITM fragment and the final byte from the real client. The advantage to the attacker in injecting a Finished message is that this provides the capability to modify other handshake messages (e.g. the ClientHello) undetected. A difficulty for the attacker is knowing in advance what impact any of those changes might have on the final byte of the handshake hash that is going to be sent in the "real" Finished message. In the worst case for the attacker this means that only 1 in 256 of such injection attempts will succeed. It may be possible in some situations for the attacker to improve this such that all attempts succeed. For example if the handshake includes client authentication then the final message flight sent by the client will include a Certificate. Certificates are ASN.1 objects where the signed portion is DER encoded. The non-signed portion could be BER encoded and so the attacker could re-encode the certificate such that the hash for the whole handshake comes to a different value. The certificate re-encoding would not be detectable because only the non-signed portion is changed. As this is the final flight of messages sent from the client the attacker knows what the complete hanshake hash value will be that the client will send - and therefore knows what the final byte will be. Through a process of trial and error the attacker can re-encode the certificate until the modified handhshake also has a hash with the same final byte. This means that when the Finished message is verified by the server it will be correct in all cases. In practice the MITM would need to be able to perform the same attack against both the client and the server. If the attack is only performed against the server (say) then the server will not detect the modified handshake, but the client will and will abort the connection. Fortunately, although OpenSSL is vulnerable to Finished message injection, it is not vulnerable if *both* client and server are OpenSSL. The reason is that OpenSSL has a hard "floor" for a minimum MTU size that it will never go below. This minimum means that a Finished message will never be sent in a fragmented form and therefore the MITM does not have one of its pre-requisites. Therefore this could only be exploited if using OpenSSL and some other DTLS peer that had its own and separate Finished message injection flaw. The fix is to ensure buffered messages are cleared on epoch change. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 22 August 2016, 09:53:55 UTC |
| f5c7f5d | Matt Caswell | 30 June 2016, 12:17:08 UTC | Fix DTLS buffered message DoS attack DTLS can handle out of order record delivery. Additionally since handshake messages can be bigger than will fit into a single packet, the messages can be fragmented across multiple records (as with normal TLS). That means that the messages can arrive mixed up, and we have to reassemble them. We keep a queue of buffered messages that are "from the future", i.e. messages we're not ready to deal with yet but have arrived early. The messages held there may not be full yet - they could be one or more fragments that are still in the process of being reassembled. The code assumes that we will eventually complete the reassembly and when that occurs the complete message is removed from the queue at the point that we need to use it. However, DTLS is also tolerant of packet loss. To get around that DTLS messages can be retransmitted. If we receive a full (non-fragmented) message from the peer after previously having received a fragment of that message, then we ignore the message in the queue and just use the non-fragmented version. At that point the queued message will never get removed. Additionally the peer could send "future" messages that we never get to in order to complete the handshake. Each message has a sequence number (starting from 0). We will accept a message fragment for the current message sequence number, or for any sequence up to 10 into the future. However if the Finished message has a sequence number of 2, anything greater than that in the queue is just left there. So, in those two ways we can end up with "orphaned" data in the queue that will never get removed - except when the connection is closed. At that point all the queues are flushed. An attacker could seek to exploit this by filling up the queues with lots of large messages that are never going to be used in order to attempt a DoS by memory exhaustion. I will assume that we are only concerned with servers here. It does not seem reasonable to be concerned about a memory exhaustion attack on a client. They are unlikely to process enough connections for this to be an issue. A "long" handshake with many messages might be 5 messages long (in the incoming direction), e.g. ClientHello, Certificate, ClientKeyExchange, CertificateVerify, Finished. So this would be message sequence numbers 0 to 4. Additionally we can buffer up to 10 messages in the future. Therefore the maximum number of messages that an attacker could send that could get orphaned would typically be 15. The maximum size that a DTLS message is allowed to be is defined by max_cert_list, which by default is 100k. Therefore the maximum amount of "orphaned" memory per connection is 1500k. Message sequence numbers get reset after the Finished message, so renegotiation will not extend the maximum number of messages that can be orphaned per connection. As noted above, the queues do get cleared when the connection is closed. Therefore in order to mount an effective attack, an attacker would have to open many simultaneous connections. Issue reported by Quan Luo. CVE-2016-2179 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 22 August 2016, 09:53:55 UTC |
