ad0fb7f | Sergey Agievich | 01 June 2015, 11:48:27 UTC | Add funtions to set item_sign and item_verify PR#3872 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> | 03 June 2015, 14:18:14 UTC |
b1d5b8a | Matt Caswell | 02 June 2015, 19:18:05 UTC | Fix compilation failure for some tool chains Some tool chains (e.g. android) do not define IP_PMTUDISC_PROBE, and so this build breaks. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 133dce447b259e0bb93076bf5fd0ce475d16910a) | 02 June 2015, 22:38:03 UTC |
fb22f74 | Annie Yousar | 03 May 2015, 13:05:47 UTC | RT3230: Better test for C identifier objects.pl only looked for a space to see if the name could be used as a C identifier. Improve the test to match the real C rules. Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 591b7aef05b22cba09b179e5787a9bf40dfc9508) | 02 June 2015, 21:17:43 UTC |
858de87 | Richard Levitte | 31 May 2015, 15:47:31 UTC | Add the macro OPENSSL_SYS_WIN64 This is for consistency. Additionally, have its presence define OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS as well. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 3f131556d6678bc3754f1e6d98a9a5bfc24e368c) Conflicts: e_os2.h | 02 June 2015, 16:03:36 UTC |
bd5b5b4 | Olaf Johansson | 02 June 2015, 11:41:35 UTC | GH249: Fix bad regexp in arg parsing. Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 8846adbd36c1de2b0d38a73ca32e28fde50083b8) | 02 June 2015, 15:25:24 UTC |
188f3f9 | Per Allansson | 02 June 2015, 08:38:28 UTC | Fix IP_MTU_DISCOVER typo The code in bss_dgram.c checks if IP_MTUDISCOVER is defined, where it should test for IP_MTU_DISCOVER RT#3888 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 0baaff1a76d4c91b9c1121059be63175454d7b03) | 02 June 2015, 11:59:11 UTC |
27c76b9 | Matt Caswell | 18 May 2015, 15:27:48 UTC | Fix race condition in NewSessionTicket If a NewSessionTicket is received by a multi-threaded client when attempting to reuse a previous ticket then a race condition can occur potentially leading to a double free of the ticket data. CVE-2015-1791 This also fixes RT#3808 where a session ID is changed for a session already in the client session cache. Since the session ID is the key to the cache this breaks the cache access. Parts of this patch were inspired by this Akamai change: https://github.com/akamai/openssl/commit/c0bf69a791239ceec64509f9f19fcafb2461b0d3 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 02 June 2015, 08:30:31 UTC |
8744ba5 | Matt Caswell | 29 May 2015, 16:05:01 UTC | Check the message type requested is the type received in DTLS dtls1_get_message has an |mt| variable which is the type of the message that is being requested. If it is negative then any message type is allowed. However the value of |mt| is not checked in one of the main code paths, so a peer can send a message of a completely different type and it will be processed as if it was the message type that we were expecting. This has very little practical consequences because the current behaviour will still fail when the format of the message isn't as expected. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 8c2b1d872b25f3ec78e04f5cd2de8f21e853c4a6) | 31 May 2015, 23:30:56 UTC |
4d9dc0c | Dr. Stephen Henson | 28 May 2015, 14:44:20 UTC | check for error when creating PKCS#8 structure Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 2849707fa65d2803e6d1c1603fdd3fd1fdc4c6cc) | 28 May 2015, 17:01:52 UTC |
7e36529 | Dr. Stephen Henson | 28 May 2015, 14:45:57 UTC | PEM doc fixes Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit f097f81c891bb1f479426d8ac9c9541390334983) | 28 May 2015, 17:01:52 UTC |
b6f33dc | Emilia Kasper | 22 May 2015, 16:35:50 UTC | Fix ssltest to use 1024-bit DHE parameters Also add more ciphersuite test coverage, and a negative test for 512-bit DHE. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 1ee85aab75d7c9f20058f781bfe9222323df08eb) | 26 May 2015, 10:42:40 UTC |
cdc47dc | Matt Caswell | 25 May 2015, 23:05:28 UTC | Don't check for a negative SRP extension size The size of the SRP extension can never be negative (the variable |size| is unsigned). Therefore don't check if it is less than zero. RT#3862 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 9c89d290834f3ed9146eeb8b64fe5de817679a0b) | 26 May 2015, 09:38:56 UTC |
9cab86e | Matt Caswell | 25 May 2015, 23:02:57 UTC | Fix error check in GOST engine The return value of i2d functions can be negative if an error occurs. Therefore don't assign the return value to an unsigned type and *then* check if it is negative. RT#3862 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 90e7cdff3aa66779486914f88333f6601f0c1cf4) | 26 May 2015, 09:38:56 UTC |
e40d7c1 | Matt Caswell | 25 May 2015, 22:57:41 UTC | Handle unsigned struct timeval members The members of struct timeval on OpenVMS are unsigned. The logic for calculating timeouts needs adjusting to deal with this. RT#3862 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit fc52ac9028b9492fb086ba35a3352ea46e03ecfc) | 26 May 2015, 09:38:56 UTC |
3ae6186 | Andy Polyakov | 26 May 2015, 07:47:35 UTC | Housekeeping 'make TABLE' update. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 26 May 2015, 08:23:21 UTC |
aa1e422 | Andy Polyakov | 26 May 2015, 07:47:16 UTC | Configure: replace -mv8 with -mcpu=v8 in SPARC config lines. RT#3860 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 26 May 2015, 08:22:01 UTC |
bec1093 | Billy Brumley | 22 May 2015, 14:44:49 UTC | fix copy paste error in ec_GF2m function prototypes RT#3858 Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 71f6130b7a96bacbffae4611796ed98c2f724d96) | 26 May 2015, 08:14:19 UTC |
78ac7fa | Andy Polyakov | 25 May 2015, 08:17:14 UTC | bn/bn_lcl.h: fix MIPS-specific gcc version check. RT#3859 Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 60c268b21ac81cc6b1af5c5470282a613b96f6fd) | 26 May 2015, 08:07:59 UTC |
11414f1 | Matt Caswell | 23 May 2015, 20:51:21 UTC | Don't send an alert if we've just received one If the record received is for a version that we don't support, previously we were sending an alert back. However if the incoming record already looks like an alert then probably we shouldn't do that. So suppress an outgoing alert if it looks like we've got one incoming. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org> | 25 May 2015, 16:52:27 UTC |
0a59e2d | Andy Polyakov | 20 May 2015, 07:36:48 UTC | bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl: fix valgrind error. bn_get_bits5 was overstepping array boundary by 1 byte. It was exclusively read overstep and data could not have been used. The only potential problem would be if array happens to end on the very edge of last accesible page. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 69567687b0b7ed67831c17a010f4d46dfd059aef) | 24 May 2015, 19:31:49 UTC |
0945bfc | Andy Polyakov | 20 May 2015, 07:24:36 UTC | bn/bn_gf2m.c: appease STACK, unstable code detector. RT#3852 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 86e5d1e32b2d702a5fc777e612cd746e790098ef) | 24 May 2015, 19:27:32 UTC |
f5d840a | Andy Polyakov | 13 May 2015, 20:19:59 UTC | bn/asm/vis3-mont.pl: fix intermittent EC failures on SPARC T3. BLKINIT optimization worked on T4, but for some reason appears "too aggressive" for T3 triggering intermiitent EC failures. It's not clear why only EC is affected... Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 579734ced696125c0768a2f4e56e97939b0e6e49) | 24 May 2015, 11:26:37 UTC |
886ef2b | Richard Levitte | 23 May 2015, 04:33:41 UTC | Fix update and depend in engines/ The update: target in engines/ didn't recurse into engines/ccgost. The update: and depend: targets in engines/ccgost needed a fixup. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 8b822d2566853ee5e313c37529f71336209b28ab) | 23 May 2015, 09:08:12 UTC |
8b89cb3 | Richard Levitte | 22 May 2015, 17:23:43 UTC | Missed a couple of spots in the update change Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 6f45032f6730622e8d484d92e07c7fce7d1f88ac) Conflicts: apps/Makefile | 23 May 2015, 04:25:12 UTC |
bf42354 | Richard Levitte | 22 May 2015, 15:54:06 UTC | Fix the update target and remove duplicate file updates We had updates of certain header files in both Makefile.org and the Makefile in the directory the header file lived in. This is error prone and also sometimes generates slightly different results (usually just a comment that differs) depending on which way the update was done. This removes the file update targets from the top level Makefile, adds an update: target in all Makefiles and has it depend on the depend: or local_depend: targets, whichever is appropriate, so we don't get a double run through the whole file tree. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 0f539dc1a2f45580435c39dada44dd276e79cb88) Conflicts: Makefile.org apps/Makefile test/Makefile | 23 May 2015, 04:25:12 UTC |
e4731f7 | Matt Caswell | 22 May 2015, 12:48:49 UTC | Fix typo setting up certificate masks The certificate masks are used to select which ciphersuite we are going to use. The variables |emask_k| and |emask_a| relate to export grade key exchange and authentication respecitively. The variables |mask_k| and |mask_a| are the equivalent versions for non-export grade. This fixes an instance where the two usages of export/non-export were mixed up. In practice it makes little difference since it still works! Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit fdfe8b06ae97da3bc3a77aa3db00f8e0445f3c70) | 22 May 2015, 23:01:48 UTC |
595487e | Matt Caswell | 22 May 2015, 12:33:19 UTC | Remove export static DH ciphersuites Remove support for the two export grade static DH ciphersuites. These two ciphersuites were newly added (along with a number of other static DH ciphersuites) to 1.0.2. However the two export ones have *never* worked since they were introduced. It seems strange in any case to be adding new export ciphersuites, and given "logjam" it also does not seem correct to fix them. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 13f8eb4730b9fc039e743870f81e5ff54b3d05b8) Conflicts: CHANGES | 22 May 2015, 23:01:45 UTC |
c6eb1cb | Matt Caswell | 19 May 2015, 15:03:02 UTC | Fix off-by-one in BN_rand If BN_rand is called with |bits| set to 1 and |top| set to 1 then a 1 byte buffer overflow can occur. There are no such instances within the OpenSSL at the moment. Thanks to Mateusz Kocielski (LogicalTrust), Marek Kroemeke, Filip Palian for discovering and reporting this issue. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org> | 22 May 2015, 22:43:07 UTC |
1a9499c | Matt Caswell | 19 May 2015, 14:19:30 UTC | Reject negative shifts for BN_rshift and BN_lshift The functions BN_rshift and BN_lshift shift their arguments to the right or left by a specified number of bits. Unpredicatable results (including crashes) can occur if a negative number is supplied for the shift value. Thanks to Mateusz Kocielski (LogicalTrust), Marek Kroemeke and Filip Palian for discovering and reporting this issue. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 7cc18d8158b5fc2676393d99b51c30c135502107) Conflicts: crypto/bn/bn.h crypto/bn/bn_err.c | 22 May 2015, 22:19:34 UTC |
254c01e | Lubom | 07 May 2015, 13:20:31 UTC | Lost alert in DTLS If a client receives a bad hello request in DTLS then the alert is not sent correctly. RT#2801 Signed-off-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 4dc1aa0436fdb8af50960db676b739c8ef81f38c) | 22 May 2015, 08:44:44 UTC |
2d8e705 | Kurt Roeckx | 18 April 2015, 10:50:25 UTC | Correctly check for export size limit 40 bit ciphers are limited to 512 bit RSA, 56 bit ciphers to 1024 bit. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit ac38115c1a4fb61c66c2a8cd2a9800751828d328) | 20 May 2015, 20:19:34 UTC |
f4d1fb7 | Emilia Kasper | 20 May 2015, 13:47:51 UTC | Only support >= 256-bit elliptic curves with ecdh_auto (server) or by default (client). Also reorder preferences to prefer prime curves to binary curves, and P-256 to everything else. The result: $ openssl s_server -named_curves "auto" This command will negotiate an ECDHE ciphersuite with P-256: $ openssl s_client This command will negotiate P-384: $ openssl s_client -curves "P-384" This command will not negotiate ECDHE because P-224 is disabled with "auto": $ openssl s_client -curves "P-224" Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 20 May 2015, 14:04:37 UTC |
10a70da | Emilia Kasper | 19 May 2015, 09:53:31 UTC | client: reject handshakes with DH parameters < 768 bits. Since the client has no way of communicating her supported parameter range to the server, connections to servers that choose weak DH will simply fail. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org> | 20 May 2015, 12:54:51 UTC |
dcbc03e | Emilia Kasper | 12 May 2015, 14:10:05 UTC | Update documentation with Diffie-Hellman best practices. - Do not advise generation of DH parameters with dsaparam to save computation time. - Promote use of custom parameters more, and explicitly forbid use of built-in parameters weaker than 2048 bits. - Advise the callback to ignore <keylength> - it is currently called with 1024 bits, but this value can and should be safely ignored by servers. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 20 May 2015, 12:54:51 UTC |
b32aa8e | Emilia Kasper | 13 May 2015, 10:05:41 UTC | dhparam: fix documentation The default bitlength is now 2048. Also clarify that either the number of bits or the generator must be present: $ openssl dhparam -2 and $ openssl dhparam 2048 generate parameters but $ openssl dhparam does not. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 20 May 2015, 12:54:51 UTC |
82697bc | Emilia Kasper | 12 May 2015, 18:15:46 UTC | s_server: Use 2048-bit DH parameters by default. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 20 May 2015, 12:54:51 UTC |
17b753f | StudioEtrange | 20 May 2015, 08:33:57 UTC | GitHub284: Fix typo in xx-32.pl scripts. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 20 May 2015, 08:34:42 UTC |
cdcb94e | Robert Swiecki | 18 May 2015, 23:08:02 UTC | Don't add write errors into bytecounts Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 00d565cfbe90fab3b157e644caca4eb4a2ebec79) | 19 May 2015, 11:20:18 UTC |
051b41d | Andy Polyakov | 15 July 2012, 13:40:04 UTC | mk1mf.pl: replace chop for windows. Backport old patch to make it work in mixture of perls for Windows. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Cherry-picked from 7bb98eee3c9e4694dfc2217001d5075ce8d2906e | 15 May 2015, 18:18:21 UTC |
c59bd61 | Rich Salz | 08 May 2015, 20:06:50 UTC | RT1207: document SSL_COMP_free_compression_methods. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit c490a5512e988559a830c15b8efb1d0376f2e282) | 13 May 2015, 17:03:32 UTC |
f34b095 | Rich Salz | 12 May 2015, 15:49:32 UTC | Add NULL checks from master The big "don't check for NULL" cleanup requires backporting some of the lowest-level functions to actually do nothing if NULL is given. This will make it easier to backport fixes to release branches, where master assumes those lower-level functions are "safe" This commit addresses those tickets: 3798 3799 3801. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 13 May 2015, 16:55:03 UTC |
d3bb25e | Andy Polyakov | 21 April 2015, 12:52:17 UTC | aes/asm/aesni-sha256-x86_64.pl: fix Windows compilation failure with old assembler. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 82c4a079395223c0063100854a0981976db9848f) | 13 May 2015, 15:00:06 UTC |
eba8bf4 | Hanno Böck | 11 May 2015, 10:33:37 UTC | Call of memcmp with null pointers in obj_cmp() The function obj_cmp() (file crypto/objects/obj_dat.c) can in some situations call memcmp() with a null pointer and a zero length. This is invalid behaviour. When compiling openssl with undefined behaviour sanitizer (add -fsanitize=undefined to compile flags) this can be seen. One example that triggers this behaviour is the pkcs7 command (but there are others, e.g. I've seen it with the timestamp function): apps/openssl pkcs7 -in test/testp7.pem What happens is that obj_cmp takes objects of the type ASN1_OBJECT and passes their ->data pointer to memcmp. Zero-sized ASN1_OBJECT structures can have a null pointer as data. RT#3816 Signed-off-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 2b8dc08b74fc3c6d4c2fc855cc23bac691d985be) | 13 May 2015, 14:28:48 UTC |
464774d | Matt Caswell | 06 May 2015, 20:31:16 UTC | Don't allow a CCS when expecting a CertificateVerify Currently we set change_cipher_spec_ok to 1 before calling ssl3_get_cert_verify(). This is because this message is optional and if it is not sent then the next thing we would expect to get is the CCS. However, although it is optional, we do actually know whether we should be receiving one in advance. If we have received a client cert then we should expect a CertificateVerify message. By the time we get to this point we will already have bombed out if we didn't get a Certificate when we should have done, so it is safe just to check whether |peer| is NULL or not. If it is we won't get a CertificateVerify, otherwise we will. Therefore we should change the logic so that we only attempt to get the CertificateVerify if we are expecting one, and not allow a CCS in this scenario. Whilst this is good practice for TLS it is even more important for DTLS. In DTLS messages can be lost. Therefore we may be in a situation where a CertificateVerify message does not arrive even though one was sent. In that case the next message the server will receive will be the CCS. This could also happen if messages get re-ordered in-flight. In DTLS if |change_cipher_spec_ok| is not set and a CCS is received it is ignored. However if |change_cipher_spec_ok| *is* set then a CCS arrival will immediately move the server into the next epoch. Any messages arriving for the previous epoch will be ignored. This means that, in this scenario, the handshake can never complete. The client will attempt to retransmit missing messages, but the server will ignore them because they are the wrong epoch. The server meanwhile will still be waiting for the CertificateVerify which is never going to arrive. RT#2958 Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit a0bd6493369d960abef11c2346b9bbb308b4285a) | 13 May 2015, 10:21:01 UTC |
833518c | Kurt Cancemi | 07 May 2015, 20:12:33 UTC | Add missing NULL check in X509V3_parse_list() Matt's note: I added a call to X509V3err to Kurt's original patch. RT#3840 Signed-off-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 344c271eb339fc2982e9a3584a94e51112d84584) | 11 May 2015, 11:19:54 UTC |
8a73e3a | Bjoern D. Rasmussen | 10 May 2015, 05:51:29 UTC | Fix for memcpy() and strcmp() being undefined. clang says: "s_cb.c:958:9: error: implicitly declaring library function 'memcpy'" Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 8f744cceff5bce8cb00a6ddd739c1bbb85c142ea) Conflicts: apps/s_cb.c | 11 May 2015, 11:03:12 UTC |
edc2a76 | Matt Caswell | 09 May 2015, 05:51:25 UTC | Check sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null return value If sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null() returns NULL then ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list() should also return NULL. Based on an original patch by mrpre <mrpre@163.com>. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 14def5f5375594830597cc153e11c6017f6adddf) | 11 May 2015, 10:53:50 UTC |
8dfe1e4 | Viktor Dukhovni | 07 May 2015, 17:43:36 UTC | Fix typo in valid_star Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com> | 07 May 2015, 18:00:38 UTC |
feb96e9 | Matt Caswell | 30 April 2015, 10:50:08 UTC | Add more error state transitions (DTLS) Ensure all fatal errors transition into the new error state for DTLS. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit cefc93910c4c0f7fa9f8c1f8f7aad084a7fa87d2) Conflicts: ssl/d1_srvr.c | 05 May 2015, 19:05:21 UTC |
67fb63e | Matt Caswell | 30 April 2015, 10:32:35 UTC | Add more error state transitions (client) Ensure all fatal errors transition into the new error state on the client side. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit cc273a93617a5c1e69cb5db6f655e463f8e31806) Conflicts: ssl/s3_clnt.c | 05 May 2015, 19:05:21 UTC |
eecc697 | Matt Caswell | 30 April 2015, 10:11:04 UTC | Add more error state transitions Ensure all fatal errors transition into the new error state on the server side. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit cf9b0b6fb253fd40225d7c648a08646686e62d2d) Conflicts: ssl/s3_srvr.c | 05 May 2015, 18:52:26 UTC |
e4f77bf | Matt Caswell | 23 April 2015, 19:01:33 UTC | Add Error state Reusing an SSL object when it has encountered a fatal error can have bad consequences. This is a bug in application code not libssl but libssl should be more forgiving and not crash. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit a89db885e0d8aac3a9df1bbccb0c1ddfd8b2e10a) Conflicts: ssl/s3_srvr.c ssl/ssl_stat.c | 05 May 2015, 18:50:12 UTC |
cd5f206 | Matt Caswell | 04 May 2015, 22:15:46 UTC | Remove libcrypto to libssl dependency Remove dependency on ssl_locl.h from v3_scts.c, and incidentally fix a build problem with kerberos (the dependency meant v3_scts.c was trying to include krb5.h, but without having been passed the relevanant -I flags to the compiler) Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit d13bd6130bd856e9f512c43499e5fc70943bf133) Conflicts: crypto/x509v3/v3_scts.c | 05 May 2015, 08:09:56 UTC |
3cf4060 | Richard Levitte | 04 May 2015, 15:34:40 UTC | RT2943: Check sizes if -iv and -K arguments RT2943 only complains about the incorrect check of -K argument size, we might as well do the same thing with the -iv argument. Before this, we only checked that the given argument wouldn't give a bitstring larger than EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH. we can be more precise and check against the size of the actual cipher used. (cherry picked from commit 8920a7cd04f43b1a090d0b0a8c9e16b94c6898d4) Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 04 May 2015, 18:21:21 UTC |
82e586a | Rich Salz | 04 May 2015, 14:34:51 UTC | Fix cut/paste error Was memset with wrong sizeof. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 23b0fa5ab6b6b9f0a9350e24ac5ddb8275802617) | 04 May 2015, 14:54:18 UTC |
a659386 | Gilles Khouzam | 02 May 2015, 02:20:42 UTC | RT3820: Don't call GetDesktopWindow() Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit bed2edf1cb73f1fe2c11029acc694086bc14443e) | 02 May 2015, 12:01:52 UTC |
5b38d54 | Rich Salz | 02 May 2015, 02:06:07 UTC | RT3776: Wrong size for malloc Use sizeof *foo parameter, to avoid these errors. Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 53ba0a9e91ad203de2943edaf1090ab17ec435fa) | 02 May 2015, 11:55:17 UTC |
6b3a315 | Hanno Böck | 02 May 2015, 02:27:20 UTC | Fix uninitialized variable. Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 539ed89f686866b82a9ec9a4c3b112878d29cd73) | 02 May 2015, 11:45:35 UTC |
f296e41 | Matt Caswell | 29 April 2015, 12:22:18 UTC | Fix buffer overrun in RSA signing The problem occurs in EVP_PKEY_sign() when using RSA with X931 padding. It is only triggered if the RSA key size is smaller than the digest length. So with SHA512 you can trigger the overflow with anything less than an RSA 512 bit key. I managed to trigger a 62 byte overflow when using a 16 bit RSA key. This wasn't sufficient to cause a crash, although your mileage may vary. In practice RSA keys of this length are never used and X931 padding is very rare. Even if someone did use an excessively short RSA key, the chances of them combining that with a longer digest and X931 padding is very small. For these reasons I do not believe there is a security implication to this. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for reporting this issue. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 34166d41892643a36ad2d1f53cc0025e2edc2a39) | 30 April 2015, 22:21:53 UTC |
5bea797 | Matt Caswell | 29 April 2015, 08:58:10 UTC | Add sanity check to print_bin function Add a sanity check to the print_bin function to ensure that the |off| argument is positive. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for reporting this issue. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 3deeeeb61b0c5b9b5f0993a67b7967d2f85186da) | 30 April 2015, 22:21:53 UTC |
9c5efc9 | Matt Caswell | 28 April 2015, 14:28:23 UTC | Add sanity check to ssl_get_prev_session Sanity check the |len| parameter to ensure it is positive. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for reporting this issue. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit cb0f400b0cea2d2943f99b1e89c04ff6ed748cd5) | 30 April 2015, 22:21:53 UTC |
75862f7 | Matt Caswell | 28 April 2015, 14:19:50 UTC | Sanity check the return from final_finish_mac The return value is checked for 0. This is currently safe but we should really check for <= 0 since -1 is frequently used for error conditions. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for reporting this issue. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit c427570e5098e120cbcb66e799f85c317aac7b91) Conflicts: ssl/ssl_locl.h | 30 April 2015, 22:21:53 UTC |
99ceb2d | Matt Caswell | 27 April 2015, 14:41:42 UTC | Add sanity check in ssl3_cbc_digest_record For SSLv3 the code assumes that |header_length| > |md_block_size|. Whilst this is true for all SSLv3 ciphersuites, this fact is far from obvious by looking at the code. If this were not the case then an integer overflow would occur, leading to a subsequent buffer overflow. Therefore I have added an explicit sanity check to ensure header_length is always valid. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for reporting this issue. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 29b0a15a480626544dd0c803d5de671552544de6) | 30 April 2015, 22:21:53 UTC |
abc7a26 | Matt Caswell | 27 April 2015, 14:41:03 UTC | Clarify logic in BIO_*printf functions The static function dynamically allocates an output buffer if the output grows larger than the static buffer that is normally used. The original logic implied that |currlen| could be greater than |maxlen| which is incorrect (and if so would cause a buffer overrun). Also the original logic would call OPENSSL_malloc to create a dynamic buffer equal to the size of the static buffer, and then immediately call OPENSSL_realloc to make it bigger, rather than just creating a buffer than was big enough in the first place. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for reporting this issue. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 9d9e37744cd5119f9921315864d1cd28717173cd) | 30 April 2015, 22:21:53 UTC |
33c99f2 | Matt Caswell | 27 April 2015, 10:13:56 UTC | Sanity check EVP_EncodeUpdate buffer len There was already a sanity check to ensure the passed buffer length is not zero. Extend this to ensure that it also not negative. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for reporting this issue. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit b86d7dca69f5c80abd60896c8ed3039fc56210cc) | 30 April 2015, 22:21:53 UTC |
1a3701f | Matt Caswell | 27 April 2015, 10:07:06 UTC | Sanity check EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS_AAD The various implementations of EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS_AAD expect a buffer of at least 13 bytes long. Add sanity checks to ensure that the length is at least that. Also add a new constant (EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN) to evp.h to represent this length. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for reporting this issue. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit c8269881093324b881b81472be037055571f73f3) Conflicts: ssl/record/ssl3_record.c | 30 April 2015, 22:21:50 UTC |
4ce0627 | Matt Caswell | 27 April 2015, 10:04:56 UTC | Sanity check DES_enc_write buffer length Add a sanity check to DES_enc_write to ensure the buffer length provided is not negative. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for reporting this issue. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 873fb39f20b6763daba226b74e83fb194924c7bf) | 30 April 2015, 22:14:55 UTC |
c5f8cd7 | Matt Caswell | 29 April 2015, 15:15:40 UTC | Add length sanity check in SSLv2 n_do_ssl_write() Fortify flagged up a problem in n_do_ssl_write() in SSLv2. Analysing the code I do not believe there is a real problem here. However the logic flows are complicated enough that a sanity check of |len| is probably worthwhile. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for reporting this issue. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 29 April 2015, 16:23:45 UTC |
937a766 | Matt Caswell | 21 April 2015, 10:28:41 UTC | Revert "Fix verify algorithm." This reverts commit 47daa155a31b0a54ce09ad2ed4d55fad74096dab. The above commit was backported to the 1.0.2 branch as part of backporting the alternative chain verify algorithm changes. However it has been pointed out (credit to Shigeki Ohtsu) that this is unnecessary in 1.0.2 as this commit is a work around for loop checking that only exists in master. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 29 April 2015, 14:44:03 UTC |
0797773 | Emilia Kasper | 27 April 2015, 16:49:43 UTC | NISTZ256: use EC_POINT API and check errors. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 6038354cf8ca0792420c1ac0ce50d6d2f0aedebf) | 27 April 2015, 17:50:19 UTC |
c7e78b6 | Emilia Kasper | 27 April 2015, 14:16:15 UTC | NISTZ256: don't swallow malloc errors Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit a4d5269e6d0dba0c276c968448a3576f7604666a) | 27 April 2015, 16:06:01 UTC |
df6c736 | Emilia Kasper | 27 April 2015, 13:41:52 UTC | NISTZ256: set Z_is_one to boolean 0/1 as is customary. Cosmetic, no real effect. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 4446044a793a9103a4bc70c0214005e6a4463767) | 27 April 2015, 14:50:05 UTC |
c30a1b3 | Emilia Kasper | 24 April 2015, 14:53:30 UTC | Error checking and memory leak fixes in NISTZ256. Thanks to Brian Smith for reporting these issues. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> | 27 April 2015, 14:37:19 UTC |
9ed5531 | Emilia Kasper | 24 April 2015, 13:38:24 UTC | Fix error checking and memory leaks in NISTZ256 precomputation. Thanks to Brian Smith for reporting these issues. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 53dd4ddf71ad79a64be934ca19445b1cf560adab) | 24 April 2015, 15:47:01 UTC |
7238a82 | Emilia Kasper | 24 April 2015, 13:19:15 UTC | Correctly set Z_is_one on the return value in the NISTZ256 implementation. Also add a few comments about constant-timeness. Thanks to Brian Smith for reporting this issue. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 24 April 2015, 15:35:56 UTC |
6e5d130 | Loganaden Velvindron | 22 April 2015, 15:16:30 UTC | Fix CRYPTO_strdup The function CRYPTO_strdup (aka OPENSSL_strdup) fails to check the return value from CRYPTO_malloc to see if it is NULL before attempting to use it. This patch adds a NULL check. RT3786 Signed-off-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 37b0cf936744d9edb99b5dd82cae78a7eac6ad60) Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 20d21389c8b6f5b754573ffb6a4dc4f3986f2ca4) | 22 April 2015, 16:20:38 UTC |
8f0f9ff | Emilia Kasper | 21 April 2015, 16:12:58 UTC | Repair EAP-FAST session resumption EAP-FAST session resumption relies on handshake message lookahead to determine server intentions. Commits 980bc1ec6114f5511b20c2e6ca741e61a39b99d6 and 7b3ba508af5c86afe43e28174aa3c53a0a24f4d9 removed the lookahead so broke session resumption. This change partially reverts the commits and brings the lookahead back in reduced capacity for TLS + EAP-FAST only. Since EAP-FAST does not support regular session tickets, the lookahead now only checks for a Finished message. Regular handshakes are unaffected by this change. Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 6e3d015363ed09c4eff5c02ad41153387ffdf5af) | 21 April 2015, 17:31:09 UTC |
5c4fd8b | Emilia Kasper | 14 April 2015, 15:42:42 UTC | Initialize variable newsig may be used (freed) uninitialized on a malloc error. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 68249414405500660578b337f1c8dd5dd4bb5bcc) | 21 April 2015, 17:27:24 UTC |
496c79f | Emilia Kasper | 16 April 2015, 16:07:58 UTC | make update Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 21 April 2015, 15:50:36 UTC |
186578b | Richard Levitte | 25 March 2015, 13:41:58 UTC | Initialised 'ok' and redo the logic. The logic with how 'ok' was calculated didn't quite convey what's "ok", so the logic is slightly redone to make it less confusing. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 06affe3dac65592a341547f5a47e52cedb7b71f8) | 20 April 2015, 23:45:47 UTC |
f4c5cd3 | Matt Caswell | 13 March 2015, 16:48:01 UTC | Fix return checks in GOST engine Filled in lots of return value checks that were missing the GOST engine, and added appropriate error handling. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 8817e2e0c998757d3bd036d7f45fe8d0a49fbe2d) | 20 April 2015, 22:10:56 UTC |
0ddf91c | Matt Caswell | 13 March 2015, 15:04:54 UTC | Fix misc NULL derefs in sureware engine Fix miscellaneous NULL pointer derefs in the sureware engine. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 7b611e5fe8eaac9512f72094c460f3ed6040076a) | 20 April 2015, 22:10:56 UTC |
73824ba | Andy Polyakov | 20 April 2015, 15:49:29 UTC | aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl: fix typo affecting Windows build. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 7be6bc68c6baef87d4d730c2505a05810a5a1684) | 20 April 2015, 16:40:46 UTC |
e95e22a | Andy Polyakov | 23 January 2015, 16:27:10 UTC | aes/asm/aesni-x86[_64].pl update. This addresses - request for improvement for faster key setup in RT#3576; - clearing registers and stack in RT#3554 (this is more of a gesture to see if there will be some traction from compiler side); - more commentary around input parameters handling and stack layout (desired when RT#3553 was reviewed); - minor size and single block performance optimization (was lying around); Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 23f6eec71dbd472044db7dc854599f1de14a1f48) | 20 April 2015, 13:44:36 UTC |
47daa15 | Dr. Stephen Henson | 24 March 2015, 16:21:21 UTC | Fix verify algorithm. Disable loop checking when we retry verification with an alternative path. This fixes the case where an intermediate CA is explicitly trusted and part of the untrusted certificate list. By disabling loop checking for this case the untrusted CA can be replaced by the explicitly trusted case and verification will succeed. Signed-off-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit e5991ec528b1c339062440811e2641f5ea2b328b) Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 20 April 2015, 12:42:17 UTC |
be856c0 | Matt Caswell | 27 January 2015, 11:15:15 UTC | Add documentation for the -no_alt_chains option for various apps, as well as the X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS flag. Conflicts: doc/apps/cms.pod doc/apps/ocsp.pod doc/apps/s_client.pod doc/apps/s_server.pod doc/apps/smime.pod doc/apps/verify.pod Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 20 April 2015, 12:42:17 UTC |
017a06c | Matt Caswell | 27 January 2015, 10:50:38 UTC | Add -no_alt_chains option to apps to implement the new X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS flag. Using this option means that when building certificate chains, the first chain found will be the one used. Without this flag, if the first chain found is not trusted then we will keep looking to see if we can build an alternative chain instead. Conflicts: apps/cms.c apps/ocsp.c apps/s_client.c apps/s_server.c apps/smime.c apps/verify.c Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 20 April 2015, 12:42:17 UTC |
dfd3322 | Matt Caswell | 27 January 2015, 10:35:27 UTC | Add flag to inhibit checking for alternate certificate chains. Setting this behaviour will force behaviour as per previous versions of OpenSSL Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 20 April 2015, 12:42:17 UTC |
6281abc | Matt Caswell | 27 January 2015, 10:03:29 UTC | In certain situations the server provided certificate chain may no longer be valid. However the issuer of the leaf, or some intermediate cert is in fact in the trust store. When building a trust chain if the first attempt fails, then try to see if alternate chains could be constructed that are trusted. RT3637 RT3621 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 20 April 2015, 12:42:17 UTC |
3661bb4 | Dr. Stephen Henson | 16 April 2015, 15:43:09 UTC | Fix encoding bug in i2c_ASN1_INTEGER Fix bug where i2c_ASN1_INTEGER mishandles zero if it is marked as negative. Thanks to Huzaifa Sidhpurwala <huzaifas@redhat.com> and Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de> for reporting this issue. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit a0eed48d37a4b7beea0c966caf09ad46f4a92a44) | 18 April 2015, 13:43:33 UTC |
e697a4c | Emilia Kasper | 15 April 2015, 12:18:55 UTC | Error out immediately on empty ciphers list. A 0-length ciphers list is never permitted. The old code only used to reject an empty ciphers list for connections with a session ID. It would later error out on a NULL structure, so this change just moves the alert closer to the problem source. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 3ae91cfb327c9ed689b9aaf7bca01a3f5a0657cb) | 17 April 2015, 16:44:35 UTC |
5613fea | Emilia Kasper | 16 April 2015, 16:46:52 UTC | Use -Wall -Wextra with clang The disabled set of -Weverything is hard to maintain across versions. Use -Wall -Wextra but also document other useful warnings that currently trigger. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> | 17 April 2015, 16:26:09 UTC |
3b38646 | Viktor Dukhovni | 16 April 2015, 05:50:03 UTC | Code style: space after 'if' Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <gitlab@openssl.org> | 16 April 2015, 17:50:01 UTC |
bf5b8ff | Dr. Stephen Henson | 15 April 2015, 23:00:40 UTC | Limit depth of nested sequences when generating ASN.1 Reported by Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de> PR#3800 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit c4137b5e828d8fab0b244defb79257619dad8fc7) | 16 April 2015, 15:06:11 UTC |
a696708 | Dr. Stephen Henson | 15 April 2015, 23:21:05 UTC | Reject empty generation strings. Reported by Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 111b60bea01d234b5873488c19ff2b9c5d4d58e9) | 16 April 2015, 15:06:10 UTC |
5101c35 | Matt Caswell | 10 April 2015, 15:49:33 UTC | Fix ssl_get_prev_session overrun If OpenSSL is configured with no-tlsext then ssl_get_prev_session can read past the end of the ClientHello message if the session_id length in the ClientHello is invalid. This should not cause any security issues since the underlying buffer is 16k in size. It should never be possible to overrun by that many bytes. This is probably made redundant by the previous commit - but you can never be too careful. With thanks to Qinghao Tang for reporting this issue. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 5e0a80c1c9b2b06c2d203ad89778ce1b98e0b5ad) | 14 April 2015, 13:59:40 UTC |
35bac91 | Matt Caswell | 10 April 2015, 16:25:27 UTC | Check for ClientHello message overruns The ClientHello processing is insufficiently rigorous in its checks to make sure that we don't read past the end of the message. This does not have security implications due to the size of the underlying buffer - but still needs to be fixed. With thanks to Qinghao Tang for reporting this issue. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit c9642eb1ff79a30e2c7632ef8267cc34cc2b0d79) | 14 April 2015, 13:48:24 UTC |
ea9de25 | Kurt Roeckx | 11 April 2015, 14:39:13 UTC | do_dirname: Don't change gen on failures It would set gen->d.dirn to a freed pointer in case X509V3_NAME_from_section failed. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 8ec5c5dd361343d9017eff8547b19e86e4944ebc) | 11 April 2015, 18:35:13 UTC |
f6cddcc | Kurt Roeckx | 11 April 2015, 15:08:38 UTC | X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free: Check param for NULL Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <openssl-users@dukhovni.org> (cherry picked from commit f49baeff50d0be9c8d86aed6fb4a08841aa3da41) | 11 April 2015, 18:35:13 UTC |
6df777e | Dr. Stephen Henson | 02 April 2015, 12:45:14 UTC | Don't set *pval to NULL in ASN1_item_ex_new. While *pval is usually a pointer in rare circumstances it can be a long value. One some platforms (e.g. WIN64) where sizeof(long) < sizeof(ASN1_VALUE *) this will write past the field. *pval is initialised correctly in the rest of ASN1_item_ex_new so setting it to NULL is unecessary anyway. Thanks to Julien Kauffmann for reporting this issue. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit f617b4969a9261b9d7d381670aefbe2cf766a2cb) Conflicts: crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c | 10 April 2015, 18:52:02 UTC |