Revision d40ec4ab8e7c0ff39bf4f9918fbb9dfdca4c5221 authored by Matt Caswell on 10 November 2015, 15:17:42 UTC, committed by Matt Caswell on 10 November 2015, 19:24:20 UTC
If a DTLS client that does not support secure renegotiation connects to an OpenSSL DTLS server then, by default, renegotiation is disabled. If a server application attempts to initiate a renegotiation then OpenSSL is supposed to prevent this. However due to a discrepancy between the TLS and DTLS code, the server sends a HelloRequest anyway in DTLS. This is not a security concern because the handshake will still fail later in the process when the client responds with a ClientHello. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
1 parent 15a7164
perlpath.pl
#!/usr/local/bin/perl
#
# modify the '#!/usr/local/bin/perl'
# line in all scripts that rely on perl.
#
require "find.pl";
$#ARGV == 0 || print STDERR "usage: perlpath newpath (eg /usr/bin)\n";
&find(".");
sub wanted
{
return unless /\.pl$/ || /^[Cc]onfigur/;
open(IN,"<$_") || die "unable to open $dir/$_:$!\n";
@a=<IN>;
close(IN);
if (-d $ARGV[0]) {
$a[0]="#!$ARGV[0]/perl\n";
}
else {
$a[0]="#!$ARGV[0]\n";
}
# Playing it safe...
$new="$_.new";
open(OUT,">$new") || die "unable to open $dir/$new:$!\n";
print OUT @a;
close(OUT);
rename($new,$_) || die "unable to rename $dir/$new:$!\n";
chmod(0755,$_) || die "unable to chmod $dir/$new:$!\n";
}

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