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Revision f5c7f5dfbaf0d2f7d946d0fe86f08e6bcb36ed0d authored by Matt Caswell on 30 June 2016, 12:17:08 UTC, committed by Matt Caswell on 22 August 2016, 09:53:55 UTC
Fix DTLS buffered message DoS attack
DTLS can handle out of order record delivery. Additionally since
handshake messages can be bigger than will fit into a single packet, the
messages can be fragmented across multiple records (as with normal TLS).
That means that the messages can arrive mixed up, and we have to
reassemble them. We keep a queue of buffered messages that are "from the
future", i.e. messages we're not ready to deal with yet but have arrived
early. The messages held there may not be full yet - they could be one
or more fragments that are still in the process of being reassembled.

The code assumes that we will eventually complete the reassembly and
when that occurs the complete message is removed from the queue at the
point that we need to use it.

However, DTLS is also tolerant of packet loss. To get around that DTLS
messages can be retransmitted. If we receive a full (non-fragmented)
message from the peer after previously having received a fragment of
that message, then we ignore the message in the queue and just use the
non-fragmented version. At that point the queued message will never get
removed.

Additionally the peer could send "future" messages that we never get to
in order to complete the handshake. Each message has a sequence number
(starting from 0). We will accept a message fragment for the current
message sequence number, or for any sequence up to 10 into the future.
However if the Finished message has a sequence number of 2, anything
greater than that in the queue is just left there.

So, in those two ways we can end up with "orphaned" data in the queue
that will never get removed - except when the connection is closed. At
that point all the queues are flushed.

An attacker could seek to exploit this by filling up the queues with
lots of large messages that are never going to be used in order to
attempt a DoS by memory exhaustion.

I will assume that we are only concerned with servers here. It does not
seem reasonable to be concerned about a memory exhaustion attack on a
client. They are unlikely to process enough connections for this to be
an issue.

A "long" handshake with many messages might be 5 messages long (in the
incoming direction), e.g. ClientHello, Certificate, ClientKeyExchange,
CertificateVerify, Finished. So this would be message sequence numbers 0
to 4. Additionally we can buffer up to 10 messages in the future.
Therefore the maximum number of messages that an attacker could send
that could get orphaned would typically be 15.

The maximum size that a DTLS message is allowed to be is defined by
max_cert_list, which by default is 100k. Therefore the maximum amount of
"orphaned" memory per connection is 1500k.

Message sequence numbers get reset after the Finished message, so
renegotiation will not extend the maximum number of messages that can be
orphaned per connection.

As noted above, the queues do get cleared when the connection is closed.
Therefore in order to mount an effective attack, an attacker would have
to open many simultaneous connections.

Issue reported by Quan Luo.

CVE-2016-2179

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
1 parent 5dfd038
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  • test
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  • heartbeat_test.c
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heartbeat_test.c
/*
 * Copyright 2014-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
 *
 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
 * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
 */

/*-
 * Unit test for TLS heartbeats.
 *
 * Acts as a regression test against the Heartbleed bug (CVE-2014-0160).
 *
 * Author:  Mike Bland (mbland@acm.org, http://mike-bland.com/)
 * Date:    2014-04-12
 * License: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC By 4.0)
 *          http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en_US
 *
 * OUTPUT
 * ------
 * The program returns zero on success. It will print a message with a count
 * of the number of failed tests and return nonzero if any tests fail.
 *
 * It will print the contents of the request and response buffers for each
 * failing test. In a "fixed" version, all the tests should pass and there
 * should be no output.
 *
 * In a "bleeding" version, you'll see:
 *
 *   test_dtls1_heartbleed failed:
 *     expected payload len: 0
 *     received: 1024
 *   sent 26 characters
 *     "HEARTBLEED                "
 *   received 1024 characters
 *     "HEARTBLEED                \xde\xad\xbe\xef..."
 *   ** test_dtls1_heartbleed failed **
 *
 * The contents of the returned buffer in the failing test will depend on the
 * contents of memory on your machine.
 *
 * MORE INFORMATION
 * ----------------
 * http://mike-bland.com/2014/04/12/heartbleed.html
 * http://mike-bland.com/tags/heartbleed.html
 */

#define OPENSSL_UNIT_TEST

#include "../ssl/ssl_locl.h"

#include "testutil.h"
#include <ctype.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>

#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST)

/* As per https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6520#section-4 */
# define MIN_PADDING_SIZE        16

/* Maximum number of payload characters to print as test output */
# define MAX_PRINTABLE_CHARACTERS        1024

typedef struct heartbeat_test_fixture {
    SSL_CTX *ctx;
    SSL *s;
    const char *test_case_name;
    int (*process_heartbeat) (SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned int length);
    unsigned char *payload;
    int sent_payload_len;
    int expected_return_value;
    int return_payload_offset;
    int expected_payload_len;
    const char *expected_return_payload;
} HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE;

static HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE set_up(const char *const test_case_name,
                                     const SSL_METHOD *meth)
{
    HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE fixture;
    int setup_ok = 1;
    memset(&fixture, 0, sizeof(fixture));
    fixture.test_case_name = test_case_name;

    fixture.ctx = SSL_CTX_new(meth);
    if (!fixture.ctx) {
        fprintf(stderr, "Failed to allocate SSL_CTX for test: %s\n",
                test_case_name);
        setup_ok = 0;
        goto fail;
    }

    fixture.s = SSL_new(fixture.ctx);
    if (!fixture.s) {
        fprintf(stderr, "Failed to allocate SSL for test: %s\n",
                test_case_name);
        setup_ok = 0;
        goto fail;
    }

    if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(fixture.s)) {
        fprintf(stderr, "Failed to set up wbio buffer for test: %s\n",
                test_case_name);
        setup_ok = 0;
        goto fail;
    }

    if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(fixture.s)) {
        fprintf(stderr, "Failed to setup buffers for test: %s\n",
                test_case_name);
        setup_ok = 0;
        goto fail;
    }

    /*
     * Clear the memory for the return buffer, since this isn't automatically
     * zeroed in opt mode and will cause spurious test failures that will
     * change with each execution.
     */
    memset(fixture.s->rlayer.wbuf.buf, 0, fixture.s->rlayer.wbuf.len);

 fail:
    if (!setup_ok) {
        ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
        exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
    }
    return fixture;
}

static HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE set_up_dtls(const char *const test_case_name)
{
    HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE fixture = set_up(test_case_name,
                                            DTLS_server_method());
    fixture.process_heartbeat = dtls1_process_heartbeat;

    /*
     * As per dtls1_get_record(), skipping the following from the beginning
     * of the returned heartbeat message: type-1 byte; version-2 bytes;
     * sequence number-8 bytes; length-2 bytes And then skipping the 1-byte
     * type encoded by process_heartbeat for a total of 14 bytes, at which
     * point we can grab the length and the payload we seek.
     */
    fixture.return_payload_offset = 14;
    return fixture;
}

/* Needed by ssl3_write_bytes() */
static int dummy_handshake(SSL *s)
{
    return 1;
}

static void tear_down(HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE fixture)
{
    ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
    SSL_free(fixture.s);
    SSL_CTX_free(fixture.ctx);
}

static void print_payload(const char *const prefix,
                          const unsigned char *payload, const int n)
{
    const int end = n < MAX_PRINTABLE_CHARACTERS ? n
        : MAX_PRINTABLE_CHARACTERS;
    int i = 0;

    printf("%s %d character%s", prefix, n, n == 1 ? "" : "s");
    if (end != n)
        printf(" (first %d shown)", end);
    printf("\n  \"");

    for (; i != end; ++i) {
        const unsigned char c = payload[i];
        if (isprint(c))
            fputc(c, stdout);
        else
            printf("\\x%02x", c);
    }
    printf("\"\n");
}

static int execute_heartbeat(HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE fixture)
{
    int result = 0;
    SSL *s = fixture.s;
    unsigned char *payload = fixture.payload;
    unsigned char sent_buf[MAX_PRINTABLE_CHARACTERS + 1];
    int return_value;
    unsigned const char *p;
    int actual_payload_len;

    s->rlayer.rrec.data = payload;
    s->rlayer.rrec.length = strlen((const char *)payload);
    *payload++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
    s2n(fixture.sent_payload_len, payload);

    /*
     * Make a local copy of the request, since it gets overwritten at some
     * point
     */
    memcpy(sent_buf, payload, sizeof(sent_buf));

    return_value = fixture.process_heartbeat(s, s->rlayer.rrec.data,
        s->rlayer.rrec.length);

    if (return_value != fixture.expected_return_value) {
        printf("%s failed: expected return value %d, received %d\n",
               fixture.test_case_name, fixture.expected_return_value,
               return_value);
        result = 1;
    }

    /*
     * If there is any byte alignment, it will be stored in wbuf.offset.
     */
    p = &(s->rlayer.
          wbuf.buf[fixture.return_payload_offset + s->rlayer.wbuf.offset]);
    actual_payload_len = 0;
    n2s(p, actual_payload_len);

    if (actual_payload_len != fixture.expected_payload_len) {
        printf("%s failed:\n  expected payload len: %d\n  received: %d\n",
               fixture.test_case_name, fixture.expected_payload_len,
               actual_payload_len);
        print_payload("sent", sent_buf, strlen((const char *)sent_buf));
        print_payload("received", p, actual_payload_len);
        result = 1;
    } else {
        char *actual_payload =
            OPENSSL_strndup((const char *)p, actual_payload_len);
        if (strcmp(actual_payload, fixture.expected_return_payload) != 0) {
            printf
                ("%s failed:\n  expected payload: \"%s\"\n  received: \"%s\"\n",
                 fixture.test_case_name, fixture.expected_return_payload,
                 actual_payload);
            result = 1;
        }
        OPENSSL_free(actual_payload);
    }

    if (result != 0) {
        printf("** %s failed **\n--------\n", fixture.test_case_name);
    }
    return result;
}

static int honest_payload_size(unsigned char payload_buf[])
{
    /* Omit three-byte pad at the beginning for type and payload length */
    return strlen((const char *)&payload_buf[3]) - MIN_PADDING_SIZE;
}

# define SETUP_HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE(type)\
  SETUP_TEST_FIXTURE(HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE, set_up_##type)

# define EXECUTE_HEARTBEAT_TEST()\
  EXECUTE_TEST(execute_heartbeat, tear_down)

static int test_dtls1_not_bleeding()
{
    SETUP_HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE(dtls);
    /* Three-byte pad at the beginning for type and payload length */
    unsigned char payload_buf[MAX_PRINTABLE_CHARACTERS + 4] =
        "   Not bleeding, sixteen spaces of padding" "                ";
    const int payload_buf_len = honest_payload_size(payload_buf);

    fixture.payload = &payload_buf[0];
    fixture.sent_payload_len = payload_buf_len;
    fixture.expected_return_value = 0;
    fixture.expected_payload_len = payload_buf_len;
    fixture.expected_return_payload =
        "Not bleeding, sixteen spaces of padding";
    EXECUTE_HEARTBEAT_TEST();
}

static int test_dtls1_not_bleeding_empty_payload()
{
    int payload_buf_len;

    SETUP_HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE(dtls);
    /*
     * Three-byte pad at the beginning for type and payload length, plus a
     * NUL at the end
     */
    unsigned char payload_buf[4 + MAX_PRINTABLE_CHARACTERS];
    memset(payload_buf, ' ', MIN_PADDING_SIZE + 3);
    payload_buf[MIN_PADDING_SIZE + 3] = '\0';
    payload_buf_len = honest_payload_size(payload_buf);

    fixture.payload = &payload_buf[0];
    fixture.sent_payload_len = payload_buf_len;
    fixture.expected_return_value = 0;
    fixture.expected_payload_len = payload_buf_len;
    fixture.expected_return_payload = "";
    EXECUTE_HEARTBEAT_TEST();
}

static int test_dtls1_heartbleed()
{
    SETUP_HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE(dtls);
    /* Three-byte pad at the beginning for type and payload length */
    unsigned char payload_buf[4 + MAX_PRINTABLE_CHARACTERS] =
        "   HEARTBLEED                ";

    fixture.payload = &payload_buf[0];
    fixture.sent_payload_len = MAX_PRINTABLE_CHARACTERS;
    fixture.expected_return_value = 0;
    fixture.expected_payload_len = 0;
    fixture.expected_return_payload = "";
    EXECUTE_HEARTBEAT_TEST();
}

static int test_dtls1_heartbleed_empty_payload()
{
    SETUP_HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE(dtls);
    /*
     * Excluding the NUL at the end, one byte short of type + payload length
     * + minimum padding
     */
    unsigned char payload_buf[MAX_PRINTABLE_CHARACTERS + 4];
    memset(payload_buf, ' ', MIN_PADDING_SIZE + 2);
    payload_buf[MIN_PADDING_SIZE + 2] = '\0';

    fixture.payload = &payload_buf[0];
    fixture.sent_payload_len = MAX_PRINTABLE_CHARACTERS;
    fixture.expected_return_value = 0;
    fixture.expected_payload_len = 0;
    fixture.expected_return_payload = "";
    EXECUTE_HEARTBEAT_TEST();
}

static int test_dtls1_heartbleed_excessive_plaintext_length()
{
    SETUP_HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE(dtls);
    /*
     * Excluding the NUL at the end, one byte in excess of maximum allowed
     * heartbeat message length
     */
    unsigned char payload_buf[SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + 2];
    memset(payload_buf, ' ', sizeof(payload_buf));
    payload_buf[sizeof(payload_buf) - 1] = '\0';

    fixture.payload = &payload_buf[0];
    fixture.sent_payload_len = honest_payload_size(payload_buf);
    fixture.expected_return_value = 0;
    fixture.expected_payload_len = 0;
    fixture.expected_return_payload = "";
    EXECUTE_HEARTBEAT_TEST();
}

# undef EXECUTE_HEARTBEAT_TEST
# undef SETUP_HEARTBEAT_TEST_FIXTURE

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    int result = 0;

    ADD_TEST(test_dtls1_not_bleeding);
    ADD_TEST(test_dtls1_not_bleeding_empty_payload);
    ADD_TEST(test_dtls1_heartbleed);
    ADD_TEST(test_dtls1_heartbleed_empty_payload);
    ADD_TEST(test_dtls1_heartbleed_excessive_plaintext_length);

    result = run_tests(argv[0]);
    ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
    return result;
}

#else                           /* OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS */

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}
#endif                          /* OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS */
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