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Revision f5c7f5dfbaf0d2f7d946d0fe86f08e6bcb36ed0d authored by Matt Caswell on 30 June 2016, 12:17:08 UTC, committed by Matt Caswell on 22 August 2016, 09:53:55 UTC
Fix DTLS buffered message DoS attack
DTLS can handle out of order record delivery. Additionally since
handshake messages can be bigger than will fit into a single packet, the
messages can be fragmented across multiple records (as with normal TLS).
That means that the messages can arrive mixed up, and we have to
reassemble them. We keep a queue of buffered messages that are "from the
future", i.e. messages we're not ready to deal with yet but have arrived
early. The messages held there may not be full yet - they could be one
or more fragments that are still in the process of being reassembled.

The code assumes that we will eventually complete the reassembly and
when that occurs the complete message is removed from the queue at the
point that we need to use it.

However, DTLS is also tolerant of packet loss. To get around that DTLS
messages can be retransmitted. If we receive a full (non-fragmented)
message from the peer after previously having received a fragment of
that message, then we ignore the message in the queue and just use the
non-fragmented version. At that point the queued message will never get
removed.

Additionally the peer could send "future" messages that we never get to
in order to complete the handshake. Each message has a sequence number
(starting from 0). We will accept a message fragment for the current
message sequence number, or for any sequence up to 10 into the future.
However if the Finished message has a sequence number of 2, anything
greater than that in the queue is just left there.

So, in those two ways we can end up with "orphaned" data in the queue
that will never get removed - except when the connection is closed. At
that point all the queues are flushed.

An attacker could seek to exploit this by filling up the queues with
lots of large messages that are never going to be used in order to
attempt a DoS by memory exhaustion.

I will assume that we are only concerned with servers here. It does not
seem reasonable to be concerned about a memory exhaustion attack on a
client. They are unlikely to process enough connections for this to be
an issue.

A "long" handshake with many messages might be 5 messages long (in the
incoming direction), e.g. ClientHello, Certificate, ClientKeyExchange,
CertificateVerify, Finished. So this would be message sequence numbers 0
to 4. Additionally we can buffer up to 10 messages in the future.
Therefore the maximum number of messages that an attacker could send
that could get orphaned would typically be 15.

The maximum size that a DTLS message is allowed to be is defined by
max_cert_list, which by default is 100k. Therefore the maximum amount of
"orphaned" memory per connection is 1500k.

Message sequence numbers get reset after the Finished message, so
renegotiation will not extend the maximum number of messages that can be
orphaned per connection.

As noted above, the queues do get cleared when the connection is closed.
Therefore in order to mount an effective attack, an attacker would have
to open many simultaneous connections.

Issue reported by Quan Luo.

CVE-2016-2179

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
1 parent 5dfd038
  • Files
  • Changes
  • c0c9b13
  • /
  • util
  • /
  • TLSProxy
  • /
  • Record.pm
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Record.pm
# Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
#
# Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
# this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html

use strict;

use TLSProxy::Proxy;

package TLSProxy::Record;

my $server_ccs_seen = 0;
my $client_ccs_seen = 0;
my $etm = 0;

use constant TLS_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH => 5;

#Record types
use constant {
    RT_APPLICATION_DATA => 23,
    RT_HANDSHAKE => 22,
    RT_ALERT => 21,
    RT_CCS => 20
};

my %record_type = (
    RT_APPLICATION_DATA, "APPLICATION DATA",
    RT_HANDSHAKE, "HANDSHAKE",
    RT_ALERT, "ALERT",
    RT_CCS, "CCS"
);

use constant {
    VERS_TLS_1_3 => 772,
    VERS_TLS_1_2 => 771,
    VERS_TLS_1_1 => 770,
    VERS_TLS_1_0 => 769,
    VERS_SSL_3_0 => 768,
    VERS_SSL_LT_3_0 => 767
};

my %tls_version = (
    VERS_TLS_1_3, "TLS1.3",
    VERS_TLS_1_2, "TLS1.2",
    VERS_TLS_1_1, "TLS1.1",
    VERS_TLS_1_0, "TLS1.0",
    VERS_SSL_3_0, "SSL3",
    VERS_SSL_LT_3_0, "SSL<3"
);

#Class method to extract records from a packet of data
sub get_records
{
    my $class = shift;
    my $server = shift;
    my $flight = shift;
    my $packet = shift;
    my @record_list = ();
    my @message_list = ();
    my $data;
    my $content_type;
    my $version;
    my $len;
    my $len_real;
    my $decrypt_len;

    my $recnum = 1;
    while (length ($packet) > 0) {
        print " Record $recnum";
        if ($server) {
            print " (server -> client)\n";
        } else {
            print " (client -> server)\n";
        }
        #Get the record header
        if (length($packet) < TLS_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH) {
            print "Partial data : ".length($packet)." bytes\n";
            $packet = "";
        } else {
            ($content_type, $version, $len) = unpack('CnnC*', $packet);
            $data = substr($packet, 5, $len);

            print "  Content type: ".$record_type{$content_type}."\n";
            print "  Version: $tls_version{$version}\n";
            print "  Length: $len";
            if ($len == length($data)) {
                print "\n";
                $decrypt_len = $len_real = $len;
            } else {
                print " (expected), ".length($data)." (actual)\n";
                $decrypt_len = $len_real = length($data);
            }

            my $record = TLSProxy::Record->new(
                $flight,
                $content_type,
                $version,
                $len,
                0,
                $len_real,
                $decrypt_len,
                substr($packet, TLS_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH, $len_real),
                substr($packet, TLS_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH, $len_real)
            );

            if (($server && $server_ccs_seen)
                     || (!$server && $client_ccs_seen)) {
                if ($etm) {
                    $record->decryptETM();
                } else {
                    $record->decrypt();
                }
            }

            push @record_list, $record;

            #Now figure out what messages are contained within this record
            my @messages = TLSProxy::Message->get_messages($server, $record);
            push @message_list, @messages;

            $packet = substr($packet, TLS_RECORD_HEADER_LENGTH + $len_real);
            $recnum++;
        }
    }

    return (\@record_list, \@message_list);
}

sub clear
{
    $server_ccs_seen = 0;
    $client_ccs_seen = 0;
}

#Class level accessors
sub server_ccs_seen
{
    my $class = shift;
    if (@_) {
      $server_ccs_seen = shift;
    }
    return $server_ccs_seen;
}
sub client_ccs_seen
{
    my $class = shift;
    if (@_) {
      $client_ccs_seen = shift;
    }
    return $client_ccs_seen;
}
#Enable/Disable Encrypt-then-MAC
sub etm
{
    my $class = shift;
    if (@_) {
      $etm = shift;
    }
    return $etm;
}

sub new
{
    my $class = shift;
    my ($flight,
        $content_type,
        $version,
        $len,
        $sslv2,
        $len_real,
        $decrypt_len,
        $data,
        $decrypt_data) = @_;
    
    my $self = {
        flight => $flight,
        content_type => $content_type,
        version => $version,
        len => $len,
        sslv2 => $sslv2,
        len_real => $len_real,
        decrypt_len => $decrypt_len,
        data => $data,
        decrypt_data => $decrypt_data,
        orig_decrypt_data => $decrypt_data
    };

    return bless $self, $class;
}

#Decrypt using encrypt-then-MAC
sub decryptETM
{
    my ($self) = shift;

    my $data = $self->data;

    if($self->version >= VERS_TLS_1_1()) {
        #TLS1.1+ has an explicit IV. Throw it away
        $data = substr($data, 16);
    }

    #Throw away the MAC (assumes MAC is 20 bytes for now. FIXME)
    $data = substr($data, 0, length($data) - 20);

    #Find out what the padding byte is
    my $padval = unpack("C", substr($data, length($data) - 1));

    #Throw away the padding
    $data = substr($data, 0, length($data) - ($padval + 1));

    $self->decrypt_data($data);
    $self->decrypt_len(length($data));

    return $data;
}

#Standard decrypt
sub decrypt()
{
    my ($self) = shift;

    my $data = $self->data;

    if($self->version >= VERS_TLS_1_1()) {
        #TLS1.1+ has an explicit IV. Throw it away
        $data = substr($data, 16);
    }

    #Find out what the padding byte is
    my $padval = unpack("C", substr($data, length($data) - 1));

    #Throw away the padding
    $data = substr($data, 0, length($data) - ($padval + 1));

    #Throw away the MAC (assumes MAC is 20 bytes for now. FIXME)
    $data = substr($data, 0, length($data) - 20);

    $self->decrypt_data($data);
    $self->decrypt_len(length($data));

    return $data;
}

#Reconstruct the on-the-wire record representation
sub reconstruct_record
{
    my $self = shift;
    my $data;

    if ($self->sslv2) {
        $data = pack('n', $self->len | 0x8000);
    } else {
        $data = pack('Cnn', $self->content_type, $self->version, $self->len);
    }
    $data .= $self->data;

    return $data;
}

#Read only accessors
sub flight
{
    my $self = shift;
    return $self->{flight};
}
sub content_type
{
    my $self = shift;
    return $self->{content_type};
}
sub version
{
    my $self = shift;
    return $self->{version};
}
sub sslv2
{
    my $self = shift;
    return $self->{sslv2};
}
sub len_real
{
    my $self = shift;
    return $self->{len_real};
}
sub orig_decrypt_data
{
    my $self = shift;
    return $self->{orig_decrypt_data};
}

#Read/write accessors
sub decrypt_len
{
    my $self = shift;
    if (@_) {
      $self->{decrypt_len} = shift;
    }
    return $self->{decrypt_len};
}
sub data
{
    my $self = shift;
    if (@_) {
      $self->{data} = shift;
    }
    return $self->{data};
}
sub decrypt_data
{
    my $self = shift;
    if (@_) {
      $self->{decrypt_data} = shift;
    }
    return $self->{decrypt_data};
}
sub len
{
    my $self = shift;
    if (@_) {
      $self->{len} = shift;
    }
    return $self->{len};
}
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