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e2e09d9 Matt Caswell21 April 2020, 12:22:39 UTCPrepare for 1.1.1g release Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>21 April 2020, 12:22:39 UTC
a1ec85c Matt Caswell21 April 2020, 09:49:12 UTCUpdate copyright year Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>21 April 2020, 10:23:36 UTC
eb56324 Benjamin Kaduk10 April 2020, 19:27:28 UTCFix NULL dereference in SSL_check_chain() for TLS 1.3 In the tls1_check_sig_alg() helper function, we loop through the list of "signature_algorithms_cert" values received from the client and attempt to look up each one in turn in our internal table that maps wire codepoint to string-form name, digest and/or signature NID, etc., in order to compare the signature scheme from the peer's list against what is used to sign the certificates in the certificate chain we're checking. Unfortunately, when the peer sends a value that we don't support, the lookup returns NULL, but we unconditionally dereference the lookup result for the comparison, leading to an application crash triggerable by an unauthenticated client. Since we will not be able to say anything about algorithms we don't recognize, treat NULL return from lookup as "does not match". We currently only apply the "signature_algorithm_cert" checks on TLS 1.3 connections, so previous TLS versions are unaffected. SSL_check_chain() is not called directly from libssl, but may be used by the application inside a callback (e.g., client_hello or cert callback) to verify that a candidate certificate chain will be acceptable to the client. CVE-2020-1967 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>21 April 2020, 10:22:51 UTC
64eef86 Benjamin Kaduk10 April 2020, 19:27:28 UTCAdd test for CVE-2020-1967 Add to test_sslsigalgs a TLSProxy test that injects a "signature_algorithms_cert" extension that contains an unallocated codepoint. The test currently fails, since s_server segfaults instead of ignoring the unrecognized value. Since "signature_algorithms" and "signature_algorithms_cert" are very similar, also add the analogous test for "signature_algorithms". Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>21 April 2020, 10:22:51 UTC
23424be Matt Caswell21 April 2020, 09:33:43 UTCUpdate CHANGES and NEWS for release of 1.1.1g Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>21 April 2020, 10:20:39 UTC
bb19162 Bernd Edlinger26 March 2020, 19:56:57 UTCAdd a CHANGES entry for AES constant time Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11411)18 April 2020, 14:06:56 UTC
7d34a9e Bernd Edlinger09 January 2020, 22:02:54 UTCAdd AES consttime code for no-asm configurations This adds optional constant time support for AES when building openssl for no-asm. Enable with: ./config no-asm -DOPENSSL_AES_CONST_TIME [extended tests] Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11411)18 April 2020, 14:06:44 UTC
a38369d Tomas Mraz16 April 2020, 10:07:35 UTCs_time: Allow using -CAfile option as in other commands The s_time command in difference from all the other similar commands supported -cafile option instead of -CAfile. Add the -CAfile option and keep -cafile only for backwards compatibility. Fixes #11552 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11555)17 April 2020, 11:36:25 UTC
18fefa3 Richard Levitte16 April 2020, 08:20:58 UTCINSTALL: document 'no-ui-console' rather than 'no-ui' The UI interface itself is never disabled, but the console backend may be. 'no-ui' is a deprecated backward compatibility alias for 'no-ui-console'. Fixes #11551 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11554)17 April 2020, 11:32:15 UTC
8e0539b Kochise16 March 2020, 19:04:04 UTCWindows: Add type casting in CRYPTO_atomic_add to remove warning CLA: trivial Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11337) (cherry picked from commit 7da7b27eec58d1efc7012f002c45ddbdd61a5e79)17 April 2020, 11:21:46 UTC
5f62ff4 scott09 April 2020, 11:36:37 UTCBIO_do_accept: correct error return value `BIO_do_accept` was returning incorrect values when unable to bind to a port. Fixes #7717 CLA: trivial Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11505) (cherry picked from commit 0437435a960123be1ced766d18d715f939698345)14 April 2020, 09:57:26 UTC
369cef7 Rich Salz10 April 2020, 15:51:02 UTCDon't compile commands if disabled Rather than wrapping whole files in "ifndef OPENSSL_NO_xxx" we handle the changes in build.info Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11518)12 April 2020, 18:29:12 UTC
07e2f4b Jake Maynard30 October 2019, 15:27:04 UTCAdd manpage entry for X509_check_purpose() Fixes #10263 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10301) (cherry picked from commit eacd30a703b52f5b3e8e70b58f99bd1128458c7c)11 April 2020, 10:30:19 UTC
3253010 Jim Newsome07 April 2020, 21:29:53 UTCUpdate RAND_METHOD definition in man page The `add` and `seed` callbacks were changed to return `int` instead of `void` in b6dcdbfc94c482f6c15ba725754fc9e827e41851 (first included in tag OpenSSL_1_1_0-pre1). The `add` callback was changed to take a `double` instead of an `int` in 853f757ecea74a271a7c5cdee3f3b5fe0d3ae863. CLA: trivial Fixes: #10199 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11486) (cherry picked from commit ae3254287ff87e484c7fd8f757cad1440ee8f5ff)09 April 2020, 09:14:36 UTC
0d011f5 Pauli08 April 2020, 02:33:47 UTCFix AES-CTR_DRBG on 1.1.1. The backport of the timing information leak fix uses u32 which is defined in crypto/modes/modes_local.h in 1.1.1 and include/crypto/modes.h for 3.0. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11489)09 April 2020, 07:16:08 UTC
9cc834d Patrick Steuer22 February 2020, 00:20:09 UTCAES CTR-DRGB: do not leak timing information Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11147) (cherry picked from commit 069165d10646a22000c596095cc04d43bbf1f807)08 April 2020, 00:58:07 UTC
1638972 Pauli05 April 2020, 23:23:00 UTCInteger overflow in ASN1_STRING_set. Addressing a potential integer overflow condition. Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11473) (cherry picked from commit 96218269f4c2da82f143727fb7697d572c190bc5)07 April 2020, 23:21:58 UTC
43c242b Billy Brumley01 April 2020, 18:15:58 UTC[crypto/ec] blind coordinates in ec_wNAF_mul for robustness Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nicola.tuveri@ibm.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11439) (cherry picked from commit c61ced5ec50fc68707c7cea79f7df1d170f03f13)07 April 2020, 13:02:21 UTC
5dc91f4 Bernd Edlinger06 April 2020, 08:41:36 UTCFix the error handling in EC_POINTs_mul This was pointed out by a false-positive -fsanitizer warning ;-) However from the cryptographical POV the code is wrong: A point R^0 on the wrong curve is infinity on the wrong curve. [extended tests] Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11475) (cherry picked from commit 1eb9b54af7e00fa12196411964ce742ea8677766)07 April 2020, 11:22:44 UTC
f9f2e60 William Brawner05 April 2020, 16:39:41 UTCEnsure ECDSA_size always returns >= 0 Fixes #10484 Signed-off-by: William Brawner <me@wbrawner.com> Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11472)07 April 2020, 11:13:53 UTC
e78f2a8 Tomas Mraz03 April 2020, 08:24:40 UTCAdd test cases for the non CA certificate with pathlen:0 Accept verification without -x509_strict and reject it with it. Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11463) (cherry picked from commit 3cb55fe47c3398b81956e4fe20c4004524d47519)06 April 2020, 08:30:08 UTC
29e94f2 Tomas Mraz02 April 2020, 15:31:21 UTCSet X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION error for invalid basic constraints If we encounter certificate with basic constraints CA:false, pathlen present and X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT is set we set X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION error. Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11463) (cherry picked from commit fa86e2ee3533bb7fa9f3c62c38920cf960e9fec0)06 April 2020, 08:28:48 UTC
00a0da2 Tomas Mraz02 April 2020, 13:56:12 UTCAllow certificates with Basic Constraints CA:false, pathlen:0 Do not mark such certificates with EXFLAG_INVALID although they violate the RFC 5280, they are syntactically correct and openssl itself can produce such certificates without any errors with command such as: openssl x509 -req -signkey private.pem -in csr.pem -out cert.pem \ -extfile <(echo "basicConstraints=CA:FALSE,pathlen:0") With the commit ba4356ae4002a04e28642da60c551877eea804f7 the EXFLAG_INVALID causes openssl to not consider such certificate even as leaf self-signed certificate which is breaking existing installations. Fixes: #11456 Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11463) (cherry picked from commit 428cf5ff83a48d0b51c97476586b2cbd053b6302)06 April 2020, 08:28:18 UTC
d251c4e Matt Caswell02 April 2020, 08:58:59 UTCExpand the XTS documentation Explain that XTS does not support streaming, and that the IV value is the tweak. Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11461) (cherry picked from commit 70d80ef9898ddbe03841efd2df2f526b71829d7f)03 April 2020, 10:13:50 UTC
d0771a9 Billy Brumley28 March 2020, 18:35:43 UTC[crypto/ec] Ladder tweaks - Convert to affine coords on ladder entry. This lets us use more efficient ladder step formulae. - Convert to affine coords on ladder exit. This prevents the current code awkwardness where conversion happens twice during serialization: first to fetch the buffer size, then again to fetch the coords. - Instead of projectively blinding the input point, blind both accumulators independently. (cherry picked from commit a4a93bbfb0e679eaa249f77c7c4e7e823ca870ef) Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11435)01 April 2020, 16:03:06 UTC
3c61ea3 Billy Brumley29 March 2020, 07:38:37 UTC[test] Make sm2_internal_test less fragile to changes in the ec module Since these are KATs, the trailing randomness consumed by the ec module does not really matter. So make the fake random buffer circular. (cherry picked from commit 09736245b174a37abb87fb7ceb55462d940ff2bb) Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11435)01 April 2020, 16:02:42 UTC
ce843e3 Matt Caswell31 March 2020, 12:19:19 UTCPrepare for 1.1.1g-dev Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>31 March 2020, 12:19:19 UTC
36eadf1 Matt Caswell31 March 2020, 12:17:45 UTCPrepare for 1.1.1f release Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>31 March 2020, 12:17:45 UTC
c855c9c Matt Caswell31 March 2020, 10:28:51 UTCUpdate copyright year Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11445)31 March 2020, 12:09:37 UTC
ff3e9e1 Viktor Szakats11 September 2019, 10:02:56 UTCfix generated Makefile for Windows builds made on *nix (1.1.1d) The fix consists of putting all destination directories between double-quotes to make the default (and any custom) prefixes containing spaces to work when doing 'make install'. Also enable CI test with x86 mingw cross-build. [extended tests] Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11434)29 March 2020, 07:14:10 UTC
0cd2ee6 Tomas Mraz25 March 2020, 13:18:13 UTCDocument the revert of the proper reporting of an unexpected EOF Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11400)25 March 2020, 13:18:13 UTC
30d190c Tomas Mraz25 March 2020, 13:15:31 UTCPartially revert "Detect EOF while reading in libssl" This partially reverts commit db943f43a60d1b5b1277e4b5317e8f288e7a0a3a. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11400)25 March 2020, 13:17:22 UTC
d7b9a7a Richard Könning20 March 2020, 19:17:50 UTCUse ctx2 instead ctx. CLA: trivial Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11372) (cherry picked from commit 402b00d57921a0c8cd641b190d36bf39ea5fb592)24 March 2020, 21:01:46 UTC
ba4356a Bernd Edlinger04 January 2020, 14:54:53 UTCFix error handling in x509v3_cache_extensions and related functions Basically we use EXFLAG_INVALID for all kinds of out of memory and all kinds of parse errors in x509v3_cache_extensions. [extended tests] Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10756)22 March 2020, 22:08:56 UTC
673692b FdaSilvaYY06 April 2019, 09:16:59 UTCCoverity: fix two minor NPD issues. Found by Coverity. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8274) (cherry picked from commit 23dc8feba817560485da00d690d7b7b9e5b15682)20 March 2020, 12:31:21 UTC
c307407 Bernd Edlinger15 July 2019, 18:48:38 UTCAdd a CHANGES entry for BN_generate_prime_ex BN_generate_prime_ex no longer avoids factors 3..17863 in p-1 when not computing safe primes. Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9387)19 March 2020, 02:23:22 UTC
186b50d Bernd Edlinger10 July 2019, 19:33:48 UTCUpdate documentation of BN_generate_prime_ex Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9387)19 March 2020, 02:18:14 UTC
0032bfe Bernd Edlinger05 July 2019, 09:55:56 UTCMerge probable_prime_dh_safe with bn_probable_prime_dh This should avoid half of the trial divisions in probable_prime_dh_safe and avoid bn_probable_prime_dh generating primes with special properties. Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9387)19 March 2020, 02:18:14 UTC
7eccef2 Bernd Edlinger04 July 2019, 12:52:41 UTCAdd a parameter to probable_prime if we look for a safe prime Currently probable_prime makes sure that p-1 does not have any prime factors from 3..17863, which is useful for safe primes, but not necessarily for the general case. Issue was initially reported here: MIRONOV, I. Factoring RSA Moduli II. https://windowsontheory.org/2012/05/17/factoring-rsa-moduli-part-ii/ Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9387)19 March 2020, 02:18:13 UTC
9e1eaa4 Matt Caswell17 March 2020, 14:32:46 UTCPrepare for 1.1.1f-dev Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <kaishen.yy@antfin.com>17 March 2020, 14:32:46 UTC
a61eba4 Matt Caswell17 March 2020, 14:31:17 UTCPrepare for 1.1.1e release Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <kaishen.yy@antfin.com>17 March 2020, 14:31:17 UTC
e7ff223 Matt Caswell17 March 2020, 13:59:29 UTCUpdate copyright year Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <kaishen.yy@antfin.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11344)17 March 2020, 13:59:29 UTC
48a09eb Matt Caswell17 March 2020, 11:24:20 UTCUpdate CHANGES for the new release Reviewed-by: Mark J. Cox <mark@awe.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11342)17 March 2020, 13:43:08 UTC
5a77b55 Matt Caswell17 March 2020, 10:11:28 UTCUpdate NEWS for the new release Reviewed-by: Mark J. Cox <mark@awe.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11342)17 March 2020, 13:43:08 UTC
1959913 Ben Kaduk16 March 2020, 18:02:14 UTCsslapitest: don't leak the SSL_CTX pair We have no need for a new set of SSL_CTXs in test_ccs_change_cipher(), so just keep using the original ones. Also, fix a typo in a comment. [extended tests] Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11336) (cherry picked from commit b3e6d666e351d45e93d29fe3813245b92a0f5815)17 March 2020, 10:00:35 UTC
2f0dab7 Benjamin Kaduk06 March 2020, 21:19:45 UTCAdd test that changes ciphers on CCS The TLS (pre-1.3) ChangeCipherState message is usually used to indicate the switch from the unencrypted to encrypted part of the handshake. However, it can also be used in cases where there is an existing session (such as during resumption handshakes) or when changing from one cipher to a different one (such as during renegotiation when the cipher list offered by the client has changed). This test serves to exercise such situations, allowing us to detect whether session objects are being modified in cases when they must remain immutable for thread-safety purposes. Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10943) (cherry picked from commit 3cd14e5e65011660ad8e3603cf871c8366b565fd)13 March 2020, 23:12:18 UTC
44bad9c Benjamin Kaduk24 January 2020, 21:44:27 UTCCode to thread-safety in ChangeCipherState The server-side ChangeCipherState processing stores the new cipher in the SSL_SESSION object, so that the new state can be used if this session gets resumed. However, writing to the session is only thread-safe for initial handshakes, as at other times the session object may be in a shared cache and in use by another thread at the same time. Reflect this invariant in the code by only writing to s->session->cipher when it is currently NULL (we do not cache sessions with no cipher). The code prior to this change would never actually change the (non-NULL) cipher value in a session object, since our server enforces that (pre-TLS-1.3) resumptions use the exact same cipher as the initial connection, and non-abbreviated renegotiations have produced a new session object before we get to this point. Regardless, include logic to detect such a condition and abort the handshake if it occurs, to avoid any risk of inadvertently using the wrong cipher on a connection. Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10943) (cherry picked from commit 2e3ec2e1578977fca830a47fd7f521e290540e6d)13 March 2020, 23:11:45 UTC
910c8ff Benjamin Kaduk24 January 2020, 21:25:53 UTCDon't write to the session when computing TLS 1.3 keys TLS 1.3 maintains a separate keys chedule in the SSL object, but was writing to the 'master_key_length' field in the SSL_SESSION when generating the per-SSL master_secret. (The generate_master_secret SSL3_ENC_METHOD function needs an output variable for the master secret length, but the TLS 1.3 implementation just uses the output size of the handshake hash function to get the lengths, so the only natural-looking thing to use as the output length was the field in the session. This would potentially involve writing to a SSL_SESSION object that was in the cache (i.e., resumed) and shared with other threads, though. The thread-safety impact should be minimal, since TLS 1.3 requires the hash from the original handshake to be associated with the resumption PSK and used for the subsequent connection. This means that (in the resumption case) the value being written would be the same value that was previously there, so the only risk would be on architectures that can produce torn writes/reads for aligned size_t values. Since the value is essentially ignored anyway, just provide the address of a local dummy variable to generate_master_secret() instead. Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10943) (cherry picked from commit d74014c4b8740f28a54b562f799ad1e754b517b9)13 March 2020, 22:55:51 UTC
a666af9 Benjamin Kaduk24 January 2020, 21:25:02 UTCFix whitespace nit in ssl_generate_master_secret() Use a space after a comma. Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10943) (cherry picked from commit 1866a0d380fc361d9be2ca0509de0f2281505db5)13 March 2020, 22:55:50 UTC
cf900cb Benjamin Kaduk17 January 2020, 19:15:59 UTCdoc: fix spelling of TYPE_get_ex_new_index The generated macros are TYPE_get_ex_new_index() (to match CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index()), not TYPE_get_new_ex_index(), even though the latter spelling seems more natural. Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10943) (cherry picked from commit fe41c06e69613b1a4814b3e3cdbf460f2678ec99)13 March 2020, 22:55:50 UTC
d3133cc Benjamin Kaduk16 January 2020, 22:37:44 UTCAdditional updates to SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb.pod Generally modernize the language. Refer to TLS instead of SSL/TLS, and try to have more consistent usage of commas and that/which. Reword some descriptions to avoid implying that a list of potential reasons for behavior is an exhaustive list. Clarify how get_session_cb() is only called on servers (i.e., in general, and that it's given the session ID proposed by the client). Clarify the semantics of the get_cb()'s "copy" argument. The behavior seems to have changed in commit 8876bc054802b043a3ec95554b6c5873291770be, though the behavior prior to that commit was not to leave the reference-count unchanged if *copy was not written to -- instead, libssl seemed to assume that the callback already had incremented the reference count. Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10943) (cherry picked from commit 06f876837a8ec76b28c42953731a156c0c3700e2)13 March 2020, 22:55:49 UTC
9011225 Jakub Jelen10 March 2020, 14:15:28 UTCdoc: Update the reference from draft to RFC CLA: trivial Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11299) (cherry picked from commit c08dea30d4d127412097b39d9974ba6090041a7c)13 March 2020, 08:57:53 UTC
b69c7d3 Dr. Matthias St. Pierre01 March 2020, 23:25:29 UTCdoc: document that 'openssl rand' is cryptographically secure (cherry picked from commit 88398d2a358f) Additionally, remove an outdated paragraph mentioning the .rnd file, which is obsolete in 1.1.1 since the RANDFILE entry was removed from openssl.cnf in commit 1fd6afb571e8. Also borrow some text from 'openssl(1)/Random State Options' on master (commit a397aca43598) to emphasize that it is not necessary anymore to restore and save the RNG state using the '-rand' and '-writerand' options. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11251)12 March 2020, 03:08:15 UTC
2cb5e08 Matt Caswell09 March 2020, 09:07:11 UTCRevert "Create a new embeddedSCTs1 that's signed using SHA256" This reverts commit b98efebeb2d4265bd6638d5947fe365500121e03. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11282)11 March 2020, 14:56:05 UTC
63fa6f2 Matt Caswell09 March 2020, 09:05:27 UTCRevert "Stop accepting certificates signed using SHA1 at security level 1" This reverts commit 68436f0a8964e911eb4f864bc8b31d7ca4d29585. The OMC did not vote in favour of backporting this to 1.1.1, so this change should be reverted. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11282)11 March 2020, 14:56:05 UTC
004f570 James Peach05 March 2020, 07:43:54 UTCdocs: fix typo in SSL functions CLA: trivial Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <kaishen.yy@antfin.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11253) (cherry picked from commit 9f44e96e245993c8e7aaa9fadf1d6713c9c60915)09 March 2020, 09:47:58 UTC
5341893 Richard Levitte08 January 2020, 10:08:06 UTCDOC: Make EVP_SignInit.pod conform with man-pages(7) Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> (cherry picked from commit 03d65ca2095777cf6314ad813eb7de5779c9b93d) Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11232)08 March 2020, 21:41:25 UTC
eed9d03 Richard Levitte08 January 2020, 10:04:15 UTCDOC: New file for EVP_PKEY_size(), EVP_PKEY_bits() and EVP_PKEY_security_bits() We change the description to be about the key rather than the signature. How the key size is related to the signature is explained in the description of EVP_SignFinal() anyway. Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> (cherry picked from commit 6942a0d6feb8d3dcbbc6a1ec6be9de7ab2df1530) Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11232)08 March 2020, 21:41:25 UTC
9aba5c5 Bastian Germann13 February 2020, 10:58:27 UTCapps x509: passing PKCS#11 URL as -signkey OpenSSL 1.1.0 has extended option checking, and rejects passing a PKCS#11 engine URL to "-signkey" option. The actual code is ready to take it. Change the option parsing to allow an engine URL to be passed and modify the manpage accordingly. CLA: trivial (cherry picked from commit 16d560439d8b1be5082228a87576a8f79b3525ac) Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11173)08 March 2020, 15:49:48 UTC
4eca3ec Matt Caswell05 March 2020, 09:21:56 UTCClarify the usage of EVP_PKEY_get_raw_[private|public]_key() EVP_PKEY_get_raw_private_key() and EVP_PKEY_get_raw_public_key() expect the size of the key buffer to be populated in the |*len| parameter on entry - but the docs made no mention of this. Fixes #11245 Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11254) (cherry picked from commit f529fc7d53bf4228fae61cb1efe73d97fe3eb35f)06 March 2020, 20:25:34 UTC
c11f490 Richard Levitte03 March 2020, 21:51:29 UTCDOC: Fixups of X509_LOOKUP.pod Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11120)06 March 2020, 08:23:00 UTC
8a7b7c9 Richard Levitte31 January 2020, 14:35:46 UTCDOC: Add documentation related to X509_LOOKUPs Most of all, the base X509_LOOKUP functionality is now documented. Furthermore, the names X509_LOOKUP_METHOD and X509_STORE are added for reference. Some functions were moved from X509_LOOKUP_meth_new.pod Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11120)06 March 2020, 08:23:00 UTC
ded6741 Patrick Steuer03 March 2020, 12:29:03 UTCcrypto/ec/curve448/eddsa.c: fix EBCDIC platforms Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11229) (cherry picked from commit af7f656cd91d99d62567e2b20c61f07cb4d81d0b)05 March 2020, 16:33:35 UTC
1d53593 Patrick Steuer03 March 2020, 16:40:07 UTCaes-s390x.pl: fix stg offset caused by typo in perlasm Signed-off-by: Patrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11234) (cherry picked from commit 7b2ce4a6e817e4385ff77fea0c6e349294c7b756)05 March 2020, 16:24:43 UTC
bf42b99 Bernd Edlinger04 March 2020, 10:42:17 UTCThis works around a gcc-9 crash It happens when configured with ./config -ftest-coverage see: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=94029 Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11246)05 March 2020, 15:04:36 UTC
93c50f4 Scott Arciszewski24 February 2020, 20:29:12 UTCFix comment placement in ecp_nistp256.ci CLA: trivial Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11175) (cherry picked from commit c590be6f12d0b725863961e41bc64a81c8cf30d6)27 February 2020, 23:41:26 UTC
3bd75cf Bastian Germann17 February 2020, 11:50:08 UTCapps x509: restrict CAkeyform option to OPT_FMT_PDE CAkeyform may be set to PEM, DER or ENGINE, but the current options are not using the proper optionformat 'E' (OPT_FMT_PDE) for this. Set the valtype for CAkeyform to 'E' and use OPT_FMT_PDE when extracting the option value. This amends bf4006a6f9 ("Fix regression on x509 keyform argument") which did the same thing for keyform and changed the manpage synopsis entries for both keyform and CAkeyform but did not change the option section. Hence, change the option section. CLA: trivial Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11172)27 February 2020, 11:18:03 UTC
605a0c7 Richard Levitte24 February 2020, 13:56:26 UTCVMS: mitigate for the C++ compiler that doesn't understand certain pragmas This only affects __DECC_INCLUDE_EPILOGUE.H and __DECC_INCLUDE_PROLOGUE.H, which are used automatically by HP and VSI C/C++ compilers. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11159)27 February 2020, 00:21:50 UTC
8d87aec Matt Turner18 February 2020, 18:08:27 UTCconfig: Drop linux-alpha-gcc+bwx Its entry in Configuration/10-main.conf was dropped in commit 7ead0c89185c ("Configure: fold related configurations more aggressively and clean-up.") probably because all but one of its bn_ops were removed (RC4_CHAR remained). Benchmarks on an Alpha EV7 indicate that RC4_INT is better than RC4_CHAR so rather than restoring the configuation, remove it from config. CLA: trivial Bug: https://bugs.gentoo.org/697840 (cherry picked from commit 19ded1a717b6c72c3db241f06787a353f1190755) Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11130)26 February 2020, 15:03:13 UTC
22623e0 Matt Caswell24 January 2020, 16:07:51 UTCTeach more BIOs how to handle BIO_CTRL_EOF Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10882)20 February 2020, 17:02:31 UTC
db943f4 Matt Caswell17 January 2020, 17:39:19 UTCDetect EOF while reading in libssl If we hit an EOF while reading in libssl then we will report an error back to the application (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL) but errno will be 0. We add an error to the stack (which means we instead return SSL_ERROR_SSL) and therefore give a hint as to what went wrong. Contains a partial fix for #10880 Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10882)20 February 2020, 17:02:30 UTC
b22a499 Matt Caswell18 February 2020, 16:08:30 UTCAdd *.d.tmp files to .gitignore These are temporary files generated by the build process that should not be checked in. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11122) (cherry picked from commit 7b5108dff4cfde059ca278147a188fb6254603d1)20 February 2020, 16:58:54 UTC
dfbaef6 Simon Cornish14 February 2020, 22:16:09 UTCHandle max_fragment_length overflow for DTLS Allow for encryption overhead in early DTLS size check and send overflow if validated record is too long Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11096) (cherry picked from commit cc0663f697b05ed121a728241f0502250429802d)19 February 2020, 08:22:09 UTC
218e740 David Benjamin17 February 2020, 02:21:27 UTCDo not silently truncate files on perlasm errors If one of the perlasm xlate drivers crashes, OpenSSL's build will currently swallow the error and silently truncate the output to however far the driver got. This will hopefully fail to build, but better to check such things. Handle this by checking for errors when closing STDOUT (which is a pipe to the xlate driver). This is the OpenSSL 1.1.1 version of https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10883 and https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10930. Reviewed-by: Mark J. Cox <mark@awe.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10931)17 February 2020, 02:21:27 UTC
57225c9 Kurt Roeckx09 February 2020, 18:28:15 UTCCheck that ed25519 and ed448 are allowed by the security level Signature algorithms not using an MD weren't checked that they're allowed by the security level. Reviewed-by: Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> GH: #1106216 February 2020, 10:55:42 UTC
42fc479 Kurt Roeckx02 January 2020, 22:16:30 UTCGenerate new Ed488 certificates Create a whole chain of Ed488 certificates so that we can use it at security level 4 (192 bit). We had an 2048 bit RSA (112 bit, level 2) root sign the Ed488 certificate using SHA256 (128 bit, level 3). Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> GH: #10785 (cherry picked from commit 77c4d3972400adf1bcb76ceea359f5453cc3e8e4)16 February 2020, 10:52:05 UTC
525e228 Richard Levitte19 January 2020, 02:19:31 UTCDOC: document in more detail what a BIO_read_ex() via BIO_f_buffer() does The BIO_f_buffer() documentation tells in enough detail how it affects BIO_gets(), but not how it affects BIO_read_ex(). This change remedies that. Fixes #10859 Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10890) (cherry picked from commit 9a4fd80ee0ad1833879b6a55c9c4673eeb8446a3)15 February 2020, 05:58:24 UTC
cd5acbb Richard Levitte13 February 2020, 12:11:50 UTCVMS: Correct error reporting in crypto/rand/rand_vms.c The future style that's coming with OpenSSL 3.0 was used, we need to revert that back to "traditional" style. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11088)15 February 2020, 05:48:04 UTC
c781d46 Richard Levitte13 February 2020, 11:06:31 UTCVMS: Adapt descrip.mms template to the changed inclustion dirs Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11088)15 February 2020, 05:48:03 UTC
52346fb Bernd Edlinger11 February 2020, 16:34:36 UTCAdjust minimal build config in 1.1.1 branch Backport of improvements from #9982 to 1.1.1 branch. Adds some more exclusions which were previously missed. [extended tests] Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11059)14 February 2020, 14:12:52 UTC
64dc4ee Nikolay Morozov12 February 2020, 12:20:41 UTCForgotten GOST2012 support in non-vital places Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11072)12 February 2020, 12:20:41 UTC
2ba3e65 Matt Caswell04 February 2020, 17:11:07 UTCFix no-tls1_3 The hostname_cb in sslapitest.c was originally only defined if TLSv1.3 was enabled. A recently added test now uses this unconditionally, so we move the function implementation earlier in the file, and always compile it in. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11014) (cherry picked from commit 104a733df65dfd8c3dd110de9bd56f6ebfc8f2f6)12 February 2020, 10:51:54 UTC
ff6d0a6 FdaSilvaYY19 October 2019, 16:24:49 UTCAppveyor: update to Visual Studio 2017. Default image was currently "Visual Studio 2015" Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10327) (cherry picked from commit b03de7a9207645c72e22627b10709f15eed211bf)07 February 2020, 08:58:01 UTC
6527714 kinichiro12 January 2020, 08:35:39 UTCAvoid leak in error path of PKCS5_PBE_keyivgen CLA: trivial Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10816) (cherry picked from commit adc9086beb21a91ca59aaf0c619b38b82c223f9b)06 February 2020, 16:21:31 UTC
3948408 Pauli07 May 2019, 00:42:58 UTCCoverity CID 1444960: Error handling issues Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8888) (cherry picked from commit a05bf83c7964bb3928b323fe356b9f70f105036d)06 February 2020, 16:21:20 UTC
0f68b77 Dr. Matthias St. Pierre02 February 2020, 21:54:01 UTCFix misspelling errors and typos reported by codespell Fixes #10998 Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11000)06 February 2020, 15:52:07 UTC
b04c8c0 Davide Galassi25 January 2020, 11:56:44 UTCPrevent compiler warning for unused static function. Prepend missing ossl_unused in front of lh_type_new to make the compiler happy. CLA: trivial Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10946) (cherry picked from commit 7b6a746721170a21519c38798041be8101e7361f)06 February 2020, 15:43:59 UTC
6b9c86c Jakub Jelen14 January 2020, 15:03:23 UTCdoc: Fix typo in EVP_DigestSignInit manpage CLA: trivial Signed-off-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10841) (cherry picked from commit 099a398268a298557be784528ac1d94f0f44c97c)06 February 2020, 15:15:33 UTC
2f16079 thekuwayama11 January 2020, 11:20:20 UTCFix small misspelling in doc for OCSP_response_status CLA: trivial Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <kaishen.yy@antfin.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10810) (cherry picked from commit 924d041fe0c650a79449217f81880a6384ff06b2)06 February 2020, 15:12:34 UTC
68436f0 Kurt Roeckx02 January 2020, 22:25:27 UTCStop accepting certificates signed using SHA1 at security level 1 Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> GH: #10786 (cherry picked from commit b744f915ca8bb37631909728dd2529289bda8438)05 February 2020, 21:07:38 UTC
b98efeb Kurt Roeckx22 January 2020, 23:24:35 UTCCreate a new embeddedSCTs1 that's signed using SHA256 Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> GH: #10786 (cherry picked from commit 4d9e8c95544d7a86765e6a46951dbe17b801875a)05 February 2020, 21:05:30 UTC
d2e8cbf Richard Levitte27 January 2020, 07:42:20 UTCconfig: ensure the perl Configure run is the last statement Running any statement after Configure means we lose its exit code Fixes #10951 Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10953) (cherry picked from commit 4bf3e989fef9268507ba02744e7f71ee5637681c)02 February 2020, 10:57:01 UTC
a9a8863 Matt Caswell02 December 2019, 17:29:21 UTCDon't acknowledge a servername following warning alert in servername cb If the servername cb decides to send back a warning alert then the handshake continues, but we should not signal to the client that the servername has been accepted. Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10018) (cherry picked from commit cd624ccd41ac3ac779c1c7a7a1e63427ce9588dd)30 January 2020, 16:12:16 UTC
721eb8f Matt Caswell28 November 2019, 12:03:00 UTCProvide better documentation for SSL_get_servername() The behaviour of SSL_get_servername() is quite complicated and depends on numerous factors such as whether it is called on the client or the server, whether it is called before or after the handshake, what protocol version was negotiated, and whether a resumption was attempted or was successful. We attempt to document the behavior more clearly. Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10018) (cherry picked from commit 0dc7c8e8314f27ac093b2d7bc8f13d0dfd302bdb)30 January 2020, 16:12:16 UTC
f6f81b2 Matt Caswell26 September 2019, 15:16:06 UTCTest that SSL_get_servername returns what we expect Test this on both the client and the server after a normal handshake, and after a resumption handshake. We also test what happens if an inconsistent SNI is set between the original handshake and the resumption handshake. Finally all of this is also tested in TLSv1.2 and TLSv1.3. Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10018) (cherry picked from commit 49ef3d0719f132629ab76d4bcb4ab0c1e016277a)30 January 2020, 16:12:16 UTC
e9cd6e7 Matt Caswell25 September 2019, 16:06:06 UTCFix SSL_get_servername() and SNI behaviour The SNI behaviour for TLSv1.3 and the behaviour of SSL_get_servername() was not quite right, and not entirely consistent with the RFC. The TLSv1.3 RFC explicitly says that SNI is negotiated on each handshake and the server is not required to associate it with the session. This was not quite reflected in the code so we fix that. Additionally there were some additional checks around early_data checking that the SNI between the original session and this session were consistent. In fact the RFC does not require any such checks, so they are removed. Finally the behaviour of SSL_get_servername() was not quite right. The behaviour was not consistent between resumption and normal handshakes, and also not quite consistent with historical behaviour. We clarify the behaviour in various scenarios and also attempt to make it match historical behaviour as closely as possible. Fixes #8822 Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10018) (cherry picked from commit 7955c1f16e72dc944677fd1dbf4b1300e75f1c84)30 January 2020, 16:07:12 UTC
081191e David Makepeace23 January 2020, 01:07:18 UTCFix type name typo in d2i/i2d documentation. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10933) (cherry picked from commit 68229aebce159ecea7b887d6a0edd47d881a659b)30 January 2020, 06:17:03 UTC
c8943eb Richard Levitte21 January 2020, 06:53:40 UTCOpenSSL::Test: bring back the relative paths Because there was a bug in File::Spec::Unix' abs2rel when it was given relative paths as both PATH and BASE arguments, the directories we deal with were made to be all absolute. Unfortunately, this meant getting paths in our verbose test output which are difficult to use anywhere else (such as a separate test build made for comparison), due to the constant need to edit all the paths all the time. We're therefore getting back the relative paths, by doing an extra abs2rel() in __srctop_file, __srctop_dir, __bldtop_file and __bldtop_dir, with a 'Cwd::getcwd' call as BASE argument. Fixes #10628 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10913) (cherry picked from commit 612539e8a678c6099131dfd0e5e4b85fa774eb1a)27 January 2020, 07:51:11 UTC
cc7c6eb Kurt Roeckx02 January 2020, 21:53:32 UTCCheck that the default signature type is allowed TLS < 1.2 has fixed signature algorithms: MD5+SHA1 for RSA and SHA1 for the others. TLS 1.2 sends a list of supported ciphers, but allows not sending it in which case SHA1 is used. TLS 1.3 makes sending the list mandatory. When we didn't receive a list from the client, we always used the defaults without checking that they are allowed by the configuration. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> GH: #10784 (cherry picked from commit b0031e5dc2c8c99a6c04bc7625aa00d3d20a59a5)25 January 2020, 13:12:10 UTC
2dbcdb6 Kurt Roeckx12 January 2020, 15:44:01 UTCReplace apps/server.pem with certificate with a sha256 signature. It replaces apps/server.pem that used a sha1 signature with a copy of test/certs/servercert.pem that is uses sha256. This caused the dtlstest to start failing. It's testing connection sbetween a dtls client and server. In particular it was checking that if we drop a record that the handshake recovers and still completes successfully. The test iterates a number of times. The first time through it drops the first record. The second time it drops the second one, and so on. In order to do this it has a hard-coded value for the expected number of records it should see in a handshake. That's ok because we completely control both sides of the handshake and know what records we expect to see. Small changes in message size would be tolerated because that is unlikely to have an impact on the number of records. Larger changes in message size however could increase or decrease the number of records and hence cause the test to fail. This particular test uses a mem bio which doesn't have all the CTRLs that the dgram BIO has. When we are using a dgram BIO we query that BIO to determine the MTU size. The smaller the MTU the more fragmented handshakes become. Since the mem BIO doesn't report an MTU we use a rather small default value and get quite a lot of records in our handshake. This has the tendency to increase the likelihood of the number of records changing in the test if the message size changes. It so happens that the new server certificate is smaller than the old one. AFAICT this is probably because the DNs for the Subject and Issuer are significantly shorter than previously. The result is that the number of records used to transmit the Certificate message is one less than it was before. This actually has a knock on impact for subsequent messages and how we fragment them resulting in one less ServerKeyExchange record too (the actual size of the ServerKeyExchange message hasn't changed, but where in that message it gets fragmented has). In total the number of records used in the handshake has decreased by 2 with the new server.pem file. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> GH: #10784 (cherry picked from commit 5fd72d96a592c3c4ef28ff11c6ef334a856b0cd1)25 January 2020, 13:12:07 UTC
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